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Introduction
The Institute for Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) sent an
Open Letter to Congress
on June 9, 1999 expressing the perspective of that
organization concerning
the seriousness of Y2K. The letter includes a description
of Y2K and the embedded
systems crisis as "non-solvable" and
as a "crisis". It also states
that the crisis has not begun to get the
attention it deserves. (A
copy of the Open Letter can be seen at
(
http://www.ieeeusa.org/FORUM/POLICY/99june09.html.)
The IEEE's admonitions seem
to have fallen on deaf ears, particularly when it comes
to the President and the
present Administration.
The letter may not have come
to the President's attention. Copies
have been sent to the head
of the President's Council. The letter does not
appear to have changed the
perspective of either the President or the head
of the President's Council.
What accounts for the current
approach that Administration has been
taking concerning Y2K? It
may be that the President has not taken to heart
the concerns that have been
expressed to him regarding the seriousness of
the problem. On the other
hand, he may have some recognition of the
seriousness of the problem,
but he may have determined that substantially
increasing Federal efforts
to address the problem now is not the best policy.
Could it be that the President
has purposely decided to wait until
around the time of the December
31st rollover to bring substantial resources
to bear on the problem?
If so, why would he have made such a decision?
and could it be that he
has made such a determination based out of
concerns for the economy
and political concerns?
In June 1999, someone told me off
the record that the President told
some acquaintances of hers
that he is indeed waiting for the December 31st
rollover and the aftermath
before committing more substantial resources to
the Y2K. On July 28, at the
Y2K Conference at George Washington
University, Congressman Dennis
Kucinich revealed that he viewed the
President's actions in just
this way. (See the Appendix of Part 4 for the
transcript of the excerpted
exchange between Congressman Kucinich and
Paula Gordon. The excerpted
exchange is also available at
( http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/.)
From my vantage point, by
delaying action that would help safeguard
the public good, the President
is abrogating his responsibilities as President.
Waiting until the rollover
to act will be too late and will result in untold
hardship and suffering for
many. Waiting will also mean substantially
adding to the long term
costs of recovery.
If the President were to
exercise real leadership on this issue, he
would persuade the public
to begin to begin to make necessary preparations
now.
Impacts could be substantially
minimized if concerted actions were
also taken now to avert
numerous technological disasters that can be
expected. This includes
disasters of the magnitude of Chernobyl and
Bhopal. The U.S. and the
U.N. (and related global institutions) simply have
not treated the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis as a crisis and, with
extremely limited exceptions
have not organized efforts and brought
necessary resources to bear
in minimizing technological disasters. Part of
the reason that international
organizations have failed to treat Y2K as a
crisis may well be the absence
of US leadership and dedicated resources.
If the President continues
to pursue his present course of restrained
activity and if he fails
to engage in crisis-oriented action and
problem-solving, the Y2K
crisis could well go down in history as the worst
instance of malfeasance
in public office in the history of the nation.
One thing is clear: the President's
failure to take adequate actions
now to encourage the public
to take adequate preparations and to minimize
the impacts of Y2K and the
embedded systems crisis will cost the nation
and the world dearly. For
whatever reason or set of reasons, he is in
effect failing to place
the public good first. It is my hope that the
President will realize his
errors in judgment and depart immediately from
his current plan which from
all indications is to wait to act until the
rollover before bringing
needed resources to bear. The Y2K and embedded
systems crisis is most assuredly
an instance where "an ounce of prevention" is
worth far,far more than
"a pound of cure".
A Perspective
Concerning the Y2K and Embedded Systems Crisis
As of August 18, I provisionally
estimate the impacts of the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis
to be between 4.5 and 9.5 on the impact scale. This is
slightly changed from the
previous month when my estimate was between 4 and 9.5.
The 9.5 figure assumes that
the Federal government continues on its
present course of relative
inaction and
1) fails to engage in broader
and accelerated remediation efforts to prevent
or minimize serious and
potentially catastrophic problems with the highest
risk systems, plants, sites,
pipelines, etc. that are otherwise likely to occur
nationally and globally
and
2) fails to engage in concerted
emergency preparedness actions, including
urging and assisting the
populations here and abroad to begin now to store
adequate supplies of non-perishable
food and water and
3) fails to make other preparations
that could help ensure social stability
during and after the rollover.
This includes encouraging the postponement
of celebrations for several
weeks, if not a full year to 2001 in order to
minimize a set of totally
preventable problems that can otherwise be
anticipated at the time
of the rollover.
The Likely
Outcome
In June of 1999, I had estimated
that impacts could be as low as a 4 if
the Federal government determined
that the Y2K and embedded systems
crisis was indeed a crisis
and took responsible action to address the threats
and challenges posed and
minimize the expected harmful impacts. This
would include creating a
Special Action Office for Y2K in the Executive
Office of the President
and establishing a similar effort at the UN. These
efforts would treat the
situation as the crisis that it is and engage in
proactive steps to ensure
that everything is done that can be done to
minimize harmful impacts,
particularly technological disasters, both here
and abroad. Extraordinary
resources and talent needs to be devoted to
such efforts now.
As of August 1999, my lower
level estimate increased to 4.5. This is owing to
failure of the government
to move decisively to implement a
crisis-oriented and action-oriented
approach to addressing Y2K. Failure to
act has left less time to
take actions that are yet needed to minimize
impacts. My lower level
estimate has also moved up from a 4 owing to the
fact that so many of those
I know about who have first hand knowledge of
remediation efforts are
reporting serious discrepancies between the
progress that has been reported
and the reality.
My estimate of the maximum
level of impacts has moved up from an 8
since the first of the year
owing to my increased awareness of the serious
problems associated with
weapons systems (because of human, as well as
computer interfaces), nuclear
power plants, chemical plants, hazardous
materials sites and facilities,
refineries, and pipelines.
I am also at a provisional
9.5 level as a maximum prediction because
of the apparent reluctance
on the part of the Clinton Administration to initiate
the kinds of actions that
are needed.
Where Does
the President Stand on Y2K?
Since learning of Y2K, I
have been trying to solve a mystery
concerning what could possibly
account for the apparent reluctance of the
Clinton Administration to
declare Y2K a crisis and act accordingly. In my
first conversation with
the head of the President's Council in June of 1998, I
asked what steps were being
taking to minimize the wide range of disasters
that could be expected.
The response was that the Council would be
making assessments and would
determine what actions needed to be taken
in Spring of 1999. No definitive
determinations seem to have been reached
as of the Summer of 1999.
In June of 1999, on receiving
some new information concerning
statements that the President
had reportedly made in private, I developed a
working hypothesis that
the President has made a political calculation not to
substantially increase efforts
to address Y2K now, but to instead wait until
the December 31 rollover.
Has the President made a calculated judgment
that it is best for the
economy and that it is best for political reasons to
wait to act until after
the rollover and then step in and focus Federal
efforts on the recovery
period?
I shared much of this hypothesis
with Congressman Kucinich in a
public forum on July 28 at
the Y2K Conference held at George Washington
University in Washington,
DC July 26 - 30. I asked the Congressman what
his views were. To my surprise,
he said that the President has indeed
made a decision not to focus
on addressing Y2K now owing to the negative
impact that raising the public's
awareness of the seriousness of the problem
would likely have on the
economy and hence the next election. Congressman
Kucinich also noted that
the President may be reluctant to acknowledge the
seriousness of Y2K
and take "ownership" and responsibility now because doing
so would be unnecessarily
assuming too great a "political" risk. By acknowledging the
problem now and taking appropriate
steps to address it now, he would be more likely to
receive the blame for
the negative outcomes that nonetheless occur.
(See Appendix A or
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/
)
Assuming that this is an
apt assessment of the President's strategy, it
seems to me that by failing
to take responsible action now, the President is
acting in a way that jeopardizes
the futures and the quality of life of many
millions, if not billions
of people around the world. His failure to act now is
jeopardizing the very future
of the country and the world.
In talking with someone who
has spoken with the President and the
Vice President about Y2K
on several occasions over the past several years, I
have concluded that the
President has a better overall comprehension of
the seriousness of Y2K than
has the Vice President. It is not clear that
either of them comprehend
the full seriousness of the problem. It is my
sense that the President
never would have opted for such a strategy had
anyone been able to convince
him how serious the impacts of Y2K and the
embedded systems crisis
could be. On the other hand, there would be
little potential "political
payoff" for opting for such a strategy if he
did not expect that the
impacts of Y2K would be at least in the 3 to 5 range
on the impact scale.
From all indications, both
the President and the Vice President
appear to have an inadequate
understanding of the embedded systems
aspect of Y2K. Neither do
they appear to comprehend fully the daunting
character of the information
technology/communications technology aspects
of the Y2K problem. If they
were more informed concerning the embedded
systems challenges facing
nuclear power plants, chemical plants, refineries,
hazardous materials sites
and facilities, and oil and gas pipelines, surely
they would not hesitate
to take action to ensure that such hazards were
minimized to the extent
possible both here and abroad.
Apparently no one has been
successful in both getting access to the
President and the Vice President
and convincing them of the special threats
and challenges posed by
the malfunctioning of embedded systems in the
highest risk systems, plants,
sites, facilities and pipelines. Indeed, even
top officials at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) do not seem to
comprehend fully the direct
as well as indirect impacts that malfunctioning
embedded systems can have
on "safety critical" systems.
No one in the immediate circle
of the President or the Vice President,
including officials who
have roles on the President's Council on Y2K, seems
to comprehend fully the
importance of the embedded systems aspect of the
problem. There are no technical
experts on staff with backgrounds that
included a knowledge of
embedded systems. As of late Spring of 1999, the head
of the President's Council
asked the National Institute of Standards
and Technology to provide
him an assessment of the seriousness of threats
posed by embedded systems.
That assessment should be forthcoming in
August of 1999.
The June 9,
1999 Open Letter to
Congress from
the Institute of
Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE)
I am not at all convinced
that anyone at the top of the Administration,
through and including the
President's Council, comprehends the
seriousness of our present
crisis as it is described so succinctly and so well
in the June 9, 1999 open
letter to Members of Congress from The Institute
of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc. (IEEE). In their letter, the IEEE
provides an excellent overview
of the complexities of issues relating to the
Y2K and embedded systems
"crisis" (and indeed the word "crisis" is used in
the letter). (For a copy
of this letter, see
http://www.ieeeusa.org/FORUM/POLICY/99june09.html.)
The head of the President's
Council has repeatedly referred to Y2K as
a solvable problem. According
to the IEEE letter, neither the informational
technology aspect of the
crisis, not the embedded systems aspect of the
crisis can be solved in
time.
The President told a mutual
acquaintance in June that he has
delegated sole responsibility
for Y2K to the head of the President's Council
for Year 2000 Conversion.
Mr. Koskinen has indicated little natural
inclination to transform
Federal activities into crisis-oriented and
action-oriented efforts.
It can be argued that such a transformation is
necessary in order for there
to be the best possible chance of minimizing
technological disasters
here and abroad. I have repeatedly challenged him
to address such matters,
beginning as early as June 1998. The head of the
President's Council has
to date failed to ask for adequate resources to take
action to minimize even
the infrastructure disruptions that can be expected
in the United States, let
along the catastrophic events that can be expected
both here and abroad.
According to a column by
Stephen Barr on Y2K in the August 10,
1999 Washington Post, a
spokesman for the President's Council said that
they were "currently looking
at the chemical sector and other areas to see
how we can best collect
more information and have a positive impact on
activity with the (chemical)
industry".
Barr also noted that Senators
Robert Bennett and Christopher Dodd
have urged the President
to "convene a special summit to assess the Y2K
readiness of the nation's
chemical industry".
While these are steps in
the right direction, information gathering and
assessment efforts need
to be translated immediately to action. The focus
on action is still missing.
The proposed summit could be a means of
making up for such a deficiency
if it were to focus on development of an
action plan and implementation
strategies that could be adopted as soon as
possible.
The Information
Coordination Center (ICC)
Some might argue that the
newly formed Information Coordination
Center (ICC) has been set
up to address the need for action. Close
scrutiny of the materials
that have been made public concerning this new
enterprise reveals that
the ICC is not focused on taking preventive actions
between now and the December
31st rollover. The ICC appears to be
focused instead on making
sure that information is gathered which will
enable the government to
best address the rollover and the post rollover
period. The ICC in no way
addresses the need for a crisis-oriented and
action-oriented effort that
can take action to minimize harmful impacts
between now and the rollover.
An amendment to Executive
Order 13073 (the Executive Order that
established the President's
Council on Year 2000 Conversion) provides for
the establishment of this
major "information coordination" effort focusing on
Y2K-related information
gathering and assessment efforts. These efforts
are geared to response,
recovery, and continuity planning and
implementation, not to actions
that could be taken before the problems
occur.
The establishment of the
ICC was at first in many ways a mystery, but
its establishment becomes
much less of a mystery when viewed in light of the
President's evident strategy
not to take decisive action until the rollover
and post rollover period.
Evidently some 40 people are soon to be involved
in the ICC effort (around
four times the size of the present full time staff of
the President's Y2K Council
that is housed in the Old Executive Office
Building). Over 200 will
be new hirers or detailees from other agencies are
to swell the ranks of the
ICC by the time of the rollover.
The Metaphor
of a Room Filled with Time Bombs
There is a metaphor that
aptly describes the evolution of Federal Y2K
efforts, including the establishment
of the ICC. Imagine that you are in a
roomful of people. In that
room are numerous time bombs of all sizes. One
might expect that the people
in the room would determine that it is in
their best interest to organize
and take action. One possibility is that they
would decide to defuse the
largest time bombs first and then move on to
defusing the smaller time
bombs that are apt to cause less damage. In
applying the metaphor in
our current situation, what we find instead is that most
are apparently content to
sit around and simply plan what to do if and
when the time bombs go off,
and put in place plans for such eventualities. One
does not have to have the
IQ of a genius to realize that there is
something wrong with such
a picture. Planning for future actions is not the
same as taking action now
that could make future actions unnecessary.
For whatever reasons, the
people in the room seemed to be inclined
to focus attention on contingency
planning and planning for what actions
would be needed after the
"bombs" go off. They seem reluctant to take
actions now that would minimize
the danger. What could account for such
inaction? There are many
possible answers:
~ They may not be used to
assuming a responsible role in a high risk
situation;
~ They may lack the necessary
courage;
~ They may lack the initiative.
leadership, understanding, and vision;
~ They may believe that someone
else will take the action that is needed;
~ Inaction can also be rooted
at times in ignorance of the threats, denial,
and wishful thinking;
~ Inaction may be based in
blind hope that surely the problem could not be
that as serious as some
contend it is; or
~ They may simply not be
using commonsense!
Indeed, all of these may
help account for the absence of meaningful action.
However, the reason that
any or all of these natural proclivities could
continue to account for
the relative inaction that characterizes present efforts
is that those at the highest
level of government, including the President, are
failing to acknowledge the
seriousness of the problem and are themselves
failing to lead the way
by taking appropriate action. They are failing in their
responsibility to take action
that would protect and safeguard the best
interests of the nation.
It appears that for whatever reason the President is
not intending to take action
until the rollover. He may be assuming that the
time bombs are relatively
innocuous and will not have a catastrophic
impacts when they go off.
No one as yet has apparently successfully
informed him or convinced
him otherwise.
The engineers who tried to
convince the powers that be not to go
ahead with the Challenger's
launch were not listened to either. In this case,
the engineers have apparently
not even met with the President to make sure
he understands the seriousness
of the situation.
It is very likely that because
the President has failed to take action,
that others in roles of
public responsibility are also disinclined to take
action. The President's
inaction can give the impression to other ~
public officials as well
as the general public ~ that there is no need
to treat this matter with
any sense of urgency. After all, by his own
example, he is obviously
not treating it with any sense of urgency.
There are others who do have
a sense of urgency, but these
individuals are often not
able to get the support that they need to act,
because the seriousness
of the problem has not been officially recognized
by the President, the Vice
President, and the Council that he has authorized
to assume the lead role.
The Consequences
of
Failing to Act Now
One must recognize that when
and as reality takes hold concerning
the seriousness of the situation
that we are in because of the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis,
the economy will likely be shaken to the core.
Prolonging the onset of
likely economic dislocations in effect helps to
perpetuate the status quo,
but in this instance, it can readily be argued,
delaying action until the
December 31 rollover, could well create an even
greater crisis, in all ways,
including economically.
Failure to take responsible
action that could minimize impacts later
can also be seen as being
in total contradiction to the principles and
foundations of American
government. This happens when public officials
fail to take responsible
action. It occurs when public officials neglect the
obligation that take upon
themselves when they enter public office or a role
of public responsibility
to act in such a way that their actions safeguard the
public interest.
Waiting until the rollover
to act is not acting in the public interest. Waiting until the
rollover to act will result
in untold additional costs,
and not just in terms of
impacts on the lives and livelihoods of individuals and
families. It will have extraordinary
impacts on communities, businesses,
industry, the disadvantaged,
the aged, the disabled, and the infirm. It will
affect all sectors of society.
There will be untold additional costs associated
with public health and safety
consequences and restoring environmental
viability in areas affected
by technological disasters. Even more important,
the long term consequences
regarding the possible destruction of an
already fragile social fabric
might not be readily mendable ~ if indeed it can
be mended at all.
What must be remembered concerning
the threats and challenges
posed by the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis, is that a person's psyche
can also be shaken to the
core when the seriousness of the crisis is fully
faced. It may take weeks,
if not months, for an individual to achieve a some
sense of equilibrium in
his or her life after beginning to grasp the
seriousness of the crisis.
If the seriousness of the situation does not dawn
on an individual until soon
before rollover or until the time of the rollover,
there will not be adequate
time for those individuals to take preparedness
steps. Such preparedness
steps could help give them and their families at
least a minimum sense of
security confronting the unknowns associated
with Y2K.
The sooner that people comprehend
the seriousness of Y2K, the
better able they will be
to take preparedness steps and to establish some
sense of psychological equilibrium.
Such equilibrium may well be crucial to
getting through the post-rollover
period, a time which is apt to be filled with
many intermittent surprises
and problems.
A Similar Absence
of
a Sense of Crisis
at the Global Level
In attending some of the
open portions of the UN and International
Y2K Cooperation Center programs
in New York held June 21 through 23,
I became increasingly concerned
that national and global efforts are not
designed in a way that will
help ensure a minimum of either technological
disasters or infrastructure
disruptions, nationally or globally. Hardly any
mention was made during
the two days that I attended of possible Bhopal-
and Chernobyl-type disasters
that could occur in the US and around the
world. There seems to be
a great deal of denial concerning such very real
possibilities.
Part of the focus of these
meetings was on contingency planning and
emergency preparedness planning,
but both contingency planning efforts
and emergency preparedness
efforts tended to be based on a superficial
understanding of the likely
impacts that will be experienced, an
understanding that focuses
practically exclusively on the possibility of
infrastructure disruptions.
The majority of those speaking at the open
sessions during these meetings
seem to be basing their remarks on least
case scenarios (level 1
- 4 on the impact scale). There were only a two
presenters at the UN whom
I heard who mentioned elements that would be
a part of a level 6 or 7
scenario. They were definitely in the minority. Indeed,
the head of the U.S. Federal
Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) appeared to be gauging
the impact of Y2K at a 1 or 2 on the impact
scale in the presentation
he gave. Here again, maybe this is a case where
very few in the upper echelons
of the governmental organizations
comprehend the threats posed
by embedded systems. Perhaps very few
recognize that there could
be numerous disasters and catastrophic events
that could occur as a result
of malfunctioning embedded systems in this
country, not to mention
the rest of the world. The assumption is made
instead that there may be
mild infrastructure disruptions in various regions
of the United States, but
nothing of long term duration and nothing of a
catastrophic character and
that there will likely be more serious
infrastructure disruptions
and the greater likelihood of catastrophic events in
other parts of the world.
If there were an understanding
that technological disasters were at the
very least a possibility,
there would be talk of the need for evacuation
planning in areas near chemical
plants, refineries, nuclear power plants,
etc., and the need for planning
large scale humanitarian relief efforts and
prepositioning supplies
would be uppermost in the minds of elected, as well
as non-elected public officials.
Information concerning such efforts, if they
are in process, is being
kept from the public. Of equal importance however
is the fact that the public,
as well as public officials at other levels of
government are being deprived
of information that they need in order to take
reasonable actions to prepare.
An especially disquieting
trend pertaining to the withholding of vital
information was echoed by
several panelists and presenters at the meetings
for national Y2K coordinators
in New York in June. Two representatives of
the national media organizations
in their panel presentations in one of the
open sessions appeared to
have acquiesced to what seems to have
become a widespread policy
of encouraging the media to "accentuate the
positive" and ignore the
negative or sensational. In doing so the media
would in effective be withholding
news that may be jarring to some greater
or lesser degree to the
public. The media would also not be reporting news
that could have a decidedly
negative affect on the economy.
There seems to be an increasing
"agreement" not to report the
"sensational". The problem
with such a policy is that information concerning
the real threats and challenges
may be classified by some as being
"sensational". When this
happens, such information may thereby be kept
not only from the public,
but it may also be kept from persons in roles of
responsibility in both the
public and private sectors, persons who need to
know the information. How
can anyone be expected to act in an informed
way if important information
regarding threats and challenges to their
immediate future and the
future stability of the nation and the world is kept
from them?
Robin Guenier, head of the
U.K.'s Taskforce 2000 stated the following
in a BBC Radio Scotland
broadcast on 2/18/99:
"Nobody knows how this is
going to play out...It is very difficult to be
optimistic, particularly
if you look at the global situation...But we
are much more likely to
have panic amongst an uniformed populace than
an informed one."
The tendency to want to manage
and "dumb down" the news so as
not to risk engendering
panic in the public is making alot of knowing people
very angry and frustrated.
It also confuses people and keeps many in the
dark. It can perpetuate
an erroneous view of reality, which can have
decidedly negative psychological
and social psychological affects.
Withholding the truth is
a misguided policy and is a certain recipe for
panic in the days immediately
preceding and following the rollover. Adopting
such a policy of withholding
critical information is one thing in a
parent-child relationship;
it is quite another when the principals include
public officials and the
adult population of a free nation. The policy will
leave the public largely
unprepared psychologically or in any other way. The
public will be ill-prepared
to meet the challenges that are likely with the
rollover. A major reason
to raise awareness now and encourage
constructive actions now,
is that in the anxiety of the moment, there will be
no time for individuals
to go through the long process of getting used to the
fact that we are in the
midst of a crisis. Time is needed to work through this
process and to adjust to
a decidedly different view of what the future might
bring.
Recapping Developments
Since February 1999
Spring of 1999 could have
marked a turning point in the way that
those in roles of public
responsibility approached the challenges of Y2K.
There is very little evidence
that it did indeed constitute a turning point.
The noteworthy assessments
and reports that have been released
between end of February
and beginning of August, and events that have
occurred in recent months
have yet to result in the implementation of a
significant set of action-oriented
and crisis-oriented initiatives on the
part of the Federal government
or world organizations. Occasionally there
have been initiatives which
are action-oriented and crisis-oriented. These,
however, have been the exception,
rather than the rule. Two such initiatives
in the United States include
~ actions taken by the U.S.
Coast Guard in spearheading national and
international Y2K efforts
bearing on shipping, ports, and tankers, and
~ actions taken by the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board in
helping to raise awareness
in that sector of the extraordinary challenges
faced by the chemical industry
as a result of Y2K and the embedded
systems crisis. (See http://chemsafety.gov.)
Some Reports
Since February of 1999, several
noteworthy analyses of the status of
the threats and challenges
posed by Y2K and embedded systems have
become available. These
include the following:
~ The Report of the Senate
Special Committee on the Year 2000 released
on March 3, 1999 (http://www.senate.gov/~y2k).
~ March 5, 1999 testimony
by Lawrence Gershwin, National Intelligence
Officer for Science and
Technology of the Central Intelligence Agency
(http://www.usia.gov)
;
~ March 5, 1999 and July
22, 1999 testimony by Jacqueline
Williams-Bridgers, the Inspector
General of the State Department at
http://www.usia.gov
and http://smamedia.wdnetwork.com/hri//bridgers.html.
respectively;
~ A March 1999 Report to
the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem entitled
"Year 2000 Issues: Technology
Problems Industrial Chemical Safety",
submitted by the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(http://chemsafety.gov).
A hearing on this topic was
held on May 10 in New Jersey.
~ Subsequent guidance material
released in July and prepared jointly by the
Environmental Protection
Agency, the Chemical Safety and Hazards
Investigation Board and
Trade Associations of the chemical industry.
~ "Second Summary of Assessment
Information" released April 21, 1999
and the Third Summary of
Assessment Information" released August 5,
1999 by the President's
Council on Year 2000 Conversion
(http://www.y2k.gov/new/FINAL3.htm).
Thesereports are noteworthy
for what they don't say as much as for what they do.
~ The April 9, 1999 Report
by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
International Trade Administration,
Trade Development, Office of
Computers and Business Equipment
entitled "The Year 2000 Problem and
the Global Trading System"
is an extraordinarily important paper in that it
provides an overview of
the multiple problem threads that are apt to
converge globally, as well
as nationally owing to the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis. This report
is of particular significance since it effectively
constitutes such an concise
and thoughtful analysis concerning the
seriousness of the Y2K and
embedded systems crisis. As many have
pointed out, this report
"connects the dots" thereby creating a clear picture of
the various problem threads
that could converge and impact global trade
and the global economy,
and therefore the national economy. This
document is easily accessed
by going to http://y2k.ita.doc.gov/y2k/y2k.nsf/
and clicking on the report.
~ Testimony by a city administrator,
leaders in community preparedness
efforts, and representatives
from the media before the Senate Special
Committee on the Year 2000
Technology Problem on May 25, 1999. The
topic of the hearing was
"Community Y2K Preparedness: Is There News
They Can Use?" The hearing
involved two panels: a panel on community
preparedness and a media
panel.
These official documents
provide a far more comprehensive overview
than had previously existed
concerning the status of Y2K and assessments
of its likely impacts both
nationally and globally. With the exception of the
reports issued by the President's
Council, in April and August, there has
been remarkable concurrence
in most of these reports and testimony
concerning the nature and
scope of the problem, both nationally and
globally. (The President's
Council reports reflect a view of the impacts of
Y2K, several points lower
on the scale than other materials noted here.)
Some Domestic
and Global Efforts in 1999
During the spring of 1999,
a wide range of new efforts were launched.
These included the Center
for Y2K and Society, the International Y2K
Cooperation Center, the
Yes Volunteer Corps, and the Information
Coordination Center.
The efforts of the Infodev
Program of the World Bank also continued.
Grants available to underdeveloped
countries through this program cannot,
however, be used for hands-on
remediation, posing a serious handicap to
developing countries in
need of just such help.
Beginning in Spring of 1999,
meetings were convened of national Y2K
coordinators, including
meetings of coordinators from Eastern Europe,
Asia, Africa, and South
America. With the exception of the latter all were
held in their respective
regions. The South American coordinators met in
Washington, D.C in May.
A meeting of over 170 national
Y2K coordinators was held at the UN
June 21 - 22. The International
Y2K Cooperation Center sponsored a
program for the national
Y2K coordinators on June 23.
The UN - and IY2KCC - sponsored
meetings have tended to focus on
information sharing and
awareness raising, and more recently, emergency
preparedness and contingency
planning.
The Information
Coordination Center (ICC) of the
President's
Council on Year 2000 Conversion
A new center, the Information
Coordination Center (ICC), was
established in the spring.
The ICC is to have responsibility for domestic and
global assessments. This
center has been established under the aegis of
the President's Council
and with the Lt. General Peter Kind (ret.) overseeing
the assessment efforts.
At first the ICC was intended
to focus on tracking pre- and
post-rollover phenomena
connected directly with Y2K. The assessments
were to be used to inform
response efforts on the one hand and actions
focusing on "continuity"
on the other.
Subsequently the full scope
of the mission of the ICC has come into question.
Questions have arisen concerning
the eventual role that the
Center has or may have in
quelling cyberterrorism.
Senate hearings on July 29
revealed that the near term as well as long
term mission of the ICC
are still not clear in the minds of a growing number
of stakeholders.
The IEEE's
Open Letter to Congress
As noted earlier, on June
9, 1999, the Institute of Electrical and
Electronic Engineers issued
an Open Letter of Members of Congress. This
Open Letter was the most
succinct and compelling statement to date made
by a professional association
and pointing out the seriousness of the crisis
facing the world as a result
of Y2K and embedded systems.
NIST Clarification
of the Embedded Problem
In late spring, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology was
called upon by the President's
Council to provide a paper on embedded
systems, outlining state
of the art understanding of the embedded problem.
This report could be ready
as early as August 1999.
"Community
Conversations" and Community Preparedness
"Community Conversations",
a community awareness building
campaign, was launched in
May by the President's Council. The head of
the Council is playing a
role in these events which are being held at
numerous sites around the
country.
A explicitly stated purpose
of the campaign (as underscored in the
literature developed for
the campaign) is to enhance the public's sense of
security concerning the
capacity of the public and private sector to meet the
challenges posed by Y2K.
The possibility of technological disasters are
not discussed.
In July, Global Action Plan,
an organization based in New York and
headed by David Gershon,
began working with FEMA to introduce into the
mix an action-oriented emergency
preparedness program focusing on
families, neighborhoods,
and communities. Apparently the approach being
promoted does not emphasize
the use of a specific number of days as a
guideline for setting aside
food, water, and medicine. The fact that this
approach is action-oriented
and not focused on awareness raising alone,
constitutes a notable shift
in emphasis. This new thrust, if widely adapted,
could make a decided difference
in the relevance and effectiveness of
Federal efforts.
What Has Been
the Impact?
In the wake of all of these
"developments", there is a question of how
much of what has been accomplished
has led to or is leading to action that
will result in minimizing
the impacts of Y2K.
A conference on Y2K was held
at George Washington University in
Washington, D.C. for July
26 - 30, 1999 that assessed actions taken to date
and focused attention on
recommendations concerning actions that still
need to be taken to address
the Y2K and embedded systems crisis on the
local, national, and global
levels.
Selected materials relating to the
conference are posted at
http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/.
The conference was videotaped and
will be digitized for viewing on the
World Wide Web. A program
of highlights is being prepared. An
announcement concerning its
posting to the World Wide Web will be posted
on the announcements page
at http://users.rcn.com/pgordon/y2k/.
The videotaped highlights
and proceedings of the conference will be posted
at http://www.y2kapproaches.com/real/pgordon.htm.
Insights were shared concerning
the current status of efforts to
address the Y2K and embedded
systems crisis, actions that are needed,
barriers standing in the
way ofneeded action, and ways of overcoming
those barriers to action.
Some of the initiatives that were recommended will
be noted in Part 5 of the
White Paper in which a status quo scenario is
compared with two versions
of a best case scenario. One of those best
case scenarios assumes that
government accepts its obligation to act to
protect the public interest;
the other assumes that non-governmental
entities step in to fill
the void left by government's failure to assume
responsibility and take
action.
Summation
Considerable assessment
of the challenges posed by the Y2K
technology crisis has been
done during 1999. Few of these assessments,
however, have led to the
acceleration of actions that could have a major
impact on minimizing the
impacts of the crisis.
If those in roles of public
and private sector responsibility do not
significantly increase their
efforts to act to minimize the harmful and
disastrous impacts of Y2K
and the embedded systems crisis, Y2K may
turn out to be the largest,
best studied, most assessed, monitored, talked
about, and planned for,
and, yes, even best understood catastrophic event in
the recorded history of
humankind. It may teach the lesson that knowledge
and understanding are worthless
if we do not act in accordance with what we
know and
understand.
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Part
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