THE SHOCK!: War In Korea?
By J. Adams
May 5th, 1997
-A Note On the Irrationality of Greed-
J. Adams
May 5th, 1997
Well, I had predicted the stock market would crash into the
Fibonacii 55th after the March 11th record high in the DJIA near 7100
and bet accordingly. I got what I deserved. Today, May 5th, the DJIA
broke into new record high territory in literally panic-buying- the
day I was expecting an '87-style selling climax. In other words, I
was perfectly wrong. So be it. Greed and arrogance, whether my own
or that of others, is always duly rewarded with an upset of
expectations.
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THE SHOCK!!!: KOREA???!!!
J. Adams
May 5th, 1997
What are the consequences of Western greed? Well, the
consequences are probably what Western society least expects at the
current time since investors and people in general are almost
completely self-deceived. This, after all, is what a Grand Supercycle
peak in stock prices represents: completely irrational collective
expectations where Western greed is most concentrated, i.e., Wall
Street.
Unfortunately, however, a likely consequence of Western greed is
that other countries around the world that may be deemed relative
have-nots are going to become thoroughly pissed-off over the years and
decades and eventually build-up the means and find the most strategic
way to wipe the wealthy nations off the face of the earth. In other
words, somewhere down the road the West will fall victim to a
collective explosion of anger against iniquity by the have-nots
against the haves.
So now, when we may be facing a Grand Supercycle crash, there is
reason to believe that the Cold War "of old" between the communism of
the East and Capitalism of the West is going to unexpectedly erupt
into a Hot War of global destruction.
From where might this explosion ignite?
I'm admittedly unsure on this point, but one possibility on top of
the threat of a global war starting in the Middle East is war starting
in the Far East- i.e., on the divided Korean Peninsula where the final
battle line between Communism and Capitalism, East and West, is
believed to be drawn between Communist North Korea and Capitalist
South Korea. Furthermore, this has become a symbolic focal point of
the division between the haves and the have-nots, the rich and the
poor, the well-fed and the hungry.
As I have mentioned before, there is reason to believe Moscow
would want Korea ignited prior to or at the time of having a war
unleashed in the Middle East since this will divert a sizable portion
of U.S. military might into the Far East so that Washington will be
unable to come to the defense of the Jewish homeland of Israel.
Furthermore, given Moscow's recent "public" befriending of China
with the recent agreement signed between Moscow and Beijing, it
appears the stage has been set for application of the "One Clenched
Fist" strategy in which the deceptive split between Russia and China
(see the work of Anatoliy Golitsyn) would end so that the two powers
could come together for a sudden, overwhelming military onslaught
against the West at the appropriate time. This time appear now to be
at hand.
Accordingly, war between East and West might now erupt and a
potential trigger-point for this is the Korean Peninsula where North
Korea is putting finishing touches on its preparations for an attack.
First off, with the recent strategic, misleading defection of the top
North Korean official, Hwang Jang-Yop, North Korea has infused
alarming, seemingly credible intelligence (i.e., possible strategic
disinformation) to South Korea that has created uncertainty in South
Korea, Japan and the U.S. about the military capabilities of North
Korea- particularly in terms of striking South Korea and Japan with
nuclear and chemical weapons. In this way, Japan and other regional
U.S. allies may be hesitant and/or unwilling to help the U.S. in
repulsing a North Korean overrun of South Korea, and the U.S. may be
hesitant or unwilling to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to a
successful North Korean invasion. Secondly, in recent weeks, U.S.
satellites have noted that black-outs are spreading across North Korea
seemingly because of low fuel supplies for generating electricity.
However, this is also a useful cover for the black-out of the North
Korean countryside that will likely be necessary at the time the North
executes its invasion plans.
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WHAT NORTH KOREA'S UP TO!
J. Adams
February 18th, 1997
Recent news articles raise some interesting questions about the newest
North Korean defection crisis:
1. Given that the defector Hwang Chang-yop developed the North Korean
philosophy of "Juche", or self-reliance, why was he sent on a mission
to elicit help, particularly in the form of food-aid, from Japan- a
country considered by North Koreans to be an ultimate imperialist
enemy?
2. Why didn't Hwang defect in Japan- where he was for a couple of
weeks prior to stopping by China- instead of Beijing, since China is
closely allied with Pyongyang and could send him back to North Korea?
3. If Hwang was closely surrounded by North Korean agents in Japan to
stop him from defecting, why was he able to casually jump into a taxi
in Beijing and drive to the South Korean embassy? And if the North
Korean leadership was aware Hwang Chang-yop might defect, why did they
send him on an trip to Japan and China where he could seek political
asylum and thereby create a dangerous political crisis in Pyongyang?
4. If Hwang knows there are tens of thousands of N. Korean agents in
South Korea that had infiltrated the South Korean political, military
and intelligence establishments to a high level, why did he reveal his
intent to defect to South Korean contacts for upwards of a year before
actually attempting to defect? Wouldn't he realize he was
jeaporadizing his chances of success or of even receiving an
opportunity to defect?
5. Is it a coincidence that the newest Korean defection crisis is
occurring at the time of the most important North Korean holiday-
i.e., the birthday of Kim Jong-Il, and at a time that Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping appears to be on his death-bed?
6. What was Hwang's meetings with Vladimir Zhirinovsky in 1994 and the
Central Committee of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev in 1987 all
about?
So what is North Korea up to?
Clearly the defection of the North Korean Communist leader Hwang
Chang-yop makes little sense. Indeed, there is reason to believe
that, in reality, Hwang Chang-yop, the Communist leader who developed
the North Korean philosophy of Juche that emphasizes complete
obedience of North Korea's leader, is defecting because he is obeying
the orders of his "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-Il. The circumstances
surrounding the defection suggest the defection is being staged (and
rather sloppily at that), i.e., this top Communist official is
attempting to defect to South Korea as part of some sort of North
Korean plan.
And what is Pyongyang's plan?
As I have long been warning, North Korea is preparing for a
massive invasion of South Korea. Final preparations may have been
completed during the past couple of months. If so, then the North
might be planning to attack the South before spring thaw since right
now rivers and rice paddies along the DMZ are frozen such that North
Korean tanks and tracked vehicles can manuever off roads and thereby
most easily roll into South Korea (see "Weather Factors" in the 1994
U.S. News and World Report article, "The Most Dangerous Place On
Earth", 6/20/94).
North Korea's most recent war preparations are overviewed in the
following excerpt from a February 16th Toronto Sun article, 'North
Korean Kettle Threatens to Boil Over', written by Eric Margolis:
The North has backed up (recent) threats by steadily moving
combat forces towards the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating
the two Koreas. Since December (1996), Pyongyang has deployed
100 MiG fighter-bombers to hardened air bases 20-30 km north
of the DMZ. These aircraft can reach South Korea's capital,
Seoul, six minutes after takeoff, and are clearly positioned
for surprise attack.
North Korea has also been beefing up its ground forces
near the DMZ. Late last year (1996), it created a new
mechanized corp tasked with striking down South Korea's east
coast. New 170mm self-propelled guns have been deployed just
north of the DMZ, from where they can hit Seoul. Equally
alarming, the North continues to add new AN-30 transport
aircraft to its growing fleet of 300. Each of these fabric-
bodied planes, almost invisible to radar, carry 13 commandos
whose mission is to deliver surprise, suicide assaults on
South Korean and U. S. airbases. North Korea has between
88,000 and 100,000 commandos, the world's largest special
warfare corps.
South Korean intelligence reports the North has at least
two plutonium nuclear weapons and is close to deploying new
Rodong-1 missiles, capable of delivering nuclear, chemical and
biological warheads to South Korea, Okinawa, and western
Japan.
Much of the food aid recently delivered to North Korea by
the U.S., South Korea, Japan and international organizations
has been diverted to the North Korean military, which
continues to build vast warstocks of food, fuel and munitions.
As so often in Asia, soldiers eat while peasants starve.
Given these potentially final preparatory steps, all North Korea
needs to launch an attack is some sort of pretext. This might explain
Hwang Jang-yop's recent defection in Beijing. The defection of such a
high-level North Korean Communist Party leader creates the image that
the political hierarchy in Pyonyang is crumbling and could implode.
Consequently, a military explosion is now believed to be possible in
the form of North Korea lashing out militarily against the South. That
such a danger is perceived is reflected by how South Korean forces
have been placed on alert since the defection crisis began last week.
The reason the potential for North Korea to unleash an attack on
the South is coinciding with the potential death of Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping is likely because what is being planned between
Pyongyang, Beijing, and, most importantly, Moscow, is a major regional
conflict in East Asia. Thus, if a second Korean War erupts at a time
of some sort of power struggle in China, the rise of a more militant,
nationalist Communist leadership in Beijing can be staged such that
American efforts to militarily defend South Korea from North Korea
aggression will entail a confrontation between the U.S. and China.
This, in turn, could be associated with a future Chinese invasion of
Taiwan and an outbreak of a regional East Asian conflict that would
completely tie-up American military forces in a distant part of the
world (of course, just a second Korean War is sufficient for tying up
a good portion of U.S. military forces in East Asia).
Importantly, the ulterior motive of future East Asian conflict is
to open the way for a war in the Middle East. As explained in my
"Korean Diversion" articles, with the Korean War in the early-1950's,
Washington was worried Moscow, who had ordered North Korea to invade
the South, was seeking to divert U.S. forces into East Asia so that
America would have difficulty defending Europe from a Soviet invasion.
Similarly, Moscow is likely seeking now to have North Korea, possibly
with Chinese-backing, invade South Korea and precipitate a major
conflict in East Asia that will draw in a huge amount of U.S. military
forces. Because U.S. forces will be tied-up in East Asia, America
will be unable to come to the defense of Israel and the Middle East in
the event of an Arab/Russian onslaught.
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"No agreement on food aid at Korean talks"
By JOHN LEICESTER, The Associated Press
BEIJING (May 5, 1997 2:32 p.m. EDT) -- Even the threat of famine could
not get Red Cross officials from the rival Koreas to resolve
logistical problems about delivering South Korean food aid to the
Communist North.
The North Koreans refused Monday to discuss ways to transport South
Korean food aid after Seoul would not say how much it plans to
deliver.
But, at the end of their first talks in nearly five years, the Red
Cross officials did agree to meet again.
Aid workers fear mass starvation if large-scale food relief does not
reach North Korea soon. Floods devastated the reclusive state's
harvests in the last two years, pushing its faltering economy into
ruin.
However, the Red Cross chapters in North and South Korea are closely
allied with their governments and political tensions have stymied
previous talks.
The two sides met for two hours Saturday and again Monday in Beijing,
but the South Koreans never proposed an amount or a time for aid
deliveries, the North Koreans said.
"I expected they would have something in their hands to deliver to us,
but when we arrived and met together, I came to know that they came
with no firm pledge," said Paek Yong Ho, head of the North Korean Red
Cross.
"Without knowing the quantity and the timing, how can we discuss
transportation of relief goods?" he said.
The South Koreans said they would provide aid but could not say how
much because that depended on public donations.
Saying they wanted food to reach North Korea "efficiently and
promptly," the South Koreans sought to discuss detailed methods for
delivering aid, but the North Koreans refused, said Chang Moon-ik,
spokesman for the South Korean Embassy in Beijing.
Still, the two sides "are very keen on meeting very soon again," Red
Cross official Lasse Norgaard said. Negotiators were returning to
their respective capitals Tuesday for consultations. No date was set
for the next talks.
Johan Schaar of the international Red Cross said the South Korean Red
Cross wants aid marked to show it came from South Korea and to monitor
its distribution -- proposals that are difficult for North Korea to
accept.
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"US sees dire conditions in North Korea"
Sunday May 4 3:10 AM EDT
WASHINGTON, May 4 (UPI) _ A published report says that North Korea's
famine is much worse than previously thought.
The Sunday Times of London cites U.S. officials and aid agencies as
saying that children are starving in the capital and there are growing
fears that the hard-line Stalinist country may launch a military
venture to distract attention from food shortages.
The newspaper says satellite photos and information from Chinese
traders in North Korea indicated famine is wiping out entire villages.
A group of U.S. congressman who traveled to North Korea last month
indicated conditions were worse than previously thought. They reported
seeing starving children in Pyongyang, the capital.
The Sunday Times quotes World Food Program director Catherine Bertini
as saying, ``If the situation remains unchecked, we could be looking
at one of the biggest humanitarian disasters of our lifetime.''
North Korea, which remains virtually isolated, has suffered
devastating floods in recent years.
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The Toronto Sun
May 4, 1997, Sunday, Final EDITION
"WILL NORTH KOREA LIGHT THE FUSE ON KOREAN POWDER KEG?;
UNSTABLE REGIME ARMED WITH NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS"
BY ERIC MARGOLIS
"North Korea is capable of turning South Korea into a sea of flames
and can completely annihilate the South with nuclear and chemical
weapons and missiles.
"If the U.S. uses its bases in Japan to support a war on the Korean
peninsula, North Korea will attack and destroy Japan with nuclear and
chemical weapons."
So states North Korea's former ideology chief, Hwang Jang Yop, who
recently became the highest ranking defector ever from the world's
most isolated, bizarre and dangerous nation.
As famine spreads among North Korea's 22 million people, risks of
another major conflict in Korea are higher today than any time since
May, 1994, when war nearly erupted over the North's secret nuclear
program.
I was with the 1st Republic of Korea (ROK) Division up on the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating the two Koreas that dangerous May
in 1994 -- and beneath the DMZ in deep tunnels bored under ROK
defences by North Korean sappers. The tension was electric as 1.8
million heavily armed Korean soldiers on both sides -- and 37,000
Americans -- went onto maximum combat alert.
North Korea's brinkmanship paid off. An outbluffed U.S. President
Bill Clinton backed down, opting to bribe rather than confront the
North. The price: two nuclear reactors, food and oil, all for free.
The North's nuclear threat was to be simply ignored.
Three years later, North Korea is on the verge of collapse. U.S.
nighttime recon photos show lights going out all over North Korea as
power supplies dwindle.
But the 1.1-million man armed forces, government officials and
Communist party cadres are amply provisioned. Most foreign food aid
is diverted to military warehouses; the armed forces have at least 90-
day supplies of oil and enough spare parts to fight for six months.
"Starving" North Korea just refused rice from Vietnam.
China supplies oil to North Korea. Pyongyang gleans hard currency
by counterfeiting, drug dealing, and from gambling parlors in Japan
run by ethnic Korean mobsters.
But time seems to be running out for the North's Stalinists.
Defector Hwang Jang Yop and U.S. military intelligence say North
Korea's regime, led by Kim Jong Il, may decide to make the ultimate
gamble by jumping ship from the sinking North and invading South
Korea. North Korean generals believe they can conquer South Korea in
a high-intensity, 20-day campaign.
Two hundred Scud-B and Frog missiles with chemical warheads would
blanket the 10 air bases used by the South Korean and U.S. air forces.
North Korea's large but antiquated air force would be thrown against
these key targets in a suicide mission. The North's 100,000-man
commando force, the world's largest, would attack air bases and
command hubs from the sea, and from low-flying AN-2 transports
invisible to radar.
Under firecover from 10,000 heavy guns and rocket batteries along
the DMZ, four North Korean mechanized and one armored corps would
attack south, possibly using nuclear weapons and chemicals to breach
South Korea's version of the Maginot Line: three belts of parallel
fortifications, Alpha, Bravo and Charlie, just south of the DMZ. North
Korean mobile forces would race down the Munsan and Chowan Valleys,
masking Seoul. By day 20, Northern forces would capture the key
southern port of Pusan, 240 miles south of their start line.
Reinforcing Korea with heavy mechanized and armor divisions could
take the U.S. up to six months. The only units available for immediate
intervention are the lightly armed 82nd Airborne Division at Ft.Bragg
and the 9th Marine Brigade at Okinawa.
U.S. bases in Japan and Okinawa would likely come under attack by
North Korean missiles and commando assaults. The North has six
operational Nodong-1 missiles. These 1,000-km range missiles can hit
much of Japan and Okinawa with chemical or nuclear warheads.
U.S. intelligence believes the North has at least three operational
nuclear plutonium warheads. A North Korean nuclear strike on Japan
would neutralize U.S. bases there that are vital to the defence of
Korea -- and inflict millions of casualties on Japan. The North may
already have infiltrated a nuclear device into Japan by submarine.
The U.S. and Japan don't want to face these mounting dangers. They
keep pressing ahead with so far fruitless four-way talks with the two
Koreas, and continue efforts to bribe the North into good behavior.
North Korea has succeeded in its strategy of keeping itself in
power by extorting aid from the U.S., Japan and South Korea by
threatening war, and in driving a diplomatic wedge between the U.S.
and South Korea.
Clinton is propping up North Korea's loathesome regime rather than
facing it down -- a remarkable contrast to Washington's demolition and
ongoing punishment of Iraq.
Korea's dangers are hard to overestimate. There is no weirder,
more frightening or more seemingly demented regime in the world than
the one in Pyongyang. The only regime of equal hideousness this writer
has ever seen was dictator Enver Hoxah's hellish Stalinist Albania.
Both tyrannies were characterized by extreme paranoia, deep delusions,
self-enforced isolation and spasms of violence.
Forty-five million South Koreans, 125 million Japanese, and 37,000
Americans live under daily threat of nuclear, chemical or conventional
attack by a lunatic regime run by shadowy men who seem a cross between
savage Mongols and modern gangsters.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Washington Post
May 04, 1997, Sunday, Final Edition
"A WAR SCENARIO; Korean Cataclysm"
By Lonnie Henley
If North Korea attacked the South, the ensuing war would be intense
and bloody, with high casualties on both sides and heavy damage to
South Korea's economic infrastructure. It is unlikely North Korea
would prevail, however, unless it were able to make quick territorial
gains and then persuade its opponents to accept a cease-fire. While
the conflict could continue for months, North Korea's fate depends on
the first couple of weeks. Such a war is not likely, in the opinion of
most analysts, but it remains a serious worst-case possibility.
Although North Korea has one of the largest armies in the world,
its military advantage has eroded since the 1980s, primarily because
of South Korea's booming economy. From near-parity with the North in
1981, the South's defense budget tripled by 1995. North Korea's
defense spending has remained roughly constant in a shrinking economy
-- now at 25 percent of the total. The country has been badly hurt by
the fall of the Soviet Union, bringing an end to discounted arms
sales, and less-generous Chinese aid.
Meanwhile, the modernization of U.S. and Republic of Korea forces
has significantly increased the capabilities of their Combined Forces
Command (CFC).
North Korea retains several advantages. It has more soldiers than
the CFC; the troops are positioned close to the Demilitarized Zone
(DMZ) between the two countries, minimizing their preparation time for
an attack; the army has invested heavily in artillery firepower,
including long-range systems that can reach across the entire
battlefield and into Seoul itself. North Korea has the world's largest
contingent of special operations forces, some 70,000 personnel. And
its economy and society function on what amounts to a permanent
wartime footing. In a population of 24 million, more than 1 million
are active duty military -- nearly 30 percent of all males ages 13 to
32 -- and another 900,000 are in organized reserve units or public
security units.
In the long run, South Korean-U.S. advantages are more important: a
strong defensive position; a world-class regional air force backed by
the strategic might of the entire U.S. Air Force; near-total dominance
of the seas; precision firepower; better training; and
economic/industrial resources that are near-infinite in comparison.
The level of Pyongyang's success, if any, would depend largely on
how the war started. If the North went for maximum surprise, attacking
with little overt preparation in a time of moderate tensions, it might
be able to catch CFC forces in garrison and its aircraft on the
ground. North Korea arguably is better prepared to carry out a massive
surprise attack than any country in the world; its front-line infantry
and artillery units are positioned forward to attack right now, as are
supplies of ammunition, fuel, etc., to sustain the attack.
The First Day
North Korea's first action, shortly before the shooting starts,
would be to insert hundreds of special operations teams into the South
to attack command centers, communications nodes, choke points, supply
depots, airfields, air defense systems and other critical targets. The
teams enter by a bewildering variety of means -- submarines,
hovercraft, small planes, helicopters, tunnels, rubber rafts, hang
gliders, fishing boats, even international commercial flights. Once
inserted, however, they move on foot in hostile territory --though
they are capable of creating substantial destruction.
The shooting erupts with an enormous artillery barrage from
thousands of tubes deployed just north of the DMZ. With systems that
can hit targets at more than 50 kilometers, this barrage of high-
explosive shells rains simultaneously on headquarters, supply depots
and transportation centers all the way from the DMZ to downtown Seoul.
Supplementing the conventional artillery are dozens of Scud missiles
launched at high-value targets, possibly with chemical warheads. The
city of Seoul and its 10.8 million people would quickly be in a panic.
At the same time, fighters and bombers streak farther south to hit
key airfields. Most of the planes are obsolescent 1950s-technology
jets whose only hope of success is to strike while CFC aircraft are
still on the ground.
Under artillery cover, the four forward-deployed infantry corps
consisting of 300,000 men pour across the DMZ to attack the first line
of defense. These corps are predominantly infantry on foot, with
limited support from tanks and armored personnel carriers. The South
Korean divisions manning the front line have had 40 years to dig in,
and this is only the first of a series of defensive lines arrayed for
50 kilometers between the DMZ and Seoul. Impressive to view, these
lines feature massive walls across valley floors, anti-tank obstacles
in the riverbeds, highly fortified fighting positions, and other
obstacles to channel the enemy into pre-planned killing zones. The
terrain is also very rugged, and favors the defense -- picture trying
to storm through the mountains of West Virginia. The constricted
terrain allows only a few narrow corridors leading toward Seoul. The
fight to hold these lines will be long and bloody, and will be the
major event of the ground campaign. The North can be expected to
sustain horrific casualties -- 150,000 or more -- but because of their
substantial numbers, they could likely take some ground.
The First Week
The air superiority battle begins as soon as CFC fighters get off
the ground, and lasts a few days at most. The North has only a few
fighter planes and air-to-air missiles comparable to U.S. and South
Korean systems; even more important is the mismatch in training,
tactics and support between the two sides. As soon as air superiority
is won, the air force will attack air defense systems, followed by the
systematic demolition of the North Korean infrastructure supporting
the war -- roads, bridges, command centers, communications assets,
supply depots.
The initial naval battle is even shorter. North Korea's navy is
primarily a coastal defense force. It has about two dozen attack
submarines trying to interdict the flow of U.S. forces into the
peninsula; destroying those subs will keep the U.S. Navy busy for a
few days. Otherwise, the U.S. fleet is on the offensive, launching air
and missile strikes against the mainland.
The ground battle centers around how far the North's front-line
corps can penetrate before they are exhausted, and around the battle
between the opposing artillery forces. North Korea uses its long-range
systems to accomplish what the South is doing with aircraft:
destruction of transportation hubs and logistical centers, disruption
of command and control, attrition of second-echelon forces. The CFC
seeks to use the superior speed, accuracy and target-acquisition
capabilities of its artillery to destroy much of the North's artillery
force, and shift the balance of fire support in favor of the allies.
The Second Week
Whether this is a long war or a short one will probably be decided
in the second week. The key issue is whether the North Korean second-
echelon forces can reach the battlefield intact, and whether they can
force a penetration all the way to Seoul. The second echelon consists
primarily of two mechanized corps and one armored corps (75,000 men),
home based 20 to 50 kilometers north of the DMZ. ("Mechanized" is a
bit of a misnomer, as they are primarily of truck-mounted infantry.)
Allied air will mount a major effort to prevent these units getting to
the battlefield intact by blocking roads and trying to destroy the
columns. If the second echelon does reach the battlefield, they will
take over the attack and try to press through the remaining defensive
lines protecting Seoul. At this point, the bulk of CFC ground forces
are committed in defensive battles and counterattacks to push back the
penetration. There would not be time for deployment of major
reinforcements from the United States, unless the war had grown from a
long period of tension and the reinforcements were already in place.
The Rest of the War
If North Korean forces reach Seoul, they must try to bypass it and
drive south as quickly as possible. There is no way the North's forces
could avoid being hopelessly bogged down if they try to take the city.
The only hope Pyongyang has for success in this war is to end it
before the rest of the U.S. Army comes storming in. If the second
echelon reaches Seoul, the third echelon -- two more mechanized corps
from farther north -- will pass through and rush for the city of Pusan
in a repetition of June-July 1950. That would give the North temporary
control of the peninsula, though several hundred thousand South Korean
regulars and a million reservists would soon counterattack to expel
the invaders.
It is extremely unlikely that the North could achieve this degree
of success given the realities of the 1990s. The North's 1950 success
depended on the gross imbalance of capabilities between North and
South, the absence of U.S. forces on the peninsula, and the
comparatively slow arrival of U.S. reinforcements. The balance is
firmly in Seoul's favor now.
In the event of war, the most likely outcome by far is that allied
forces would stall the North Korean army north of Seoul, probably at
great cost, but without any real danger that the enemy could reach the
capital. (Casualties would be very high; if Pyongyang's troops were
not willing to fight, the war would not happen in the first place.)
After the allies regroup, while continuing to punish North Korean
forces throughout the peninsula, the allied counter-offensive will
sweep north. How far it will go depends largely on political
calculations, especially Chinese sensitivity to movement north of
Pyongyang.
Wild Cards
There are two low-probability, high-impact variations on this
scenario that merit discussion. The greatest danger is war between the
United States and China. Most observers believe China would not
directly support the North unless Seoul was clearly the aggressor.
Some argue that China might join the war in order to expel the United
States from Asia. In the opinion of this author, such a scenario
requires China to abandon its deep commitment to long-term economic
development and achieving its rightful place among the superpowers --
a goal that will take another 50 years -- in pursuit of very
questionable short-term gains. So assume China is not directly
involved.
North Korean use of nuclear weapons is also worth discussion. It is
possible Pyongyang has a few nuclear warheads for its missiles. A
nuclear strike on a city, port, airfield or other facility in South
Korea would kill millions, and would severely damage some aspects of
the allies' fighting capability. It would not alter the outcome of the
war, however, except to rule out any possibility of a negotiated
settlement. Threats of use, rather than actual use, might be more
effective, perhaps keeping Japan from supporting the allies or
bringing about a political settlement.
Preparing to fight and win this war is not easy, and avoiding very
costly surprise requires South Korean and U.S. forces to maintain a
high state of readiness. But recent diplomatic developments, growing
allied strength, North Korean economic woes, and the steady
deterioration of North Korean forces all give hope that we can
continue to deter war as we have since 1953. The North Koreans have to
know that if they start a war, the ultimate outcome is in little
doubt.
Lonnie Henley is a career Army officer and Asian analyst assigned
to the Pentagon. The views expressed here are his own and not those of
the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Jane's Defence Weekly
April 30, 1997
"USA to ponder N Korean defector's nuclear riddle"
By Barbara Starr
It is "unclear" how much of the military information on North Korea
offered by defector Hwang Jang-yop is "hearsay" and how much is based
on direct knowledge, according to Kurt Campbell, US deputy assistant
secretary of defense for Asia and Pacific affairs. The USA hopes to
begin talking to Hwang shortly, specifically to evaluate his view that
North Korea still considers the " war option" as a viable strategy.
The USA is also interested in verifying his statement that North Korea
holds enough fissile material to construct a nuclear weapon.
The USA believes statements attributed to Hwang are genuine. However,
the question remains how much of the knowledge is first hand. Campbell
also noted that North Korea has stored large amounts of chemical
weapons close to the demilitarised zone along with its long-standing
inventory of artillery pieces, mortars and rocket launchers.
Although the economic crisis in North Korea continues to affect
certain military tasks such as pilot training, Campbell said that the
forward-based weaponry can be readily fired against the south at any
time. He further acknowledged that much of the artillery and weaponry
is in tunnels or buried for survivability.
There is "nothing we can do if North Koreaâ wanted to roll out
artillery and fire on Seoul," Campbell said. However, US officials do
not believe any attack is imminent.
Campbell said that North Korean exercises in February and March were
in fact "not very effective militarily" and "very expensive" for the
cash-strapped nation, but nonetheless indicate the continued
government support for the military.
The ability of US troops in South Korea to detect and cope with a
chemical warfare attack "could be improved", Campbell added. US forces
are currently testing a variety of detector technologies that could be
placed at key ports and airfields in South Korea.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Journal Sentinel Inc.
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel
April 28, 1997 Monday Final
"Korean defector's claims dubious"
BY FOSTER
That North Korean bigwig who defected to South Korea a few days ago
may not be the "crazy man" his former colleagues say he is. But some
of the frightening things he has said and written seem a little
extreme and ought to be treated with a fair amount of skepticism.
Among other scary things, he said North Korea possesses nuclear
weapons and would not hesitate to use them to turn South Korea and
Japan into a "sea of fire. " So mighty is North Korea, he said, that
it can even "reduce the United States and Japan to ashes."
The warning generated a lot of attention partly because the
defector, Hwang Jang Yop, was his country's top ideologue. In
February, he sought political asylum in South Korea's consulate in
Beijing. He finally made it to South Korea last weekend, where some of
his warnings were made public.
There is little doubt that, at least until fairly recently, North
Korea wanted the world to believe it was acquiring a nuclear arsenal.
In 1994, it signed an agreement that promised to end its nuclear
program, but U.S. intelligence officials have said they think North
Korea collected enough plutonium for one or two bombs.
Maybe that estimate is too low. At the same time, asylum-seekers
want soft landings when they defect, which means they tend to say
things their hosts want to hear. Also, they usually harbor grudges
against their former comrades. They are, after all, defectors.
But even if North Korea is the menace that Hwang says it is, it is
also desperately poor. Earlier this month, after a four-day tour of
North Korea, Rep. Tony Hall (D-Ohio) reported that he was "stunned"
to find people in rural areas trying to subsist on a diet of five
ounces of rice a day, plus grass, weeds and tree bark.
Wars are notoriously costly things to wage, and a nation on the
verge of starvation is not apt to start a war that it could not pay
for or launch an attack that would inevitably invite devastating
reprisals. North Korea's rulers may be fanatics, but that does not
mean they are suicidal.
Hwang was the philosophical mastermind of the cruel, crude system
that has beggared and tyrannized the people of North Korea. Maybe
that's just another reason to be wary of the extraordinary things he
is now saying.
His track record isn't any better than the record of the regime he
helped to build and from which he has decided to flee.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Kyodo News International, Inc
Asian Political News
April 28, 1997
"N. Korea warns Hwang's defection could spark war"
TOKYO, April 23 Kyodo North Korea on Wednesday blasted high-ranking
defector Hwang Jang Yop as a "lunatic" and a " war criminal" and said
South Korea's act of bringing him to Seoul constituted "a declaration
of war against the North."
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), quoted a statement it said
had been issued by the pro-North "the National Democratic Front of
South Korea" as saying the 74-year-old defector's arrival in Seoul on
Sunday could undermine peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
"It is, in actuality, a forestalling attack and a declaration of
war against the North. If one side fires, the other side is bound to
retaliate and the crossfire will inevitably lead to igniting a war, "
the statement said.
South Korean authorities said they are not aware of the pro-North
Korean group's existence.
The KCNA report, monitored in Tokyo, is the first comment from
Pyongyang's official media on Hwang's arrival in Seoul 68 days after
he sought asylum at the South Korean diplomatic mission in Beijing.
Hwang, who was the chief ideologue of the state philosophy "juche"
or self-reliance, is the first member of the North Korean leadership
ever to defect to South Korea
In his arrival statement, he painted a bleak picture of North Korea
as a country without hope whose efforts to build a socialist paradise
left it a "beggar."
In return, the KCNA statement heaped abuse on the defector,
variously calling him a "traitor," "a common enemy of the North and
South Korean people," and "a crazy man sick with paranoia,
eccentricity and mental derangement."
"To our people, his worth is less than a dog's," it said.
In what appeared to be a thinly veiled threat against Hwang's life,
it said, "If Hwang, an uninvited guest and a spark of confrontation
and war with the North, is left alone, our people will soon suffer a
holocaust of war. "
----------------------------------------------------------------------
The Montgomery Advertiser
April 28, 1997, Monday
"EVEN STARVED, NORTH KOREA DANGEROUS"
By Paul Greenberg
It sounds like something out of a sci-fi horror comic book, or
maybe just the history of the 20th century: A defector from another
starving totalitarian regime says its leaders wouldn't hesitate to
reduce its neighbors to a "sea of fire."
Hwang Jang Yop, formerly of Pyongyang, North Korea, may have had
his own reasons for sneaking out of the country he helped shape as
chief ideologue and tutor to the next tyrant. He may have his own
reasons now for echoing South Korea's official line and worst fears.
He makes the North's strategy sound grotesque, irrational, paranoiac
... but that is a fairly accurate description of North Korea's
insulated, isolated, quite mad leadership.
Talk about criminal fantasies: "North Korea is capable of scorching
South Korea with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and rockets," this
highest ranking of defectors warns. "North Korea believes that if
there were a war, it would certainly win, and if the United States
intervenes, it can reduce the United States and Japan to ashes."
Well, the West can't say it wasn't warned. Washington may yet rue
the day or night that it didn't take out North Korea's nuclear
capacity in a surgical strike -- the way the Israelis destroyed Saddam
Hussein's nuclear plant and threat in 1981.
At the time, this country joined the world in condemning Israel's
raid on that reactor at Baghdad, only to have to do the job again a
decade later on a much grander scale, once Iraq's ruler had shown his
hand in Kuwait. (Nor is Saddam Hussein finished even now, or the world
with him.)
Now it is Pyongyang that may be harboring delusions of grandeur --
and horror. Month after month, year after year, Washington has chosen
to placate, rather than confront North Korea.
Practicing a kind of diplomacy not always distinguishable from
bribery, the United States has offered North Korea's rabid regime
food, nuclear power, alternate fuel sources, a soft word and just
about anything else -- if only it will keep its latest word not to
develop nuclear weapons.
In an earlier time, this kind of diplomacy was called by a
different name --appeasement -- but the results could prove just as
much of a failure this time around.
Totalitarian powers that agree to freeze their nukes can thaw them
in a hurry. And without any compunctions. What's more, the smaller the
power, the greater its apocalyptic ambitions. When the full story of
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963 came to light, it became clear that
Fidel Castro had been dying to get his trigger finger on the Soviets'
nuclear arsenal.
IF HE HAD succeeded, a lot of others would have died with him.
North Korea's own Ultimate Leader, Kim Jong Il, represents the same
kind of ever clearer and more present danger to the peace of the
planet. There is no longer a Soviet Union, but that evil empire has
left a legacy of sawdust Stalins.
Much as Americans would like to slide back into our usual
isolationist coma, the world is still a dangerous place. Lest we
forget, there's still a Cold War in Asia. And however cozy its
connections with the Clinton-Gore campaign/administration, Red China
remains Red, and North Korea is even Redder. For Beijing, it must be
like having a crazy nephew in the attic -- playing with nukes.
Why would any country whose subjects have been reduced to eating
tree bark entertain such illusions? This isn't strategy; it's Grand
Guignol. It's the Theater of the Absurd with nukes.
It is, in short, the diplomatic and military history of the 20th
century. Suppose a high-ranking defector from North Korea had warned
the world in early 1950 that Pyongyang was about to invade the South
with everything it had? Would oh-so-respectable opinion have given him
any credence -- before June 25, 1950?
The surest way to repeat the past is to forget it. The reason
George Santayana's maxim to that effect is endlessly repeated is
because it remains so relevant.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
AND REPEATING THE PAST COLLECTIVE MISTAKES OF HISTORY IS PRECISELY
WHAT CAUSES GRAND SUPERCYCLE CRASHES, I.E., THE GREAT MISTAKES OF
HISTORY HAPPENING OVER AND OVER AGAIN, BECAUSE MAN, IN HIS IRRATIONAL
GREED, FAILS TO LEARN FROM HIS PAST MISTAKES...
-J. Adams
----------------------------------------------------------------------
International Herald Tribune
April 24, 1997, Thursday
"Russia and China Agree: Washington Is Too Bossy"
By Lee Hockstader; Washington Post Service
The presidents of Russia and China, symbolically thumbing their
noses at the United States, signed a declaration Wednesday formally
endorsing ''a new multipolar world'' that would counterbalance
Washington's global muscle.
But beyond pomp, ceremony and words of friendship at their Moscow
meeting, there was little sign of what policies or actions Boris
Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin planned to embrace that would advance the
''new international order'' they so gravely proclaimed.
Although both took pains not to mention the United States by name,
their resentment of Washington's unrivaled clout permeated the Kremlin
signing ceremony.
''Some are pulling the world toward a unipolar order,'' said Mr.
Yeltsin, who, when he last met with President Bill Clinton in Helsinki
a month ago, appeared grumpy at a press conference afterward.
''Someone wants to dictate order in the world. And we want a
multipolar world.''
He added, ''These poles constitute the foundation of a new world
order.''
China is on record supporting Russia's bitter opposition to the
eastward expansion of NATO, the Western security alliance in which the
United States plays the leading role. NATO is expected to announce in
July that it will add members from the former Soviet-dominated Warsaw
Pact Q probably the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
In the past, mutual suspicions between Moscow and Beijing have run
deep. In December, for example, Russia's defense minister, Igor
Rodionov, warned on the eve of a visit by Prime Minister Li Peng to
Moscow that China remained a military threat to Russia.
Visiting China this month, though, Mr. Rodionov shifted gears. A
member of his traveling delegation told the Interfax news agency that
not only did China no longer pose a threat, but also that ''Russia can
supply China with up-to-date arms and technology for their production
without harm to its own security.''
For months, it has been reported that as part of their
reconciliation, Moscow and Beijing planned troop reductions, perhaps
of 15 percent to 20 percent, along the 8,000-kilometer (5,000-mile)
border that once demarcated the Soviet Union and China. But the issue
appeared clouded Wednesday. Citing an unnamed person, Interfax
reported that the troops would remain where they were and that the two
sides had merely ruled out any increase.
In a separate accord scheduled to be signed Thursday, Mr. Yeltsin,
Mr. Jiang and the leaders of the former Soviet central Asian
republics of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will agree to inform
each other about troop movements in the border region.
Mr. Yeltsin, who returned from a vacation to greet the Chinese
leader on his five-day visit to Russia, said the occasion was ''of
enormous, possibly historic importance, as we are determining the fate
of the 21st century.''
Mr. Jiang, who speaks some Russian, addressed the Russian
Parliament with a similar message of friendship and ''strategic
partnership.''
''Let the powerful tree of friendship between our two peoples
always be green,'' he said.
The two leaders announced that a committee on ''friendship, peace
and development'' would be set up to nurture the warming bilateral
relationship.
The Russian side will be headed by Arkadi Volsky, who has close
ties to top figures in Russia's crumbling military-industrial complex.
The top Chinese representative will be Huang Izheng, vice chairman of
the Chinese National People's Congress Commission for Financial and
Economic Issues.
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