|
|
|
Much of my current
work concerns the political economy of e-commerce. More specifically, my research
focuses on the so-called "Safe Harbor" arrangement between the European Union
and the United States. This arrangement seeks to provide an "interface" between
two very different approaches to data protection and privacy, one of the
most important regulatory issues of the new economy. "Safe Harbor" seeks
to involve private self-regulatory organizations working within a general
framework agreed among states and supranational organizations. "Safe Harbor"
provides an important test case for more general phenomena, including in
particular the delegation of enforcement authority from public to private
actors in order to solve problems of interdependence.
My research on Safe Harbor consists
of several linked papers. First is a paper which seeks to analyse Safe Harbor
in the context of the Transatlantic Relationship, to be published in a volume
edited by Michelle Egan. Second is a paper looking at the
political opportunities created by Safe Harbor for actors on both sides of
the Atlantic, forthcoming in Adrienne Heritier ed. Common Goods: Reinventing
European and International Governance (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
Finally, my major paper on the subject examines the Safe Harbor negotiations
in terms of current discussions in international relations about constructivism
and persuasion in international bargaining. It's forthcoming in International
Organization - the proofs are here
.
Constructing the International
Foundations of E-Commerce: The EU-US Safe Harbor Arrangement. Forthcoming,
International Organization.
Negotiating Privacy Across
Arenas: The EU-US "Safe Harbor" Discussions. Published in Heritier ed.
Common Goods: Reinventing European and International Governance.
Hybrid Institutions and the
Law, which talks briefly to Safe Harbor as a case study of how new forms
of regulation may be understood in terms of debates about legal theory. Published
in the Zeitschrift fuer Rechtssoziologie.
|