Welcome to the JBC Supreme Court page

Please Pick a case!

1. Orton v. Mittleton, 1 JBCSC 109 (1980)

2. Corontin v. Cotin 4 JBCSC 823 (1982)

3. Cosely v. Alben, 5 JBCSC 219 (1983)

4. Matenraz v. Oaten, 5 JBCSC 342 (1983)

Now on with the cases!

Orton v. Mittleton, 1 JBCSC 120 (1980)

Case heard: July 25, 1980

Case decided: July 30, 1980

Justice John Corsedean writes the opinion of the court:
      Petitioner Jane Orton is the Program Director of our network's affiliate in San Francisco, California. She has held this position since May 28, pursuant to her appointment by the president of the station, George Corsen. Petitioner charged that on or about the date of June 25, most of her assigned duties were illegally transferred to James Mittleton, the Chief Operator for our affiliate in San Francisco. The facts of this case are not in dispute. Mr. Mittleton admits that he did takeover many of Orton's duties, because in his words, "President Corsen did not like her style." The issue before this body, therefore, is does the Program Director of a station have official duties delegated to her, and if she does may they be removed by the president.
      How would we decide this case? Simple etiquette or the policies of past presidents of local channel 66 affiliates, or the past policies and pronouncements of our network presidents? I believe none of these can fairly settle this dispute. I believe we must look at the one document that can authoritatively aid us in deciding this matter: The Constitution of our Network.
      "The Constitution of our Channel" was written by the four founders of Channel 66: John Cortin, Joe Corsel, Bob Cosen and Jack Jodions. It provides the rules and the guidelines that these founders believed were essential if the network was to be run properly. Since there are no official rules that guide us as to what the duties of a Program Director are, we should look to Article 2, section 3. Quoted verbatim it states:
      " The Program Director creates the programs that air on this station. He decides which shows should be canceled and what new shows should appear. He hires the actors for each show, and advises the president on program matters."
      The powers that President Corsen removed from Ms. Orton were precisely the powers that the Constitution provides for a Program Director. he removed her power to hire actors and removed her power to design and put on the air new shows. This clearly violates the Channel 66 Constitution.
      But does a president of an affiliate have the power to remove such power from the Program Director? Admittedly, Article 2 section 1 does state " All power is vested in the president of the channel." This however means the president of the network, not the president of a local affiliate. In the 1st amendment to the Constitution (1979) it states:
      "When a new station is formed in our network, the president of the first station shall have all vested authority over all other station." Thus the local president does not have the right to remove the powers from any sitting executive. Such power is not granted directly and cannot possibly be inferred from the Constitution of this channel.
      Thus Ms. Orton must have her rights restored forthwith. _____________________________________________________________
      Commentary: This short, relatively insignificant case is undoubtedly the most important court decision in JBC history. It established the right of a board (called the JBC Supreme Court) to overturn acts of other JBC officials because they violated the JBC Constitution. Before this time the Constitution was merely a seldom used guide. After this it became a vital part of the network, followed up to today. This decision made possible all of the other major decisions in JBC history. While the results of Orton v. Mittleton had no major effect on JBC, the precedence set by the case certainly did.

    Corontin v. Cotin, 4 JBCSC 823 (182)
    Case Heard: December 14-15, 1982
      Case Decided: December 28, 1982

Chief Justice John Corsedean writes the unanimous opinion of the Court

Petitioner John Corontin, seeks to have a vote in the upcoming JBC presidential election. The JBC Board of elections voted 85-15 that Corontin and fellow petitioners John Cly and Jane Ortontin have no right to vote because they are not employees of JBC. Petitioner appealed to us to decide the issue.
First, we must dispose of the matter of whether petitioner has standing. Initially such appeals to this Court were only granted to current or former JBC employees. But that has changed of late. See Corrient v. Cordent 4 JBCSC 753 (1982). ("Employee of Channel 69, "Spin-off network", has standing to petition the Court to invalidate his firing"). In Orton v. Orteniez 4 JBCSC 800 (1982), we extended that right to petition this court to a former owner of a building in which this network operated. We thus decide that a viewer of this network does have standing to petition this court to decide an issue of concern to him in his capacity as a viewer.

    Now we must address the substantive issues this case raises.
Petitioner claims his right to vote on the basis of the fact that he is a regular viewer of the JBC television network, and has been so for some four years. He insists that the viewers of the network should elect those who make the crucial programming and budget decisions that affect the product that appears on the air.
    This case presents us with an issue of first impression: Do the viewers of a network have a fundamental right to elect the the leaders of that network? This issue is further complicated by the fact that petitioner, and the overwhelming majority of viewers of this network are under the age of 18. Thus a second issue could be summarized as whether or not minors have the right to vote for the political leaders of the network they view.
    These issues will be addressed one at a time:
        1. Do viewers have a right to elect network executive and legislative members?
    This question has never come up before in any court of law. Clearly nothing in the United States Constitution, nor in any federal, state or local law requires a private organization to in effect open up its leadership selection process to the consumers who use its products. While this might be a fair way to show responsiveness to consumer concern, this cannot be required, as it would destroy the free enterprise system.
    Next we turn to our JBC Constitution. This Constitution is the controlling "law" of this network. Orton v. Mittleton, 1 JBCSC 120 (1980). Nothing in our constitution requires consumer control of this station. Clearly however, we must remember that the all power at this network is vested in the President of our network. Corrient v. Cordent 4 JBCSC 753 (1982). If the President of the network wishes that consumers have such control, and furthermore takes action over time which give consumers such control, or suggests that he or she intends to give consumers such control, the constitution requires such control be given. Corrient. See also Croten v. Olmstead 4 JBCSC 504 (1982) ("JBC President intended to extend employee health care coverage despite wishes of President's Council, thus such coverage is extended."). To evaluate whether President Jodions intended such a shift in electoral control of this network, we must turn to our second question.
        2. Did President Jodions intend to give viewers under 18 ("Viewers") control of the electoral reins of JBC Government?
    In order to properly answer this question, a few facts should be given judicial notice from the outset. First, the great majority of JBC viewers are minors. In fact some 92% of JBC viewers are under 18, with almost 75% being under 15.
The median age of JBC viewers is 10.8 years of age. Thus the term "viewer" is synominous with the term "minor".
    Clearly John Jodions has supported an encouraged a rapidly increasing role within the leadership of this station for viewers. Almost immediately after becoming President, Jodions organized his Council of 24, a group of viewers between the ages of 9 and 19 to advise on matters of Programming and budgetary issues. Over time, the leaders of this Council, including petitioner Corontin, and Co-petitioners Cly and Ortonin exerted more and more influence over President Jodions. They advised him on matters of advertising and marketing, helped him fight off challenges from rival networks, and even offered to arbitrate potential employee-network contract disputes. All the while, Jodions' admiration of these viewers grew. He called them, "essential to the functioning of the network" and insisted that "viewers of all ages have something to contribute to this network."
    Jodions has moved toward, and now supports the concept that viewers have a right to elect at least some of the network leadership. Every attempt as been made to reach a compromise on this subject. Please remember that in fashioning this decision I sought to unite both wings of this court and obtain a unanimous decision. In so doing no one is totally pleased, but all sides will receive something they desire.

        First, though petitioners requested the right of all viewers between 9 and 19 to vote, we can not give them all they request. Viewers who are as young as nine may lack some of the knowledge needed for a well thought out decision at the polls. Those who are 17, 18, and 19, on the other hand, rarely watch JBC. This small minority of viewers could in effect thwart the decision of its younger brothers and sisters on issues that are important to them. Let's face it, Teenagers and younger children do not agree on much. Thus in order to foster something resembling unity among JBC voters, a more narrow age requirement is necessary. We are suggesting that viewers between the ages of 10 and 14 be allowed to vote, though it could easily be between the ages of 11 and 15 but no other. That is a decision for President Jodions in consultation with the legislature to reach.
    Second, though petitioners insist they have a right to some formal legislative role within this network, it must remain totally unofficial and advisory. At this time we are not willing to decide whether or not viewers have a right to hold any legislative posts within this network or have any binding voting power. The Council of 24 may exist as long as it desires now that it has been created by President Jodions. But it will not receive any additional powers unless the President of this network chooses to bestow such powers. Again, we make no authoritative statement on viewer governmental rights but reserve such a decision for a later date in a case that actually addresses that issue.
    Third, respondent does not receive what he desires. Viewers, because they have been given power and authority by President Jodions should have the only voting power within this network. Adult workers and minor viewers simply have such a fundamental difference in interest that if both voted division and dissension would reign supreme. Workers interests will continue to be protected because only they can hold office within JBC.
    Thus despite the concerns of Union President Johnson, adult workers at JBC no longer have the right to elect JBC officials, other than Union representatives and other official worker-management envoys. Remember the "right" of workers to elect network leaders was not in the JBC Constitution, nor was it granted by President Jodions. Instead it was an unofficial process, devised initially by Union President Johnson in consultation with Program Director Bob Cosen in 1979. It was never considered completely binding. As President Jodions has chosen a different path, we now let that path take form.

Decision of the Board of Elections is hereby reversed, and remanded in order that the Board follow instructions herewith.

Comments: With this short, controversial opinion, a change swept through JBC and arguably the world. Never before had kids had a right to elect those who would represent them, politically, or as here in the corporate world. Clearly Corsedean's opinion reflects a carefully constructed compromise. The left wing of the Court wanted all viewers between 9 and 19 to have a vote, and maybe even recognize the Council of 24 as having some formal (though probably non-binding) legislative authority. They also wanted to give employees the right to vote for at least half of the PAC to keep some control of those who were elected.
    The right wing of the Court , led by Dordan and Crotenton, supported the right of viewers to vote only because they hoped it would allow a conservative President like Joe Cosely to upset liberal John Jodions. They also pushed for the 10-14 requirement so that they would be sure that viewers would not hold their power for long. Thus the constant turnover would greatly weaken viewer power. They also hoped by disfranchising workers they could defeat many of the left leaning lower level workers who helped elect several liberal JBC Presidents and PAC members.
    The President's Council (with approval of the PAC) drew up the 10-14 age requirement officially on December 31, 1982.

Matenraz v. Oaten, 5 JBCSC 342 (1983)
      Case heard: May 28-May 30
      Case Decided: June 4, 1983
     Chief Justice John Corsedean writes the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice Alben, Coroton, Mitson, Oaten and Quoten.

      Petitioner James J. Matenraz was fired from his position as the adviser to Jane Oaten, Vice-President of the JBC Station in Baltimore, Maryland. Oaten claimed Matenraz did sloppy work, and failed to appear on time for work 21 of the 30 days he worked for her. Matenraz claimed he could only be fired for convicted crimes, as found in PAC-AL 357 (1982). The case was brought up to the local Baltimore Board of Operations, which handles issues of hiring and firing at the Baltimore JBC Station. The Board decided 9-0 that PAC-AL 357 did not apply, as it was a non-binding resolution, meant only to suggest a course of action the President's Council might choose to take. The Board stated:
      "Although the legislation was passed by the P.A.C., it failed by an almost unanimous margin in the President's Council [8-2]. At the time of the bill, binding legislation proceeded only through the President's Council. Therefore the passage by the PAC is mute, and the bill is not in effect."
      The Board denied Matenraz's claim. He petitioned here, and we agreed to take the case, on the grounds that it may prove a constitutionally valid point.
      In Cosely v. Alben, 5 JBCSC 219 (1983), this court held that the status of the PAC as an advisory body was unconstitutional violation of Article 2, Section 1 of the JBC Constitution. We need not examine our reasons behind that ruling, as it has been so recently released and is well within the knowledge of the parties involved.
      In deciding Cosely, we in effect held that representatives elected through the PAC should and must have the legislative authority of the network, rather than a President's Council:
      " The role of the President as defined in the JBC Constitution is to administer and enforce rules, negotiate contracts with advertisers and provide the vision needed to move into the future. The role of the legislature is best filled by workers, elected by those viewers who watch the network. The idiocy of the President's Council can be easily shown by the following analogy: Imagine 50 US state governors serving as the US Senate, and the sole legislative body for the country. It would not work. President's, like governors, have local concerns, which would. . . take them away from their legislative duties on crucial occasions."
      While it clearly can be argued, as the dissent does quite well, that whatever we feel now concerning the legislative authority of the PAC, we cannot impose this ruling retroactively.
      I respectfully disagree with that charge. If as we found in Cosely, the President's Council was unconstitutionally usurping power that rightfully belonged in the hands of the PAC, then the decisions of the PAC, at least so far as we can determine them clearly by roll call vote, should now be adopted. Only some half dozen important roll call votes differed with the decisions of the President's Council during the period 1980-1982. These bills deserve to become law because they were the will of the only body with authority to pass legislation.
      I recognize this may have an effect on several important pieces of legislation, including the controversial lay-offs provision of 1982. Admittedly, no pieces of legislation are as controversial as the one brought up in the instant case. Clearly, rational company policy, and common sense business practices might suggest a wider latitude on the part of employers. But this point is immaterial. The test for whether or not an act of the JBC legislative body is valid is simple:
      1) It must be not be expressly prohibited under the JBC Constitution, and
      2) It must not be prohibited by local, state or federal law, and
      3) It must not be prohibited by the United States Constitution
     As PAC-AL 357 meets these requirements, it qualifies as a valid legislative act applying to all JBC owned Stations, and stations who choose to affiliate themselves with JBC.
      We Reverse the opinion of the Board of Operations of Baltimore, and order Mr. Matenraz restored to his previous employment. He may not be fired "except for convicted crimes." PAC-AL 357 (1982)
      Justice Alben, Concurring:
      I concur in the Court's decision, and reiterate the following:
      It is essential to follow the will of the valid legislative body. Although the President's Council held the reigns of power in 1982, they did so unconstitutionally. Much like a criminal, who by coup or trickery obtains power over a country, rules passed by the President's Council are NOT valid if the PAC chose a different path. Whatever effect this will have on the rules governing the network is completely unrelated to the issues involved.
      Justice Cortingston, joined by Justice Croteson and Johnson, dissenting
      I dissent from the majority opinion on two grounds:
      1) Retroactively applying rules goes against past decisions of this court, common sense and the laws of this country.
      2) Giving such narrow latitude to employers makes obtaining discipline, hard work, and timeliness almost impossible. 1)
      This decision goes against past decisions of this court. In Coteson v. Ortonion, 3 JBCSC 231 (1981), we ruled that a rule fining employees at the affiliate in Los Angeles who smoked on the job could not be applied to employees who were found smoking before the law was passed. Also, in Whittington v. Bittington, 3 JBCSC 478 (1981), we decided that a rule limited money allocated for each Star Wars tv-movie appearing on JBC could not be applied to Star Wars movies already in pre-production or production at the time of passage of the rule.
      Common sense also dictates that one should not be punished for committing acts that were not prohibited at the time they were being committed. Otherwise every person must essentially sneak around, fearing every legal activity might be punishable at the whim of a legislature at any time in the future.
      Additionally, US Court decisions since the founding of this country have suggested that retroactive punishment is inherently unfair. I think that the precedent established by US Courts is greater or at least should be greater than whatever our decision in Cosely implies. 2)

      I also believe, in terms of corporate policy, this unfairly restricts employer rights to establish reasonable requirements for timeliness, cleanliness, work effort and courtesy. Such traits are the hallmark of any successful business, and a prerequisite for corporate success, especially in businesses, such as ours, that serve the public.
      The Majority glosses over the flagrant violations of Mr. Matenraz. Ms. Oaten claimed, and Matenraz did not deny, that the latter was late for work 21 of the 30 days of his employment. He arrived an average of 25 minutes late on those days. Four days he arrived over an hour late, providing no excuse whatsoever for his tardiness. He was seen in the words of Oaten "goofing off" in the employee lounge, watching television for hours on end, instead of attending to his duties. On two occasions he walked off of work in the middle of the day with no reason provided other than "I don't feel like working today."
      I fear the Court is giving sanction to other workers out there who might otherwise obey the rules established to help the network run smoothly. And while all businesses may have their recalcitrant employees, they must have an adequate means of dealing with them to prevent their disease from spreading to other, normally hard working employees. I am less concerned about the chronic offenders such as Matenraz than I am about ordinary workers who will see this ruling as a chance to get a free day off work any time they feel out of sorts. They will take that extra 10 or 20 or 30 minutes for lunch, and answer the phones only when they feel like it. Discipline will be damaged, and work productivity will be all but obliterated.
      I caution the Court about the effects of this decision, and encourage it to reconsider to the sake of the network.
      Justice Croteson, dissenting
      I support the dissent of the previous Justice. I must add however one major argument not brought up in this case as of yet.
      The legislative history of PAC-AL 357 suggest that it was intended to be only a protest vote, not to be taken seriously even by many of those who supported. A brief history lesson is in order.
      Throughout the early days of Joe Cosely's administration as President of the JBC affiliate in New York, Cosely tried to remove from office left-leaning employees at all levels, and replace them with more conservative counterparts. Cosely, through his local Chief Operator, would fire scores of workers at once, without giving any cause whatsoever. James Johnson, the liberal president of the Channel 66 Union and a PAC member himself, suggest the PAC approve a bill that the President's Council could then consider, and with adequate pressure brought to bear by the union, pass. The bill stated that no network employees would be fired without "just cause." Such causes included tardiness, lack of work effort, etc. The legislation passed the PAC almost unanimously, and appeared to be heading toward approval by the President's Council.
      Then two things occurred. First, Cosely talked to several President's Council members and it appeared he might gather enough to defeat the bill 6-4. Then Cosely, before the bill even came up for vote, began requiring that all employees fired be given "cause sheets" stating why they were fired. Cosely then continued, at an even more rapid pace, to fire liberal workers, giving them tersely written, fabricated cause sheets. Cosely went as far as to say to the PAC in private "Sure I make up the causes. Sure they aren't guilty, but so what, let the JBC supreme court decide, or take it to the US courts."
      The statement infuriated a lot of liberal and even moderate workers. They correctly realized that the number of cases filed against Cosely would create an enormous backlog. Years might go by before employees could get their jobs back or receive any monetary compensation.
      To protest what appeared to be complete disregard for the law or justice by Cosely, radical PAC member Joe Coron suggested that the bill be amended to read: "No employee of JBC shall be fired, except for convicted crimes." PAC-AL 357 (1982). The bill was passed to protest the tyranny of Cosely, not because of any support for the concept that no employee should be fired except for convicted crimes.
     Even now, surveys of those who voted for that bill suggest 70 to 80% of them would vote against it "if it were made a binding rule." The PAC members knew the rule would never pass the President's Council, and thus had no reason to believe it actually would pass. By disregarding the legislative history of PAC-AL 357, this court ignores the intentions of the PAC members who cast votes for the legislation. We must consider the actual intent of the members, not the language or margin of passage that could best and only be defined as a protest bill.
      Therefore I dissent

_____________________________________________________________

COMMENTARY:

      Matenraz v. Oaten became a key case in JBC history. Following up Cosely, it established that all major laws that the PAC passed but the President's Council voted against were binding legislation. The decision, however, did not quite have the influence some feared (or hoped) it might.
      First, Matenraz suggested, and later decisions bore it out, that only MAJOR votes were declared valid. The problem of determining what constituted a major vote brought some 120 cases to the court in 1983 and 1984. Only 25 actual bills were defined as "major" and declared binding; the rest were considered "minor" or "lessor" and thrown out. The Court surprised many with its somewhat capricious and often confusing decisions. It declared several important bills "minor". Among these were PAC AL-368 (Programs cannot be canceled without at least 30% support for the cancellation from the PAC) and PAC AL-371 (No person shall serve as PAC member and executive cabinet member either locally or network wide at the same time). Among the seemingly unimportant bills it declared binding were PAC-AL 328 (No more than 5% of the JBC Budget may be spent for security) and PAC-AL 390 (Allocations for the budget of the game shows shall not increase at a greater rate than that of inflation). It appears the court tended to make binding legislation dealing with money allocations because they considered this within the scope of the duties of the legislature. They were less willing, however, to make binding legislation infringing or regulating acts of agencies connected with the executive branch, such as the Program Board.
      Second, the courts rulings did not invalidate legislation rejected by the PAC but accepted by the President's Council. It also had no effect on legislation that the President's Council had passed but the PAC had not taken a roll call vote. This interpretation applied to cases where individual members had spoken out against legislation, and even when a voice vote found the PAC opposed.
      Thus the opinion of Matenraz, though far reaching in many respects, failed to have the impact its proponents believed would improve the network, and its opponents believed would destroy the network. All in all, however, it was an interesting case.

      Cosely v. Alben, 5 JBCSC 219 (1983) Justice Alben writes the opinion of the court
      George Alben, speaker of the Political Advisors Council (PAC) filed a suit against Joe Cosely, President and CEO of the Jodions Broadcasting Network (JBC). Alben charged Cosely had unconstitutionally removed authority from the PAC to decide issues that the President's Council had expressly delegated to it. The Board of Elections heard the initial complaint, and ruled in favor of Alben. It declared:
      "The PAC was given authority to decide several issues that effected its members most closely. The President's Council at the behest of Cosely, removed powers from the PAC, that once delegated could not be removed without the consent of the PAC. The decisions of the President's Council in PC-L 789 and PC-L 802 is reversed. Such legislation cannot be passed without the approval of the PAC."
      Mr. Cosely appealed the case to us, as was his right. We agreed to take the case on the grounds that it posed a broader constitutional principle.
      We affirm the decision of the Board of Elections, but wish to broaden its scope.
      We find the following:
      1) The President's Council has no authority under the JBC Constitution to legislate for the network.
      2) Such power properly belongs solely in the hands of the PAC, as the elected representatives of the workers of JBC.
      3) Joe Cosely and the President's Council unconstitutionally removed power from the PAC without its consent.
      4) The JBC network is required to create a legislature composed of workers, elected by their constituency, the viewers of the JBC network.
      1) There is no mention of the power to legislate in the JBC Constitution. The powers of the President, however, are clearly defined. The JBC Constitution states in Article 2, Section 2 states:
      "The role of the President is to serve as the leader of the station. Only he can administer rules and regulations, negotiate contracts with potential advertisers, in conjunction with the Budget Director and Chief Operator, and provide security for the workers under his authority. Only he can provide the vision absolutely required for an expanding, growing network, and the values for the children who will look up to him."
      Though this refers to only the role of the president of the network, this court held in Bortan v. Ittingston, 4 JBCSC 381 (1982), that JBC Constitutional Amendment 1 applies such powers to individual presidents of stations. In no court decision have we held that a president has any power to make the rules and regulations for the network, nor have we held any local president has the power to make the rules and regulations for their individual stations.
      The dissent charges that presidents, both local and national, have been making the rules of this network since day one. This is irrelevant. Our role as the Supreme Court of this network is to determine whether or not any action by this network or by anyone working for or connected with this network is in accordance with the JBC Constitution. We have no other guide to follow than that. Ortan v. Jodions, 2 JBCSC 34 (1980).
      The dissent also points out that JBC Con. Amend. 1 ¤ 2 provided for a President's Council. We do not deny that fact. The relevant passage of the amendment states: "A council will be formed of the Presidents of the stations of this network."
      No where in the amendment is the role that President's Council should take clearly laid out. If it is not defined as a legislative body, or defined as having such powers, it does not have such powers. Thus the President's Council has, since its inception, unconstitutionally usurped the power that rightfully belonged to the PAC.

2, 3)
     The PAC is not mentioned in the JBC Constitution, nor does it appear in any amendment to the Constitution. The PAC was formed in 1979, as a body to advise Channel 66 President John Cortin about the course his new channel should take. The PAC was not initially granted any power to legislate, or even the power to approve legislation that Cortin or his executive department supported.
      But during the Jodions Administration (1980-1983), the PAC was granted more and more authority.
      A) In March of 1980, It received, through the custom and choice of John Jodions, the right to cast a non-binding vote on major issues effecting the network.
      B) In August of 1981, it was granted the exclusive right to impeach and remove from office JBC executive branch officials found to be corrupt.
      C) In July of 1982, it received the power to legislate the salary structure of all JBC employees, except those in the local and national executive departments (e.g. President, Vice-President, etc.)
      D) In October of 1982, it received the power to cast a quasi- binding vote on issues of "crucial importance" to the network. A four-fifths vote could overturn President's Council decision.
      E) In December of 1982, it was granted authority to cast a quasi-binding vote on ALL budget issues. It could overturn a President's Council decision with a four-fifths vote. This grant of additional authority given by the President's Council and the President of the network, once given could not be taken away, without the consent of the PAC itself.
      We ruled in Corrient v. Cordent, 4 JBCSC 542, 544 (1982), that no JBC President could be removed from power except through defeat in a "fair and untainted election by his or her peers." This precedence for this concept came from the JBC Constitution, Article 3, section 1: "No one can become president of this station unless and until they receive the President's Authorization Card." President's receive their authorization cards only upon election by the voters. Thus we held, such authorization could be withdrawn only by election of the voters.
      We believe that the granting of the legislative powers to the PAC were the equivalent of receiving authorization to legislate. Clearly such authorization whether formal in a card, or informal in an official grant, could not be removed except by the consent of those who received the power (resignation) or by defeat of members in a fair and untainted election.
      In other words, if all members of the PAC voted to disband, the PAC could be disbanded. This is the equivalent of a President choosing to resign from office. If even one PAC member chose not to resign, that member would be allowed to remain and make up the PAC, even as its sole member.
      Individual PAC members can also be removed by election, but cannot be forced out by the legislation of another group.
      The dissent contends that the President's Council is not actually removing members, but only taking away powers granted to them by the President's Council. In fact removal of such factors in effect converts the PAC from a legislative body to a advisory body. Each member is thus removed as a legislator and made an advisor, whether they want this position or not.

4)
      We hold that the JBC network, through its President and President's Council must draw up a new legislative body whose rules and regulations incorporate the PAC and its members as it presently exists. The President's Council has every right to remain as an advisory group, but cannot legislate, because it has no authorization to do so. It must disband however as a legislative body.
      The dissent contends that such a ruling amounts to the taking of the power of the President's Council without their approval, the very same thing we consider unconstitutional in the case of the PAC. It is not the same thing at all. The constitution provides no defined role for the PAC, and thus power granted can be viewed as authorization for legislative authority. The constitution provides a clearly defined role for the President of the network, and presidents of individual stations. That role does not include the power to legislate. Thus the President's Council is stepping outside of its proscribed role, and violating the JBC Constitution.
      I should add, that I support the plan Justice Corsedean suggests for the JBC legislative body, but remind the network that this is only a suggested course of action.
      We order the JBC Network to approve of a plan which places the PAC and its members as the sole legislative body at JBC. This plan must be drawn up and codified as soon as is possible.

Justice Corsedean, concurring
I wish to strongly support the opinion of Justice Alben. I am writing not to show my difference of opinion with him, but to suggest a possible plan for the new PAC. This is only an option.
I believe we should model the PAC after the US Congress, by creating a House and a Senate. The Senate would contain one or two members for each JBC station. The House would either be based on viewership much as the US House is based on population, or it might contain four or five members per station. Legislation would have to be passed by both houses in order to becoming binding for JBC. I believe two new houses rather than one would allow for greater diversity in the leadership of the New PAC and a greater opportunity for the full discussion and debate of issues that might be stifled in a one house system dominated by a few leaders.

Justice Mitson, dissenting,

      Before examining the relevant constitutional issues, let us first examine a bit of the history of the PAC and its relation to the President's Council.
      The President's Council was formed when the JBC network grew from one station to two in July of 1979. Then Cortin wrote into the JBC Constitution, the following amendment: "When a new station is formed, the President of the first may appoint a President of the second. A council will be formed of the Presidents of the stations of this network." JBCCon. Amend. 1 (1979).
      The majority would have us believe that because the President's Council was not formally authorized to legislate in JBCCon Amend. 1, it could not possibly receive this right. The majority, on the other hand, claims that the PAC, which was never mentioned in any JBC Constitutional Amendment received its exclusive right to legislate because of a Presidential grant.
      Yet did not the President's Council receive a similar legislative grant, even earlier. In Jane Bortin's careful study of the Cortin administration, she found this document dated July 4, 1979, just four days after Channel 66 in New York opened, and 15 days before JBCCon 1 went into affect. The document is a memo signed by President Cortin, stating, and I quote:
      "After the new station opens in New York, I will set up a council which will decide key issues of this network. While we will remain in charge here, some legislative authority will be instilled in the collective body. Once we add additional stations, it will take the form of a real council, but for now I have a vote as President of this station and veto power as President of the Channel 66 Network."
      The majority insists this memo is not "official", and even questions its authenticity. Yet, Bortin's research is thorough. The majority is unwilling to call Mr. John Cortin himself, because they realize he would tell the truth of his intentions. Clearly Cortin intended that the President's Council have legislative authority. Are not his intentions just as binding as those of John Jodions.?
      The majority is attempting to give total authority to a legislative body not contemplated by the JBC Constitution, while taking it completely away from the body granted the right to legislate. The majority's decision is a politically biased one, one drawn on sentiment for Speaker Alben. One need only look as far as the identity of the majority writer, Mr. Jim Alben. I am not contending nepotism, merely suggesting that Jim Alben has made every effort to aid his uncle, George Alben, and deliver to him the decision he longs for. The sort of garbage has no place in this court room. And I am unanimous in this!

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Commentary:

Mitson, the lone conservative and only dissenter, was far from unanimous in her contentions. Yet other critics, mostly conservative, attacked the Court for what they saw was the beginnings of class warfare at JBC. [Statistics showed JBC Presidents tended to be older, wealthier and more conservative than their PAC counterparts. Consider these April 1983 statistics:

PAC:

Median age: 36.1

Median Income: $19,000 per dependent (p/d)

Median Political Score (PS): 82 (100 is most liberal)

President's Council

Median Age: 45.0

Median Income: $32,000 per dependent

Median PS: 53]

While conservatives used the decision to attack the Court as left-wing, a growing number of liberals also found the case to say the least, inconsistent. How could power be rightfully removed from the President's Council without returning it to the PAC. This feeling prompted the PAC to later recognize the equal authority of the President's Council, and the two became in effect Co-Legislative bodies. This did not occur, however, until 1987.
In 1983, meanwhile, this decision became an important turning point in the Cosely administration. Cosely had attempted to remove power from the PAC, putting it back into the hands of local presidents, and especially, himself as the national president of JBC. He failed miserably, costing local presidents the unquestioned authority they had had before. This angered many conservatives who had initially supported Cosely. They considered him greedy and stupid; he should have known such a power grab would only lead to a loss in power. Conservatives began to look for another to champion their cause. The Board of Elections May 25 decision to hold another election marked the beginning of the end of the Cosely regime.