*Impact Ratings

Impact Rating of 1.5: Current impact as of January 17, 2000, based on
an assessment of reported problems

Impact Rating of 2.5: Current impact as of January 17, 2000, based on an
assessment of currently reported problems and of problems that have not
been reported by the media or made available by official sources

Impact Rating of 2.5 to 3.5: Estimated impact by March 31, 2000, assuming

1) Everything possible is done between now and then to avert any
date conversion problems on February 29, 2000;

2) Everything is done that can be done to ensure that the remediation
of the highest hazard systems, plants, sites, refineries, pipelines,
dams, water systems, sewage systems, etc. has been completed by
February 29, 2000;

3) Everything is done that can be done to ensure that the Y2K and
embedded systems problems that have become evident before and
after January 1 have been corrected by February 29;

4) Everything is done that can be done to ensure that the remediation
has been completed by February 29, 2000 of all those public and
private sector systems that are most essential to economic and
societal stability (Note: according to assessments released in
December, significant percentages of the following had not completed
remediation efforts: small and medium sized businesses, cities and
counties, and small and medium sized chemical plants);

5) Everything is done that can be done to deal with the problems that
have become evident; and

6) The current 4% shortfall in fuel does not rise significantly between
now and March 31, 2000.

Minimum Impact of 4 to 5.5: Estimated impact by March 31, 2000 if the
shortfall in fuel exceeds 4%

****************************************************************************

I have limited these estimates to the first quarter of the Year 2000. My chief
reasons for limiting the estimates are the following:

1) It is not clear the extent to which the world's infrastructure was "powered
down" at the time of the Century Date Change and it not clear the extent to
which "powering down", reverting to manual, and going off line may have all
contributed in significant ways to the absence of major infrastructure
disruptions and technological disasters during the first weeks of January
2000.

If such a "powering down" was a major factor in keeping the impacts to their
mid-January level, then it stands to reason that the impacts that could be felt
on and after the February 29th date, may also depend on whether or not
there is a similar powering down of the world's infrastructure at the February
29 date.

[A note concerning the "powering down" of the world's infrastructure:
According to a number of observers and accounts, the world's infrastructure
was "powered down" to an extremely low level on January 1, 2000. Indeed,
the world's infrastructure may not be operating at normal levels even now.
A recent thread on the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion Forum is about the
"powering down" of the world's infrastructure at the time of the Century Date
Change. The topic is also discussed in Ed Yourdon's letter to Rodney
Dangerfield article (http://www.yourdon.com Click on recent articles.) The
thread about the status of the world's infrastructure at the Century Date
Change is entitled: "Week 1: Was it Russian Roulette with the Lights
Turned Down Low? The gun, fingerprints, & related URL's". This tread can
be found at the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion Forum site at
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=002HOy ]

2) The extensive collection of incident reports that has been accumulated by
the Information Coordination Center of the President's Council on Year 2000
Conversion has not been made public and there is no way for researchers,
the media, or the public to access the voluminous data that has been
collected. In fact, these reports may not become accessible until March or
sometime after March. Since research efforts are extremely time
consuming and labor intensive, it would be difficult to compile, let alone
analyze a collection of incident reports the size of the ICC's collection. A
more informed and timely estimate of the possible impacts of these
problems could be made if the reports were made accessible. It was my
understanding that a purpose for establishing the ICC was to provide the
public and the media timely information concerning the incidents that were
being reported. To date, this has not as yet been the case. The majority of
the incidents reported as of mid-January have involved information system
problems.

3) Members of the media, with few exceptions, seem to be lacking in
incentive, interest, and/or expertise regarding the technical issues involved
information systems and embedded systems. With a few notable
exceptions, they are not choosing (or, in some cases, not being tasked by
their networks, newspapers, wire services, etc.) to report on incidents that
have suspected or proven connections to Y2K or embedded systems.
Another reason for ignoring Y2K and embedded system problems at this
point in time is that many have accepted the Administration's declaration of
victory and see no reason to question it. Some think that they would look
ridiculous continuing to report on Y2K since "everyone knows, the problem
has been solved."

Since so many are convinced that Y2K has been solved, it will be very
difficult to persuade them that this is by no means the case. Estimates of
impacts that include major technological problems or technological disasters
that come from persons outside the government are likely to mean little or
nothing to the vast majority of those in either the public or private sector,
including the media, who are quite convinced that the problem is behind us.
Few in government and few in the media are actively acknowledging even
the small- and medium-sized technological problems and small scale
disasters that have occurred to date (before as well as after January 1,
2000). While it is true that reports on a portion of these incidents can be
found on government Web sites, few people search these Web sites or make
the connections to Y2K and embedded systems. I do not consider placing
information on a Web site an active way of acknowledging that the problem
has occurred. One of several notable exceptions was the Office of Pipeline
Safety's prompt attention to the gas pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
Washington in June of 1999 and the rapid action they took in establishing
new guidelines on pipeline safety.
 

Some General Comments on the Year to Date as of January 17, 2000

We do indeed appear to have "lucked out" and escaped major disruptions or
disasters in the first days after the January 1, 2000 Century Date Change.
Some have been quick to declare this luck a total victory. It is not. I
would use the following criteria to gauge the success of efforts to address
Y2K and embedded systems problems:

~ no widespread major disruptions attributable to Y2K and embedded
systems (including significant societal impacts) through the first quarter of
2001

~ no Chernobyl's, Bhopal's, or major environmental disasters that can be
directly or indirectly linked to unremediated or poorly remediated systems
through the first quarter of 2001; and

~ achievement of success by the end of the first quarter of 2001 in
addressing the problems triggered both before and after January 1, 2000.
 

All of the remediation that was needed to prevent such disruptions and
disasters was not completed by January 1, 2000. There are instances too
numerous to mention where such remediation was not even begun.
Problems can still be expected. Problems will continue to become evident
as long as remediation efforts remain incomplete.

A monumental fallacy that is rampant in the world is that all problems, large
and small, would all be evident by now. It is assumed that they would all
have been triggered and would be observable by now. That is simply not
the case.

It is unclear how and when such a mistaken notion gained currency. It is
unclear how so many have come to the conclusion that it would be possible
to assess the overall impacts of Y2K and embedded systems problems
within the first two weeks of the New Year. (January 1, 2000 is, of course,
the first of several problematic dates to come.) It is unclear how this
mistaken notion that the overall impacts could be assessed in such a short
time gained currency so quickly, including, apparently, among some who
have been spending considerable time studying Y2K over the past few
years.

So far as I am aware, none of the most respected consulting groups,
companies doing hands-on remediation and testing, and none of those who
have extensive backgrounds in relevant technical fields, ever suggested
prior to January 1, 2000 that a final assessment of the impact of Y2K and
embedded systems problems would be possible in the week or two of the
New Year. It appears that those who do not have backgrounds in relevant
technical fields, simply jumped to unwarranted conclusions. With the
spotlight of the media on them, they seem to have succeeded very quickly
in spreading the mistaken notion to a largely unknowing public that an
assessment of Y2K and embedded systems problems could be made in
such a short period of time. Indeed, even if only a fraction of the problems
reported in the first two weeks had occurred, there would still be no way that
the books could be closed on Y2K. These problems have involved the
following:

~ nuclear power plants here and abroad, a nuclear weapons plant in the
United States, chemical plants, refineries, manufacturing plants, and
pipelines (some of which have involved the release of hazardous materials,
some of which have involved explosions, and some of which have involved
both);

~ transportation-related problems (these have included train collisions;
airplane crashes; and problems with airplanes, including some identical
problems that have caused aborted flights; and

~ information systems in the public and private sectors (In Great Britain, an
estimated 5% of all business have been effected according to a high level
official in the United Kingdom's Y2K efforts. In the United States, 30% of
over 2000 computer professionals surveyed had observed Y2K-related problems.)

The problems that directly and immediately place public health and safety in
jeopardy are only now beginning to become apparent. Problems of lesser
consequence involving billing and accounting errors and the degradation
or loss of data are also becoming increasingly apparent. There are many
problems that will not become obvious for weeks or months. Problems
involving both information systems or embedded systems can both be
triggered by the activation of unremediated systems or portions of systems
that were not remediated or not remediated correctly. They can be triggered
by the restart of systems as well as by their interaction with unremediated or
incorrectly remediated systems. Not all such problems will be evident
immediately.

I plan on posting on my Web site by the end of January a longer discussion
concerning what is going on and the actions that are still needed. I believe
that attention needs to continue to be focused on remediation efforts. In
particular, efforts need to be focused on making sure that the February 29
date will not cause problems.

In the meantime, I commend to your attention the following Web sites for
reports of problems:

~ The Grassroots Information Coordination Center at
http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a.tcl?topic=Grassroots%20Informa
tion%20Coordination%20Center%20%28GICC%29

~ The Chemical Safety Board's Web site at http://www.chemsafety.gov/circ/
for hazmat incidents

~ "Today's Crude Oil, Gasoline & Distillate Market Developments" at
http://pub3.ezboard.com/fdownstreamventurespetroleummarkets

~ For daily reports (and archives) of problems involving nuclear
    power
    plants:  http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/DAILY/der.htm   Such reports can also be
    compared to reports during the same time period in previous years.  For
    instance, see http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/DAILY/980113pr.htm and
    http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/DAILY/000113pr.htm

~ The Center for Y2K & Society's list of problems at http://www.y2kcenter.org/resources/glitches

~ Http://www.humanitarian.net/challenges.html

~ Http://www.michaelhyatt.com/glitchlist.htm

~ Http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3872a32d5936.htm

~ Http://stuarthrodman.com/Bugbite.htm

~ Http://www.y2knewswire.com/Y2KNewswireHistoryProject.htm

~ Y2K: Latest global problems: http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth040.htm

~ Glitch Central at http://www.ciaosystems.com/glitchcentral.htm

~ Http:www.lsry2k.net/glitch.html for a list of incident tracking sites

~ The International Y2K Cooperation Center at http://www.iy2kcc.org.

The last site contains assessments that are largely self-reported. One must
be particularly careful not to jump to conclusions as a result of assessments
or reports that are based primarily or solely on self-reporting, whether that
self-reporting is being done on behalf or a corporation, a plant, a
government agency, or a country.

(It should be noted that there are major disincentives to report problems
relating to Y2K and embedded systems. There are not only legal
implications and insurance concerns, there are bottom line concerns and
concerns over possible damage that will be done to a company's reputation.
People who decide to report such problems may well be placing their jobs
and their chances for career advancement on the line. There can be major
disincentives not to come forward and tell the truth about what is actually
happening.)

It is also important to know if the assessments were made when systems
were powered down, turned off, and/or being operated manually. This may
not be clearly noted in the assessment. Then again, it may be inadvertently
noted such as the case of a Third World country which
acknowledged that they did not report a failure as a failure because they
implemented their contingency plan which was to revert to manual
operation. Since "Y2K readiness" is defined as being able to continue to
operate, they did not consider that they had experienced a failure. They
were "Y2K ready".

In addition to semantics, one needs also to pay attention to the date when
the report was submitted.

Two other rich sources of information concerning Y2K and embedded
systems problems are available owing to litigation on the one hand and to
insurance claims on the other.
According to a recent edition of a newsletter from the Information
Technology Association of America (ITAA), "(t)he Federation of Insurance
and Corporate Counsel, Inc. (FICC) maintains a Web site engaged in a
general discussion of the insurance issues raised by Y2K claims under
different lines of coverage. The site also tracks some of the major
insurance-related Y2K cases. To access the site, click 'FICC Y2K Index'."

It is also possible to review information on the eighty or more law suits that
have been filed. Such documentation provides detailed accounts of what
aggrieved parties are alleging went wrong.

For ITAA's Legislative and Litigation Table, see
http://www.itaa.org/year2000/legis.htmand Calendar and
http://www.itaa.org/y2kcal.htm

I particularly commend to your attention the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion
Forum as an up-to-the-minute source of information. The Time Bomb
Discussion Forum is an extraordinary source of both confirmed and
non-confirmed reports of problems. It is also a one-stop source for latest
breaking media coverage and press releases. The Discussion Forum also
serves at once as a useful source of leads about problems and as an
invaluable research tool. Anyone can initiate a thread by posing a question
concerning Y2K or embedded systems. It is possible to obtain nearly
instantly, answers, as well as leads: qualified and unqualified. Those
participating in the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion Forum include numerous
seasoned professionals with many years experience in relevant fields.

For a list of current threads at the TB 2000 Discussion forum, see
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a.tcl?topic=TimeBomb%202000%20
%28Y2000%29

Because the Administration has made only a very small fraction of the
extensive data bank of incident reports available to date, it is essential, if
one wishes to have any idea of the problems that are being reported, that
one utilizes other sources of information, including any of the various
sources of information that have been noted here.

In addition to becoming more knowledgeable concerning the problems that
are being reported, it is also critically important, particularly for the
media and for others in roles of public and private sector responsibility,
that far closer attention be paid to embedded systems and their potential
role in infrastructure disruptions and technological disasters. Closer attention will
need to be paid these concerns well beyond the next weeks and months.
By learning more about these problems, more are likely to identified,
recognized, and properly assessed and remediated. By paying closer
attention, it is more likely that lessons will be learned and that knowledge
can be used to prevent other disruptions or disasters from occurring.
Those outside a company, agency, or a plant, etc., can benefit from such
lessons learned only if the lessons are shared. These lessons are not being
shared as freely as they should be now. For instance, if the information in
the ICC's collection of incident reports were shared, many more people
would be given a heads up concerning problems that they are facing or are
about to face. The names of companies and businesses, etc. could be
deleted from such reports and the reports could still be of value to others.

Those who think that they have fully remediated their systems may learn
about unexpected problems from others who had also remediated their
systems, but still had problems. Understanding when a problem has its
source in an embedded systems failure can be key to trying to deal with the
problem in a timely and effective way.

The following threads may help shed light on embedded systems failures
and on the time delays that can be involved in some embedded system
failures. Material presented in the following threads may also help explain
why embedded systems continue to pose such a threat:

~ A thread about embedded systems and buffer overflows: "An Overflowed
Buffer Could Make a 9 on the Richter Scale" (1/5/2000)
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=002EOu

~ "Embedded Systems Failures That Can Occur More Than a Week After a
Trigger Date or a Restart" (1/9/2000)
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=002HzT

~ "Why the embedded issue isn't 'dead' yet" (1/9/2000)
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=002HFE

~ "Did you notice the embedded systems problem is growing? Look at these
reports!"
(1/13/2000)http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=
002Iyk

~ "Can anyone explain embedded chip buffers filling up to a person not
knowledgeable in the field?" (1/14/2000) http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=002JxR

A paper of mine entitled "Some Major Y2K & Embedded Systems Concerns
at the Rollover" was released December 28, 1999. It includes attachments
with pertinent background on embedded systems, including a statement on
embedded systems that Mr. Koskinen issued in November of 1999. The
paper with attachments and my comments on his statement can be found
at http://www.michaelhyatt.com/discuss/ubb/Forum14/HTML/002662.html

Endnote

The working title for Part 7 of my White Paper is "Serious Y2K and
Embedded Systems Concerns That Are Continuing Beyond 1/1/2000:
It's Still Not Over Until It's Over and We Are Only in the Top of the First
Inning. These comments have been taken in large measure from the
current draft of Part 7. (The rest of my White Paper can be found
at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/ )

When Part 7 has been completed, I will post it at this Web site. I will also
send out an announcement to the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion Forum at
http://hv.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a.tcl?topic=TimeBomb%202000%20
%28Y2000%29 , and several other listservs letting people know that Part 7
has been posted.
 

Paula Gordon
pgordon@erols.com
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon
January 17, 2000
 

****************************************************************************

* Those unfamiliar with the "Y2K Impact Survey Scale" will find a copy of the scale at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. Click on Part 1 of the White Paper.

*****************************************************************************

My provisional rating as of December 1, 1999 is between a 5.5 and 9.5.

The higher level 9.5 rating could apply if the Federal government continues
on its present course:

~ failing to acknowledge that we are in a crisis and

~ failing to take all the proactive measures that need to be taken, both
before the rollover and in the months after the rollover, to help minimize the
impacts that can be expected.

My lower level rating of a 5.5 on the impact scale has increased owing to
the Federal government's apparent decision in November to minimize the
seriousness of the crisis even further by changing its message and only
calling on the public "to prepare as you would for a long holiday weekend".
At the same time, the Emergency Management Agency of the District or
Columbia is recommending the more reasonable course of action by urging
that the public stock supplies of 7 to 10 days of water and non-perishable
food. This is one of a growing number of incongruities in policy that can be
expected among different levels of government as well as within the
Federal government itself.

The 5.5 rating could apply if the Federal government were to do everything
that could be done in the days remaining and in the months immediately
following the rollover to minimize the impacts of the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis here and abroad. Barring unforeseen developments, it
appears quite unlikely that the Federal government will make additional
efforts of the sort needed before the rollover. If major problems manifest
before the rollover, there is a chance that the Federal government will finally
acknowledge that we are in a crisis and begin to act accordingly to avert
further problems and minimize the impacts that can be expected.

The Federal government might even be able to help deter runs on banks if
the President and others exercised extraordinary leadership. A level of trust
and faith on the part of the American people would need to be cultivated in
order for this to occur. The Administration would need to demonstrate
through its actions that it had had a change of heart and now recognized
that we are in a crisis situation. People should be encouraged to take steps
that will give them greater security in getting through the next months and
years. There is a real question as to whether or not the words of the
President or others in roles of leadership would be believed. Indeed, on
November 10, when some people who "didn't get" the seriousness of Y2K
and were not intending to prepare for Y2K heard the President minimizing
the need for preparing, they made an about face and began to made serious
preparations! They assumed that the President must be purposely trying to
keep the truth about Y2K from the public and not let the public know what a
serious challenge Y2K poses for the nation and the world. They were ready
to believe the opposite of what he said and they did.

The Actions That Are Needed

Ideally, government actions need to be along the lines described in Parts 3
and 5 of my White Paper at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k.
Actions would involve establishment of a crisis-oriented, proactive Office in
the Executive Office of the President that would have several hundred full
time employees who have responsibility for taking action and facilitating
action PRIOR to the rollover and CONTINUING as long as need be after
that, months or possibly even years.

The Information Coordination Center (ICC), which has been established
under the President's Council, does not have such a mission. Instead the
ICC focuses on gathering information and doing assessments that will help
guide actions that will need to be taken AFTER the rollover. These actions
would be in response to problems that are identified. The ICC as presently
configured does not focus on taking assessments before the rollover that
could lead to preventive actions. Conceivably the ICC could be reconfigured
to encompass both proactive and reactive concerns before as well as after
the rollover. It would also need to be reoriented along crisis-oriented lines.

Other ICC Concerns

There are two other concerns regarding the ICC that need to be mentioned
here:

1) There are apparently no contingency plans for the ICC in the event that
Y2K proves to be more serious than a 2 or 3 on the Y2K impact scale. The
failure to have such contingency plans seems to be a major oversight.

2) Actions of the ICC, indeed, of most all agencies planning on tracking the
unfolding events at the time of the rollover, do not appear to be focusing first
and foremost on taking actions that directly serve the public good,
promote the general welfare, and ensure the security of the nation. They
seem primarily concerned with chronicling unfolding events. It is almost as
if they are more interested in seeing what the outcome might be rather than
in doing anything to prevent or minimize the impacts. Some attention
needs surely needs to be given to tracking what has gone wrong after the
fact. However, in a crisis situation, preventive measures and early
intervention can be critical in minimizing overall impacts and losses. When
lives are at stake, when public health and safety is at risk and when
environmental sustainability is in jeopardy, It is foolhardy to overlook
preventive measures and early intervention.

In a Complex, Cascading
Emergency, What Difference
Does It Make What Happened First and Why: What Are Our
Priorities?

Whether or not a "disruption" or a "disaster" or a "catastrophe" is traceable
to squirrels, crows, Y2K, embedded systems, weather, cyberterrorists, or
"regular" terrorists is a bit of a moot point when it comes to doing something
to ensure that the public prepares for any of a range of eventualities. It is
also a moot point when it comes to making sure that emergency services
prepare and respond in a way that designed to save lives and aid in the
recovery process. It is also a moot point when it comes to early intervention
in keeping an emergency situation from worsening. If efforts were more
proactively focused now, they would include attention to prepositioning
resources, supplies, and equipment that could be utilized for any of a range
of disruptions and disasters. This would seem to be a reasonable course of
action. Steps would be taken to ensure that public officials and emergency
personnel were fully aware of possible disruptions and disasters and as
prepared as possible to address them.

The Present Thrust of
Information Gathering
Efforts

The present thrust of information gathering efforts that are to go into effect
during the rollover seem to me to be characterized by several serious
oversights.

The first is a failure to separate out the most serious concerns from the
relatively trivial. For instance, the breakdown of a certain model ATM
system or computer program is trivial when compared with a series of
Bhopal or Chernobyl-like catastrophes or refinery and pipeline explosions.
Where are our priorities?

A second oversight or flaw in the process has equally significant implications.
There seems to be a profound communication gap between
those who are involved in the information gathering process and those who
are in roles of responsibility who presumably would be taking action on the
basis of the information. Splitting the responsibilities is almost a guarantee
that the information will be less useful and less helpful than it might have
been had information gathering efforts and responsibilities for taking action
resided in the same organization.

A third concern is that the process is upside down. The purpose of the
government in a crisis should be

~ to prevent it from happening in the first place,

~ to intervene at the earliest possible moment to minimize impacts when
prevention has not be possible, and

~ to respond as quickly as possible when neither of these has been
accomplished or neither has been possible.

The approach that is being put in place is anything but proactive. It is a "fix
on failure" approach, a reactive approach, one that is geared to acting after
the fact, not to making sure that everything is done that can be done to

1) avert problems in the first place OR

2) intervene at that earliest possible manifestation of a problem to make
sure that the problem does not become a serious disruption, a disaster, or a
catastrophe.

The Uses of Information
in a Crisis Situation

A long time acquaintance asked me recently about the tracking that
government would be doing at the time of the rollover. As he had shown
little interest in Y2K in the past, I asked him why he wanted to know and
what did he plan to do with the information. He said that he planned to sell
the stocks of the companies he held that feel victim to major problems. I
asked him if he realized that the Internet itself might be affected and that
instantaneous online trading might not be an option. No, that had not
occurred to him. I did not go on to tell him of other parts of the
infrastructure that could also be affected making difficult, if not
impossible to execute, any plan to modify his portfolio at the last possible
minute. It strikes me that his "plan of action" reflects some of the same
problems and shortsightedness as found in the announced plans of action of
those who are going to be involved in information gathering. They are
failing to appreciate the overall context in which their efforts will be
taking place. They are failing to consider how they would need to modify,
indeed, would have to modify their plans, if other worst case scenarios
emerged.

How Much Can You Do With a Few Hours Warning?

The following article that was reprinted on the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion
Forum is illustrative of a major error in judgment evidently being made by at
least several people in the highest levels of responsibility for Y2K efforts in
the Administration:

Chinese Nuclear Station To Serve As "Guinea-Pig" For Y2K in France

http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001tno

greenspun.com : LUSENET : TimeBomb 2000 (Y2000) : One Thread

MARSEILLE, Dec 1, 1999 -- (Agence France Presse)
Frances's electricity company EDF will be keeping
a close watch December 31 on the Chinese nuclear
power station at Daya Bay north of Hong Kong to
see whether it experiences any problems linked to
the millennium computer bug, officials said Tuesday.
- - -
He said the Chinese station, built in part by EDF,
will in a way serve as a "guinea-pig" allowing
officials to see whether its computers mistakenly
register 1900 when the year 2000 starts.

From "Inside China Today"

End of Thread and End of Quoted Material

*******

When you have a situation in which you don't know exactly what went wrong,
such as a situation similar to Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, the length
of time needed in order to determine what exactly did go wrong could take
far longer than twelve hours.

And what if you were an official at the Chinese nuclear facility and were not
in a position (owing to telecommunication problems) to inform those in roles
of responsibility at the French nuclear facility of the problems you were
having? What if you were not even able to let them know of what you
guessed had gone wrong?

Also, figuring out what went wrong would very likely take second place to
trying to trying to contain the problem and make sure that it did not get
worse. You would be focusing on safeguarding the lives of key personnel
and those in the surrounding region likely to be impacted by the problem if it
worsened. (The October accident in Japan provides alot of lessons
concerning the immediate aftermath of a problem.)

Of course, when it comes to the case of the Chinese nuclear power plant
and the French nuclear power plant, one option would be for the French
plant to begin shut down operations (assuming word of a problem got to the
French plant), but then there would have to be contingency plans that would
allow for that to take place safely in a context that might well include other
infrastructure disruptions. Often contingency plans do not take such
scenarios into consideration. There would also have to be provision for
adequate backup generation capacity that would ensure a safe shut down
over time. That in turn would depend on keeping an adequate supply of
fuel, which also might not have been planned for.

I am afraid that I have seen considerable evidence of an absence of
awareness of these kinds of complexities and concerns in the Administration as well as
some key Members of Congress.

The President's Council's Perspective
Changes on Embedded Systems:

In the latter part of October, I talked with two individuals who have been in
close touch with the President, the Vice President, and/or the head of the
President's Council. I am still trying to fully absorb what these two
individuals shared with me concerning what is happening and why. What I
can say is that it appears that I have given Mr. Clinton too much credit for
his level of understanding of the crisis that we are in as a result of Y2K and
embedded systems. While it seemed to me that he must have been at least
at a personal 3-5 on the impact scale, I now think that it is quite plausible
that he is no higher than a 2 or 3. I have the sense that he is, for all
intents and purposes, essentially disengaged from the problem known as Y2K! He
is truly leaving it in the hands of the person who head the President's
Council on Year 2000 Conversion. The President is relying on the Chairman
of the Council to let him know the status of Federal efforts and whatever else
that the Chairman feels that he should know.

[It should be noted that while the President is disengaged from Y2K, he is
however apparently deeply concerned about other threats to national
security involving cyberterrorism and other forms of terrorism that could also
be manifested in the coming few years. Indeed, I believe that it is the case
that many of the actions that people are attributing to clandestine
preparations by the government for Y2K are actually preparations to defend
against various forms of terrorism.]

On November 9, 1999, the President's Council and the Office of
Management and Budget convened a meeting involving a small group of
embedded systems experts. The result of that meeting was reflected in part
in a press release that was issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Commerce. On the same date, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology issued an article that focused on embedded systems issues.
The Secretary of Commerce urged that efforts need to be redoubled to test
for year 2000 computer problems that are hidden away in a variety of
machines other than computers. See
http://www.nist.gov/y2k/embeddedarticle.htm and
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/g99-204.htm
The Chairman of the President's Council was questioned about the
November 9 meeting at the Press Briefing held on the occasion of the
release of the Council's Final Assessment Report at the National Press Club
on November 10. A New York Times reporter wrote the following of the
exchange that he had with Mr. Koskinen after the formal Press Briefing had
concluded.

"Another concern, which Koskinen said he was briefed about on Tuesday at
an Office of Management and Budget meeting with computer specialists, is
that some computer systems that do not appear to track the date may
nonetheless have date-sensitive microchips in them. Those systems also
have to be tested and plans must be made to handle breakdowns,
Koskinen said." [From:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/11/biztech/articles/11year.html]

According to an embedded systems expert who is acquainted with Mr.
Koskinen's change in perspective on this issue combined with my own
knowledge of what was determined at the November 9 meeting, the quote
should more correctly have read:

"Another concern, which Koskinen said he was briefed about on Tuesday at
an Office of Management and Budget meeting with EMBEDDED
SYSTEMS specialists, is that some EMBEDDED systems that do not
appear to track the date may nonetheless have date-sensitive microchips in them.
Those systems also have to be tested and plans must be made to
handle breakdowns, Koskinen said."

I would add these major and continuing concerns regarding embedded
systems failures. The first is from my Part 2 of my White Paper:

"When embedded systems fail, they can fail in a variety of unpredictable ways.
Small, seemingly insignificant failures can trigger other system
failures." [From Page 40 of Part 2 of my White Paper: "A Call to Action:
National and Global Implications of the Year 2000 and Embedded Systems
Crisis". See http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k.]

I would also add that the timing of the triggering of other system failures
cannot be readily predicted since the environment in which the failures are
taking place is dynamically changing. Once the failures have occurred and
have triggered other failures, the root causes of the initial failure can be
hard if not impossible to determine.

Understanding embedded systems is crucial to understanding the crisis
nature of the situation that we are in. The absence of understanding of
embedded systems has played a major role in the government's approach
to addressing Y2K. In my view, the failure of the Administration to
recognize from the outset the importance of consequences of the
malfunctioning of embedded systems has resulted in an extremely flawed
approach to addressing the problem and a failure understand its
complexities, along with a failure to recognize the crisis nature of the
problem.

The President's Council has failed to give adequate attention to the highest
risk, highest hazard systems, plants, sites, pipelines, facilities, etc. The
President's Council has failed to take the action that it should have taken to
help ensure that impacts that can be expected as a result of malfunctioning
embedded systems in highest hazard, highest risk sites, plants, facilities,
systems, pipelines, refineries, etc., etc. would be minimized to the extent
humanly possible.

Even with the late recognition concerning the seriousness of embedded
systems problems as of the November 9 meeting, no major initiatives
involving embedded systems have been apparent on the part of any
agencies or departments of the Federal government apart from the
statement of the Secretary of the Department of Commerce. The important
implications of the November 9 meeting and the subsequent press release
and article at the NIST Web site, seem not to have been recognized or
shared with the President, the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of
Energy, based on remarks they have made since the November 9 meeting.

The President's Apparent
Absence of Understanding
Coupled with an Abrogation
of Responsibility

The critical points here are these: not only is the President seemingly
uninformed of serious implications of embedded systems as well as other
aspects of the Y2K problem, he apparently has effectively abrogated his
responsibility as President and Commander in Chief by having transferred
responsibility for addressing the most challenging crisis in the history of the
nation and the world to Council composed of individuals who also apparently
do not fully appreciate the crisis nature of the situation that we are in.
Fairly incredible, but that is my current reading of what is going on.

The Administration Not Only Fails
to Increase Emphasis on the Need
for Public Preparedness Efforts, It Has Been Downplaying the Need for Such Efforts

In early September, the Chairman of the President's Council indicated that
the Council would increase its efforts to encourage public preparedness. On
October 7, he indicated that he expected to launch such increased
efforts the next week. The only apparent movement in that direction during
October has been some new materials on preparedness that have come out
and are available at http://www.y2k.gov and the new brochure that was
released in early November. While there was mention at the National
Press Club Briefing on November 10 of the fact that some areas were
preparing for as much as 7 to 10 days of disruptions, there seems to be no
concerted effort to make this fact known to the wider public. Any sense of
urgency is quickly undermined with the advice to prepare as you would for a
long holiday weekend. Indeed, the President in his remarks of November
10 stated in effect that there was no need whatsoever for the public to
prepare.
FEMA's Project Impact to Hold
a Summit in December, No Mention
of Y2K on the Agenda

I have reiterated my entreaties that Project Impact, an excellent program
that FEMA has developed to minimize impacts of natural disasters, be
expanded to encompass Y2K preparedness. A statement I have written on
this subject can be found on the "Comments, Essays, and Op-Ed Pieces"
page of my Web site at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. There
has been strong opposition to this recommendation from a FEMA official
who sees no relevance of the program to Y2K. He also seems to be at the
0 - 1 level of the impact scale regarding Y2K. He seems to see no merit in
even alerting the 600 or more Project Impact grantees who will be in
Washington for a December 12 - 16 Summit Meeting to the possibility of
infrastructure disruptions that can be anticipated as a result of Y2K. The
possibility of technological disasters triggered as a result of malfunctioning
embedded systems is not something that the FEMA official in question
appears to be even remotely considering.

A Conference Series Focusing on
High Hazard, High Risk Sectors
A Conference Series was held at George Washington University for
November 10, 11, 12, 19, and 23. (The program on November 11 was held
at the Washington Post, sponsored by the University, but hosted by The
Washington Post Company.)

This series was aimed at bringing to the attention of public officials, the
media, and the general public a wide range of concerns that have been
addressed inadequately nationally, as well as globally. The concerns
included the highest hazard, highest risk sectors: nuclear power plants,
chemical facilities, refineries, oil and gas pipelines, hazardous materials
sites and facilities, and water purification and wastewater disposal plants.
Panels were also included on Food Concerns and on Family and
Community Y2K Emergency Preparedness Concerns.

A highlight of the Conference Series was a panel that took place on
November 23. The panel was entitled: "Still Needed: National and
Global Initiatives Aimed at Minimizing the Impacts of Y2K". This
panel was broadcast live by C-SPAN and can now be viewed at
http://www.c-span.org/watch/otherevents.htm Click on WATCH for
November 23. Copies of the video are also available from C-SPAN by
calling 1-800 277 2698.

A list of participants in the panel included:

Moderator: Paula Gordon, Director of Special Projects, Research
Program for Social and Organizational Learning (RPSOL), George Washington University

Panelists: Norman Dean, Director, Center for Y2K and Society

Stuart Umpleby, Professor of Management Science and Director, RPSOL, GWU

The Honorable James Moody, CEO and President, InterAction
(former Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Wisconsin)

John Streufert, Information Resources Director, U.S. Agency for
International Development

This panel should serve as a helpful introduction to the complex and
daunting set of challenges and threats known as Y2K. For people who have
been long focused on Y2K, it should serve as an excellent update. Please
let public officials, people in the media, friends, family, and associates
know of the availability of this video and of its accessibility online. It
could prove helpful to them.

A highlight of the panel was Norman Dean's sharing of his perspective
concerning the nature of the impacts that Y2K can be expected to have: He
described the
impacts as coming in waves over a period of the year or two. This strikes
me as being one of the most apt description that I have heard concerning
what we might anticipate.

Videotapes of Panels and Presentations
from the July 1999 Y2K Conference
Are Now Available

All 32 hours of the panels and presentations at the Y2K Conference
are now available on video from Public Production Group.

To order tapes of any part or all of the conference, please call 202-898-1808
for further details and ask for Mary Anne or Jereme. Public Production Group
will donate $5 from each tape purchase to RPSOL.

Please use the agenda below when ordering to help you identify the tapes
that you would like to order. For a copy of the agenda, see
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/1999conference.html#item7
Particularly noteworthy sessions included an embedded systems panel
featuring Gary Fisher of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and Mark Frautschi; a Global Impacts panel featuring Jacquelyn
Williams-Bridgers, Inspector General of the State Department; Roger
Ferguson Jr., Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and Congressman Dennis Kucinich. An outstanding panel was
also featured on the topic of Y2K-related nuclear power plant safety
concerns. Participants in that panel included representatives from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Energy Institute, the Nuclear
Information Resource Service, and the Union of Concerned Scientists.

RealVideo Web site to Expand to Include Videos from the July Y2K Conference

For a Y2K Audio/Video webpage of Y2K-related programs,
see http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm

Selected videos of the proceedings of the July 1999 Y2K Conference
will be posted there soon. For comments on the conference and copies of
prepared statements and related material, see
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k

The Next Installment of
"Comments on Y2K Impacts"

By mid-January, assuming the Internet is functioning well enough,
I will plan to post comments on what has transpired through that date
and what actions are still needed. These comments will be posted on the
"Comments, Essays, and Op-Ed Pieces" page of my Web site:
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k

In Closing

I thank Russ Kelly for so kindly inviting me to post these comments on his
Web site.

I would also like to take this opportunity to say (with apologies to Winston
Churchill) that I believe this to be the end of the beginning of a very
arduous road ahead. I wish us all well and I hope that leadership emerges
that will recognizes the challenges and the threats and is up to the tasks.

The Head of the President's Council has stated:

"The only thing that could sink the system would be overreaction."
[http://www.c-span.org/guide/society/y2k.asp]

I would change this statement significantly. I believe that the only thing
that will "sink the system" is the failure of those in roles of public
responsibility to comprehend the seriousness of the threats and challenges
that face us, understand their complexities, and, most of all, exercise the
leadership and take the actions that are needed.

Getting through this crisis will in turn depend on the dedicated and
selfless actions of individual citizens who want more than anything to see
our extraordinary experiment in freedom survive and flourish.

Paula Gordon
December 1, 1999
 
 
 
 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 

Impact rating for November: My provisional rating remains between a 5 and 9.5.

Some comments on this rating:

My initial comments regarding this rating are similar to my comments for
October. I have made a few changes in some key paragraphs, and add notes on
a variety of evolving concerns and activities.

The higher level 9.5 rating could apply if the Federal government continues
on its present course failing to acknowledge that we are in a crisis and
failing to take all the proactive measures that could still be taken before
the rollover to help minimize the impacts that can be expected.

My lower level rating of a 5 on the impact scale would apply if the Federal
government were to do everything that could be done in the days remaining to
minimize the impacts of the Y2K and embedded systems crisis here and abroad
before the rollover. The Federal government might even be able to avert
runs on banks if the President and others exercised extraordinary
leadership. A level of trust and faith on the part of the American people
would need to be cultivated in order for this to occur. The Administration
would need to demonstrate through its actions that it had had a change of
heart and now recognized that we are in a crisis situation.

Government actions would need to be along the lines described in Parts 3 and
5 of my White Paper at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. Actions
would involve establishment of a crisis-oriented, proactive Office in the
Executive Office of the President that would have several hundred full time
employees who have responsibility for taking action and facilitating action
PRIOR to the rollover and continuing as long as need be after that. The
Information Coordination Center (ICC), which has been established under the
President's Council, does not have such a mission. Instead the ICC focuses
on gathering information and doing assessments that will help guide actions
that will need to be taken AFTER the rollover. The ICC as presently
configured does not focus on taking actions before the rollover.
Conceivably the ICC could be reconfigured to encompass both pre- and post-
rollover concerns. It would also need to be reoriented to along proactive,
crisis-oriented lines.)

In the latter part of October, I talked with two individuals who have had
been in close touch with one or more of the following: the President, the
Vice President, and Mr. Koskinen. I am still trying to fully absorb what
these two individuals shared with me concerning what is happening and why.
What I can say right now, is that it appears that I have given Mr. Clinton
too much credit for his level of understanding of the crisis that we are in.
While it seemed to me that he must be at least at a personal 3-5 on the
impact scale, I now think that it is quite plausible that he is no higher
than a 3. I have the sense that he is, for all intents and purposes,
essentially disengaged from the problem! He is truly leaving it in
John Koskinen's hands. The President is relying on John Koskinen
to let him know the status of Federal efforts and whatever
else that Mr. Koskinen feels that he should know. In addition, the
President is under the impression that the Vice President has been actively
involved in Y2K efforts! I have no idea what these activities are. Neither
did the person who passed on the information.

The President's Apparent
Absence of Understanding
Coupled with an Abrogation
of Responsibility

The critical point here, however, is that the President is effectively
abrograting his responsibility as President and Commander in Chief by have
transferred responsibility for addressing the most challenging crisis in the
history of the nation and the world to an individual who (also) does not
appreciate the crisis nature of the situation that we are in. Fairly
incredible, but that is my current reading of what is going on.

An Open Letter to Erskine Bowles

I have written An Open Letter to Erskine Bowles and other Presidential
advisors past and present, asking them to come forward and let us know what
they know of the President's strategy with regard to Y2K. This Open Letter
has been posted at the Time Bomb 2000 Discussion Forum at
http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001cia. Based
on my newly acquired insight concerned the President's perspective, it seems
quite likely that the President's "political" strategy to wait until after
the rollover to take a leadership role (or to assign such a leadership role
to the Vice President after the rollover), is based more much more on
ignorance of the fact that we are in a crisis and somewhat less on
Machiavellian machinations. The relative weighting I would now give to the
roles played by ignorance, indifference, irresponsibility, ineptitude, and
the playing of political games has altered somewhat. All nonetheless still
seem to be factors in what is going on. Before the last last week of
October, it had not crossed my mind that a conscious disengagement from the
problem coupled with ignorance of the nature and scope of the problem might
be playing such a major role in the President's evident inaction.

The Administration's Failure
to Increase Emphasis in October on the Need for Public
Preparedness Efforts
 

In early September, Mr. Koskinen indicated that the Council would increase
its efforts to encourage public preparedness. On October 7, he told me in
person that he expected to launch such increased efforts the next week. The
only apparent movement in that direction during October has been some new
materials on preparedness that have come out and are available at
http://www.y2k.gov.

FEMA's Project Impact to Hold
a Summit in December, No Mention
of Y2K on the Agenda

I have reiterated my entreaties that Project Impact, an excellent program
that FEMA has developed to minimize impacts of natural disasters, be
expanded to encompass Y2K preparedness. A statement I have written on this
subject can be found on the Comments, Essays, and Op-Ed Pieces page of my
Web site at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. There has been strong
opposition to this recommendation from a FEMA official who sees not
relevance of the program to Y2K. He also seems to be at the 0 - 1 level of
the impact scale regarding Y2K. He seems to see not merit in even alerting
the Project Impact grantees to the possibility of infrastructure disruptions
as a result of Y2K. Technological disasters are not even a possibility as
far as this individual seems to be concerned.

Conflicting Views on Embedded Systems

There have been some "skirmishes" in the intellectual wars over embedded
systems. These have primarily been occurring among American embedded
systems engineers and IT specialists in Discussion Forum threads on the Web.
I will be including some recent comments and reflections on these skirmishes
in the "Comments, Essays, and Op-Ed" pages of my Web site. The comments
are in the form of a reply that I have sent an individual who feels that my
concerns regarding the threats posed by embedded systems are unwarranted. I
quote in my response to him a submission made to a current discussion forum
thread on embedded, and add my comments to that. The differences that I
have with him are similar to differences I have identified with a number of
others. These differences are summed up in the following comments I have
recently made about embedded systems:

Re differences in perspectives concerning the implications of we know about
embedded systems:

"We come out in decidedly different places regarding the old stakes vs.
probabilities debate, especially when it comes to malfunctioning embedded
systems as these can affect safety critical systems in high hazard, high
risk systems, plants, sites, etc. I think that it was and is a false
economy to use such methods as type testing and statistical sampling, not to
mention vendor certification, in relevant aspects of the assessment,
remediation, and testing process. Such methods in my view should not be
used in assessing, remediating, and testing embedded systems in nuclear
power plants, chemical plants, refineries, oil and gas pipelines, water
purification plants, wastewater disposal plants, etc. In my view, to rely on
any one of these methods is to put economic interests above public health
and safety and environmental concerns. It is known and accepted as fact
that the use of these methods will result in some unknown number of failures.

Newly Posted Installment of Part 6 of my White Paper
Focuses on Common Sense and Y2K

The first installment of Part 6 of my White Paper is now posted. It is
entitled: "'De Nile Ain't Just a River in Egypt' ~ Social Pressure, Group
Think, and Denial vs Common Sense in the Y2K and Embedded Systems Crisis".
This installment of Part 6 describes some major barriers to progress in
efforts to get the government to take needed action. The focus of this
installment is on the failure of key people to use common sense in assessing
both key elements of the crisis and what should be done about it.
 

A Conference Series Focusing
on High Hazard, High Risk
Sectors that the Federal
Government Has Failed to Address Adequately
 

I am organizing a Conference Series at George Washington University for
November 10, 11, 12, 19, and 23. (The program on November 11 will not be at
the University, but will be an evening forum hosted by The Washington Post
Company.)

Most, but not all of the programs are slated for evening hours. This
series is aimed at bringing to the attention of public officials, the media,
and the general public a wide range of concerns that have been addressed
inadequatedly by the President's Council and the Executive Branch, as well
as the Congress. They have failed to take adequate action regarding these
concerns. The concerns include the highest hazard, highest risk sectors:
nuclear power plants, chemical facilities, refineries, oil and gas
pipelines, hazardous materials sites and facilities, and water purification
and wastewater disposal plants, to name a few. The programs are free and
open to all.

Paula Gordon November 2, 1999

*****************************************************************************
 
 

Impact rating for October: My provisional rating remains between a 5 and 9.5.

Some comments on this rating:

The 9.5 rating could apply if the Federal government continues on its
present course failing to acknowledge that we are in a crisis and failing to
take all the proactive measures that could still be taken before the
rollover to help minimize the impacts that can be expected.

Of greatest concern to me are nuclear weapons systems that remain on hair
trigger alert. (I understand that even Stratcom has voiced concern
regarding this fact. Whether or not the concern has reached the Secretary
of Defense or the President is a question.) While nuclear weapons can only
be launched as a result of a human decision, if data is corrupted or if
computer screens go blank, there is the chance that human factors could lead
to an unprovoked launch. While the Federal government is to be lauded for
taking initiatives aimed at minimizing the risk of unprovoked weapons
launches, much more needs to be done to help ensure that no such launch
occurs by any nuclear power. A moratorium on the use of nuclear weapons for
at least a year would be a first step in that direction. Taking all weapons
off hair trigger alert is essential with or without a moratorium.

Nuclear power plant safety issues have not been fully acknowledged to date
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Nuclear Energy Institute. NRC,
NEI, and the President's Council have failed to date to acknowledge the
recommendations offered by Mary Olson and Paul Gunter of the Nuclear
Information Resource Service and David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned
Scientists. They have failed to respond to the very serious concerns raised
by these watchdog organizations. The approaches that have been used to
ensure the safety of nuclear power plants have not included attention to
all safety critical systems. The focus has been instead on mission critical
systems. The current inadequacy of backup diesel generation capacity is a
major concern. If the Social Security Administration has jet engines for
use as sources for back up power generation, why not use jet engines as back
up power generation sources for nuclear power plants?

If fuel shortages accompany the rollover as seems quite likely at present,
it will be difficult to guarantee safety in the shutting down of any plant,
should such actions become necessary. Prepositioned stocks of potassium
iodide or potassium iodate need to be stored in close proximity to all
nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel processing plants so that nearby
populations will have some safeguards in the event of an accident or
catastrophe. (To date only four states have taken such initiatives according
to a news report of October 1.)

(For a general critique of nuclear power plant safety issues, see a review
by Patrice Kaufman of a July 28, 1999 panel on nuclear power plant safety
with NRC, NEI, NIRS, and UCS participating. The panel was sponsored by
George Washington University and held as a part of the Y2K Conference.
See http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k.)

(Regarding potassium iodide and potassium iodate, see a recent discussion
thread at http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=000zXv.)

The chemical industry continues to place public health and safety and the
environment at risk. On the plus side a number of plants have announced
their intentions to shut down over the rollover or take other extraordinary
measures to ensure safety. Also on the plus side, the State of California
is leading the way in taking a proactive approach to address Y2K-related
chemical plant safety issues. The approach taken by the State of California
should be vigorously promoted through out the country and the world. To
date the Federal government has failed to take a vigorous and proactive role
in helping ensure the widespread adoption and adaptation of such approaches.

A press conference to release "the official consensus from the groups
represented at the August 30, 1999 Chemical Safety Roundtable" was held on
October 7. The Roundtable itself was closed to the public and the press.
The Center for Y2k & Society were observers at the Roundtable. They have
issued a press release on October 7 entitled: Federal Government Fails to
Act "Despite Widely Acknowledged Y2K Risks", Experts Say: White House Urged
to Take Steps to Increase Safety of Chemical Plants. See the Center's
Web site for further details: http://www.y2kcenter.org.

To date the Federal government has not assumed responsibility for
spearheading truly comprehensive efforts that could be helpful to the public
and private sector in minimizing the impacts that can be expected in
chemical sector, let alone the other highest hazard sectors. They should be
promoting the proactive, crisis-oriented approach that the State of
California is taking. As regards the chemical sectory, the President's
Council and the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) have
done little more than to write a letter to each of the States urging action.
Less than ten states have responded to the letter. While the President's
Council and CSB have brought attention to California's efforts, the Federal
government has not to date funded efforts aimed at adoption or adaptation of
similar efforts throughout the nation. They have acknowledged the tool kit
developed by the State: The Y2K Hazardous Material Project Implementation
Tool Kit" available at www.oes.ca.gov.

There seems to be little recognition or appreciation on the part of Federal
officials and the chemical industry that simply making people aware of
informational resources has limited effectiveness. In the majority of
cases, according to research on innovation diffusion, technology transfer,
and knowledge application, such information dissemination efforts must be
joined to technical assistance and education and training efforts if they
are to be successfully adopted or adapted. Innovative and interactive
approaches to large scale education and training efforts should be
considered. These could be along the lines that have been employed by the
World Bank; the Bank's African Virtual University Program is a prime
example. The Bank has used live satellite transmission of workshops to
multiple sites in Africa simulaneously. The programming has been coupled
with the use of the internet, fax, and phone, allowing for maximum
discussion and interactive exchange. This would be an excellent means of
getting information and assistance out to a large number of sites nationally
or globally simultaneously. Such an approach would also be an excellent way
of maximizing scarce expertise. Such an approach could be designed to raise
awareness levels of the seriousness of the threats and challenges while also
assisting those taking part taking steps to address these threats and
challenges locally, regionally, nationally, or globally.

As regards the chemical sector in the United states, substantial funding
needs to be provided to the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, and the Chemical Manufacturers
Association to accomplish these objectives nationally.

Also of great concern is the fact that some oil and gas pipeline companies
are taking a fix on failure approach. The possibility of explosions and
other problems have been raised. The malfunctioning of embedded systems
that control valves could in and of itself lead to cascading impacts that
could affect the functioning of pipelines. The dysfunctioning of oil and
gas pipelines could create highly hazardous situations in communities as
well as in individual residences. The potential for major environmental
impacts is also great. Should massive problems occur, the potential for
disruption in the flow of oil and gas throughout the nation is also great.

Great concern remains regarding the compliance of water purification plants
and waste disposal plants. One of the most outstanding spokesman in this
area has been Erik Olson of the Natural Resources Defense Fund. As has been
the case in so many of the other high hazard, high risk sectors, the Federal
government has not assumed responsibility for spearheading comprehensive
efforts that could be helpful to the public and private sector in minimizing
the impacts that can be expected in this sector. EPA hosted a three hour
meeting on September 28, 1999. According to one attendee, discussion during
this meeting focused in part on "some problems a few utilities faced in
doing their audits and patches". According to this same individual, there
was also "some airing of concerns by some EPA officials and even some
utilities". "At worst 10%" of the U.S population is served by utilities MAY
not be Y2K compliant. The AWWA representative reportedly said that "the
only thing we have to fear is, fear itself". According to the same
attendee, thinking seemed to be that we have "to avoid panicking the
gullible & skitish public".

According to another individual who attended a closed door meeting of mostly
Federal officials in February or March of 1999, a high ranking Federal
official expressed the view that five million people without water would be
an acceptable number!

The absence of a concern for the public good evident in this statement is
appalling.

The absence of concern for the public's right to know in keeping such a
possibility from the public also has no place in a free and open society.
Surely if the public were aware of such a possibility, they would have
pressured the Congress and the President to take steps to avert such a
catastrophe.

The citizens of this nation are being treated like children. If this
continues, their anger may be without bounds when they come to realize how
much has been kept from them.

Unlike some other developed countries and even some developing countries,
the U.S.'s approach to Y2K preparedness has failed to be action-oriented and
has focused instead information gathering and assessment and public and
private sector efforts to share information. With few exceptions, the
results of the assessments have not provided the basis for recommendations
for action and have not led to initiatives aimed at actually minimizing the
impacts now during the pre-rollover period.

The focus on information gathering and assessments efforts has in a way
taken the attention away from the need for commonsense action: we know that
there will be a convergence of problem threads. We have no idea what the
consequences of that convergence of problem threads might be. Even if one's
home, business, organizations, community, state, region, and even national
government were to be 100% compliant, there are any number of other
interdependency and supply change factors, nationally or globally, that
could impact locality, regionally, or nationally. In light of this fact,
commonsense dictates that we not only do everything we can to minimize
possible disruptions and disasters, it dictates that we prepare for the
possibility of such disruptions and disasters. Setting aside a stock of
food and water is an essential first step. Having adequate prescription
medicine and medical supplies is another. Taking steps to ensure that one
is ready to withstand climatic conditions is also crucial. Having a radio
that will work without electricity is another.

Where possible prepayment of some monthly financial obligations (mortgage
payments, rent, insurance, utilities, etc.) could help give people a sense
of security.

Regarding disasters, the public needs to be acquainted with steps that would
need to be taken. See the thread on "Chemical Plants Still a Concern..
" at http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001Xiu for an
example of the guidance that one state is recommending.

While one of the greatest risks that we face is not being ready to deal with
infrastructure disruptions, another great risk arises out of the failure of
public officials to alert the public to even the possibility of
technological disasters. Beyond these concerns there is yet another: there
appears to be no comprehension on the part of many of those in roles of
responsibility at the Federal level of what actions they might be taking now
to help hold the social fabric together. To date, the efforts of these
individuals have been marked by an evident absence of understanding of the
full scope and nature of the threats and challenges that face us. In
addition to that their efforts have been marked by an apparent conviction
that the American public would panic if they knew that impacts might be as
severe as a 3 to 5 on the impact scale, let alone higher on the impact
scale. Owing to this conviction, those in roles of responsibility have
determined that every effort must be made to "quell" panic and they have
tried to do this through keeping even their limited understanding of the
possible severity of the impacts from the public. They have also not
listened attentively to persons who have greater comprehension of the
impacts. For instance, they have not listened to Ed Yourdon. They have not
listened to Howard Rubin.

My lower level rating of a 5 on the impact scale would apply if the
government were to do everything that could be done beginning now in the
eighty or so days remaining to minimize the impacts of the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis here and abroad before the rollover. Government actions
would need to be along the lines described in Parts 3 and 5 of my White
Paper at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. Actions would involve
establishment of a crisis-oriented, proactive Office in the Executive Office
of the President that would have several hundred full time employees who
have responsibility for taking action and facilitating action PRIOR to the
rollover and continuing as long as need be after that. (The Information
Coordination Center ~ the ICC ~ does not have such a mission. Instead the
ICC focuses on gathering information and doing assessments that will help
guide actions that will need to be taken AFTER the rollover. The ICC as
presently configured does not focus on taking actions before the rollover
that would be aimed at minimizing impacts and averting disasters that can be
expected after the rollover. Conceivably it could be reconfigured to
encompass both pre- and post- rollover concerns. It would also need to be
reoriented to along proactive, crisis-oriented lines.)

In Part 5 of my White Paper posted in September, I introduced two versions
of a best case scenario, one that involves the Federal government assuming
its proper role of responsibility in addressing Y2K, and failing that, an
alternative scenario that would involve the rest of the public sector in
colloboration with the non-profit and private sector. In this case the rest
of the public sector and the non-profit and private sector would step into
the vacuum left by an absence of decisive Federal leadership and action. In
this version of the best case scenario, everything that can be done would be
done to minimize impacts and avert disasters before the rollover.

Part 4 of my White Paper was posted at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k on August 18. It goes into detail
concerning the strategy that the President has apparently adopted. It
discusses the President's absence of understanding concerning the nature of
the threats and challenges posed by the Y2K and embedded systems crisis.
Apparently the President is privately somewhere between a 3 and a 5 on the
impact scale, while publicly acting as if he believes that the impact will
be less than a 3. (See Part 1 of my White Paper for an description of the
impact scale I am using here.) It seems obvious that the President has
decided to wait to tell the American public about the fact that we are
facing a problem of at least a 3 - 5 magnitude. He apparently feels that if
he were to let the public know how serious the impacts could be, that his
statements would trigger an immediate downturn in financial markets,
something that could have major ramifications, including profound political
repercussions. Indeed, his legacy could be shattered beyond repair.

Part 4 of my White Paper should help jar some people who have been asleep or
who have been lulled into inaction by the Administration's absence of
evident concern regarding the seriousness of the problem and by the
Administration's failure to recognize and openly acknowledge that we are in
a crisis.

In the Appendix to Part 4, Congressman Dennis Kucinich's views are quoted
from a transcript of an exchange that took place at the Y2K Conference
July 26 - 30. All parts of the White Paper can be accessed from my home page
at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k. The Congressman's statements
support the explanations that I offer concerning the President's strategic
approach to the crisis.

Some of the videotapes of the four and a half day conference, including the
exchange involving the Congressman Kucinich should be available soon at
http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm. A grant from the Nathan
Cummings Foundation made the videotaping of the conference possible. The
overall focus of the conference was on actions to address Y2K and the
embedded systems crisis that are yet needed at the local, national, and
global levels. Papers and commentary focusing on the converend can be found
at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/1999conference.

Parts 1 - 4 of my White Paper provide a basic analysis of the current status
of efforts. Part 5 includes a description of the basic differences in three
possible scenarios that could unfold, the status quo scenario and two
alternative best case scenarios. I hope that public officials and the media
here and abroad will read Part 4 and 5 and go back and read Parts 1 -3. If
they were to do so, I think that they would begin to understand that
political games are being played with the Y2K and embedded systems crisis at
the highest levels of government in the United States. (By all means, they
should also review the videotapes of the July 26 - 30, 1999 George
Washington Univerity Y2K Conference to be posted soon at
http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm. That four and a half day
conference was on "Y2K: Local, National, and Global Concerns ~ What Further
Actions are Needed?" A briefing by Ed Yourdon and myself on related issues
is already available for viewing on this realvideo Web site.)

As a result of the inadequacy of U.S. government efforts, international
efforts that have been strongly influenced by the U.S. government, have also
failed to address the threats and challenges posed by the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis. Not only are the Administration's efforts ill-serving the
nation, they are ill-serving the world as well. We all stand to suffer as
a result of these failings. Key questions are as follows:

~ Can we yet rise to the occasion and educate and support those in roles of
public and private sector responsibility to do what can be done in the
little time remaining?

~ Will individuals and organizations from other parts of the public sector
and from the non-profit and private sectors step forward to fill the vacuum
if the Federal government continues to focus so little attention on
protecting and preserving the public good?

I am still hopeful that the President will accept responsibility in the days
remaining and do all that can be done to minimize the impacts that we can
expect. Failing that our other institutions and leaders must come to our
rescue.

In order to expedite the dialogue concerning what remains to be done, I am
appending a list of individuals based in Washington, who are well prepared
to speak to various aspects of the crisis that we are in:

_____________________________________________________________________

Health Issues:
(EXCELLENT, FORMERLY A PRINCIPAL AT BOOZ-ALLEN HAMILTON)
Margaret Anderson, Director of Policy, Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3267
_____________________________________________________________________
 

Community Preparedness Issues and Social and Psychological Aspects of Y2K
(PARTICULARLY OUTSTANDING IN BOTH SUBJECT AREAS)
Philip Bogdonoff
202 775 3157

______________________________________________________________________
 

Community Preparedness and Organizing Issues
Lois Saboe
Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3157

_______________________________________________________________________
 

Environmental, Public Health and Safety Issues Relating to Y2K
Fred Millar
Director of Environmental and Public Safety Policy
Center for Y2K & Society
202 775 3162
_______________________________________________________________________
 

Chemical Sector Impacts
Jerry Poje (Dr. Gerald V. Poje)
Member, Chemical Safety and Hazards Investigation Board
202 261 7617

_______________________________________________________________________
 

Embedded Systems, General Overview, National and Global Impacts
Financial Sector Impacts:

Stuart Umpleby
(Professor Umpleby has an extraordinary aptitude for explaining the
complexities of Y2K and embedded systems to people who have no technical
background.)
Professor of Management Science
Director
Research Program in Social and Organizational Learning
George Washington University
202 994 5219
 

_______________________________________________________________________
 

Water-related Issues Erik Olson
Natural Resources Defense Fund
<eolson@nrdc.org>
_______________________________________________________________________
 

Pipeline Issues
Lois Epstein
Environmental Defense Fund
<lois_epstein@edf.org>
________________________________________________________________________
 

Y2K and Nuclear Power Plant Issues:

(All excellent and well spoken)

Paul Gunther
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
202 328 0002

Mary Olson
Nuclear Information & Resource Service
202 328 0002

David Lochbaum
Union of Concerned Scientists
202 332 0900

I hope you will watch my George Washington University Web site for Part 6 of
my White Paper. A new feature will also be added to that Web site that will
include updates of this rating and other commentary.
 

Paula Gordon October 8, 1999

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Item # 4
 
 

Summary: FEMA's Project Impact program is aimed at building disaster
resistant communities: Project Impact could be quickly adapted to assist
communities prepare for Y2K. This multi-million dollar investment could help
in preparing for and minimizing impacts of Y2K. Why isn't this national
asset being used in this way?
 

Project Impact is a promising program of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. The purpose of Project Impact programs is to build
"disaster resistant communities". Some excellent guidance materials have
been developed and are freely available through FEMA. The materials are
filled with useful ideas. The program could be quickly adapted to serve as
models to assist communities all over the country to prepare for Y2K.
Project Impact is holding a Summit in Washington, DC, December 12 to
December 16. Representatives of over 116 programs from throughout the nation
will likely be there. Last year over 600 people attended. If last year is a
guide, all of the FEMA regional directors will also be present. There were
only rare mentions of Y2K at last year's Project Impact Summit. In the 14
page Summit overview for this year's meeting, not one mention is made of
Y2K. Surely it will be a major embarrassment to FEMA if it turns out that
FEMA never alerted its Project Impact grantees to the threats and challenges
of Y2K and the need to prepare.

How ironic that those who have been participants in such a promising
program have not been encouraged to redirect their efforts to preparing for
Y2K. At best, they could be serving as models for organizing for community
preparedness. At the very least, they could help their own community to
prepare.

Information about the Summit can be found at
http://www.fema.gov/impact/summit99.

In a letter from James Lee Witt quoted in the preliminary program for
the Summit, he states "Together we are building safer, stronger communities
before disasters strike." Why is the obvious relevance to preparing for Y2K
being missed?

It would not be that hard to maximize the sunk investment that the
nation has already put into the Project Impact program. What has happened to
American ingenuity, creativity, and just plain commonsense?

-- Paula Gordon (pgordon@erols.com), October 24, 1999

Reprinted from greenspun.com : LUSENET : TimeBomb 2000 (Y2000) : One Thread http://www.greenspun.com/bboard/q-and-a-fetch-msg.tcl?msg_id=001dd7

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