Summation Assessing the changing status of homeland
security and critical infrastructure protection efforts since 9/11 and
identifying ways of improving efforts are necessarily qualitative
endeavors. Qualitative assessments will vary according to the
perceptions, perspectives, knowledge, understanding, and experience of those
making the assessments. An additional challenge in using the Homeland
Security Impact Scale is that there is no precedent in human history for the
kind of actions that have occurred and that may occur randomly and without
warning in the future. We are in unknown territory. The full
force of the implications of these realities does not seem to have been
grasped. Evidence of this lies in the fact that there are those who
continue to feel that traditional kinds of risk analysis, risk/benefit
analysis, and vulnerability and threat assessment are as feasible and
relevant post- 9/11 as they were pre-9/11. Those who grasped the
implications of the changed reality recognize that "all bets are
off" concerning what might happen. As a result, they may see the
logic in developing and implementing plans of actions that are
multi-dimensional and multi-purpose and address as many contingencies as well
as possible. In the language of various fields, including emergency
preparedness planning, strategies need to have a "dual use",
"multi-use", or multi-hazard focus. Actions need to serve a
range of possible purposes or address more than one problem, threat, or challenge
simultaneously. The common denominator is that all actions need to have
is that they all serve in some way to strengthen simultaneously national,
economic, societal, and individual security. If one accepts Secretary Ridge's and President
Bush's stated goals of enhancing national, economic, and personal security as
the goals of the Administration's homeland security efforts, then the
question that follows is: What progress has been made in realizing
these goals? If one assesses the impacts of the 9/11 attacks in the
vicinity of the 3 - 5 range on the Homeland Security Impact Scale, then
additional questions might be: ~ Have government efforts served as fully as
they need to in order to minimize these impacts? Some maxims that might apply here include the
following: ~ Deciding where we need to go depends on
where you think we are; and ~ What you think we need to do depends on our
perspective, experience, knowledge, understanding, and imagination and our
assessment of the seriousness of the situation that we are in. While much progress has been made during very
turbulent times, there are many actions that can be taken to improve and
strengthen all aspects of our security and the position that we are in.
The November 2002 Hart/Rudman report and the Heritage Foundation Report
(January 2002) both state that vulnerabilities continue to exist and action
is urgently needed. The latest strategy documents issued by the government
while detailing well many of the vulnerabilities, do not seem to include the
kind of strong focus on immediate steps that could be taken that could do
much to strengthen our security and the stability of our position. Some
of the prescribed approaches would focus extensive resources on long term
time and resource intensive studies and assessments of problems, threats, and
vulnerabilities. There are, however, problems that can be and need to
be addressed now and in the near term, problems that do not require the prior
completion of Herculean data gathering and analysis efforts. What More Needs to Be Done?
The government launched a first major
preparedness initiative in February of 2003. Other initiatives in a range
of other areas are evolving. The goals have been generally identified,
but to what extent do the current strategies help or hinder progress in
achieving those goals. If the strategies serve to slow action and
if they result in efforts to micromanage major elements of the problemsolving
process, what is the likelihood that they will have a stultifying effect on
the creativity and motivation of everyone involved? Creative energies
and motivation are crucial to progress. They are crucial to the winning
of wars. They are crucial to managing crises. They are crucial to
addressing challenges that are unlike any we have known before. Where we need to be focusing our efforts at
any given point in time needs to reflect an awareness of the highly
changeable character of the context that we are in. At the same time,
our efforts need to reflect our highest sense of purpose and direction.
A major reason for this is that a common sense of purpose, direction, and
mission helps ensure that we all working together to do what needs to be
done. Such a sense of purpose can become what Mary Parker Follett
called "an invisible leader". A common sense of purpose cultivated
through "invisible" as well as visible leaders can be key to
motivation, collaboration, and accomplishment. A common sense of
purpose as well as a common understanding of the challenges we face, a common
definition of the problem, can be key to our progress in addressing the extraordinary
challenges before us. ******* Return to Paula
Gordon's Homeland Security Page or to Appendices |