Bergson and Univocity
by Beth Metcalf
Bergson says that experience gives us only composite mixtures and
differences in degree. With the badly analyzed
composite given in experience, the mixture of
recollection-images and perception-images are different only in
degree and not in kind. However, Intuition as a method takes us
beyond the possibilities of experience to the conditions of real
experience. The method of Intuition gives us a moment of
dualism that differs in kind, not just in degree.
This is not the oppositional dualism of composite experience.
Rather, it is a moment of dualism that divides
representation in general into two lines that differ in kind.
When a composite is decomposed by the intuitive method, there are
two types of multiplicity. One is Space which is homogeneous,
discontinuous, and actual difference in degree. It is perception
in space that puts us at once into matter. The other is Duration
which is heterogeneous, continuous, and virtual difference in
kind. It is memory of past preserved in duration that puts us at
once into the mind. All real difference is on the side of
duration. Therefore, although there is a point within composite
experience that gives us only mixtures and difference in degree,
beyond the turn in experience is a moment of dualism
(difference in kind). And, beyond that is a point of convergence
in the virtual where dualism rediscovers monism. In this moment
of monism we rediscover the point where the lines
intersect again, not in the composite in which they started, but
in a virtual point that is the sufficient reason for the
composite---the condition of real experience.
Therefore, Representational thought gives us the homogeneity of
false problems and badly analyzed
composites that differ only in degree and never reach
difference in kind at all. Bergson says it is only with the
heterogeneity of the Method of Intuition that the sufficient
reason for an actualized composite is found on the other side of
the turn in experience. This is, therefore, the
transcendental empiricism that we always find with
Deleuzes Univocity. The transcendental condition of
experience is never found within our experience. It is the
virtual which is actualized in experience. Virtual-transcendental
conditions account for all real differences of duration which
become actualized. Each actualization finds its sufficient reason
on the other side---the virtual side---of the turn in experience.
Each actualization is generated from a real difference in kind
that can never be found in the mere possibilities of experience.
Each actualization is really different from any other.
Deleuze says it is this virtual-transcendental condition that
allows Bergson to give Einsteins scientific Theory of
Relativity the metaphysical foundation it lacked. Bergson knew
that the condition for Einsteins scientific theory cannot
be found inside our empirical experience. A transcendentalism
that merely resembles experience cannot account for experience.
Rather, we must find the transcendental conditions of real
experience. We must reach a transcendental
empiricism.
Bergson criticizes Einsteins Theory of Relativity for
merely introducing another way of spatializing time. Einstein
says there can be two systems that are not of the same time. Each
frame of reference sees the other as a different time. But what
is this other time? Both systems are held in the
symbolic identity of the concept of spatialized time. The two
systems can differ only quantitatively. If time is held within a
conceptual identity of spatialized time, there can be no real
difference in kind. The other time cannot be lived as different.
Bergson says, paradoxically, there can be no real difference in
lived duration unless time is ontologically singular virtuality.
There can be no other time as another one of many durations. For
Bergson, only a single time can account for the virtual
multiplicity of real difference in kind. Duration is virtual
coexistence of all degrees of a single time. Bergson integrates
duration into space as sufficient reason for that which is
actualized in extension. The virtual point is the sufficient
reason in duration that becomes actualized. There is extensity in
duration. There is duration in matter. The two lines of
repetition---the two multiplicities---the virtual-real
multiplicity and the actual-numerical multiplicity---intersect
and interpenetrate. Extensity becomes qualified by the
contractions that become expanded in it. There are numbers
enclosed in qualities. Intensities are included in duration.
Memory is difference in kind, matter is repetition in degree.
Between the two lines are all degrees of difference and all
nature of difference. Duration is the most contracted degree of
matter. Matter is the most expanded degree of duration. There is
no longer dualism between difference in degree and difference in
nature. All coexist in monism. All levels of expansion and
contraction coexist in the virtual singularity that is all real
difference.
Therefore, just as Univocity says being in one sense, so
does Bergsonism live time in one sense. And that of
which being is said, or time is lived, is the difference of real
distinction---of real difference in kind. If time is merely a
fourth dimension of space, as Einstein says, then we still have a
merely spatialized-time. There can be no real difference in time
at all. Bergson says that Einsteins theory merely finds
another way of spatializing time---of conceptually symbolizing
relative difference in degree in a way that cannot be lived as
difference. For Einsteins Relativity Theory, different
reference frames are merely relative to a totalizable structure
of space-time. Therefore, Bergson tries to give a metaphysical
foundation for Einsteins theory. That is, a
transcendental empirical philosophy must be the
foundation for scientific theory. A scientific theory is an
actualization of a virtual ontology. Science is the actual,
numerical, and discontinuous multiplicity of space. Philosophy
is the virtual, continuous, and qualitative multiplicity of
duration. The intersection of these two types of
multiplicities is necessary to give science its philosophical
foundation.
Therefore, Bergson says that there cannot be multiple
times that could be totalized into one symbolic unity.
That would be merely the multiple/one opposition that
Univocity overcomes with its concept of multiplicity. If
there were multiple durations, then there would be one symbolic
or conceptual spatialized time to which all durations would be
relative. Only with Univocity can there be multiplicity. Only
with Univocity can there be One time lived in All
durations of real difference. There is no multiple/one
opposition. Rather, there are two types of multiplicity that
interpenetrate in the One-All. At the level of virtual
multiplicity, with its interpenetrating contractions, duration
cannot divide without changing in kind. At the level of
numerical-actual multiplicity, matter divides without changing
its nature. The two lines of repetition intersect as the virtual
is actualized. Between the two lines of repetition all
degrees of difference and all nature of difference are
said/lived in one sense.
For Deleuzes Bergsonism, duration is lived in the sense of
a single time, but it is the real difference of rhythms of
duration. That is, there is monism of time. But this monism of
single time is not at all inconsistent with the pluralism of
really distinct rhythms of duration. Only when there is
dualism of real difference in kind, can there be
divergent lines of contraction in a monism of time.
The real differences of contracted rhythms of duration become
inserted into matter to be actualized/individuated differently.
Each actualization is really different from any other
actualization. Each actualization is open onto ontological
duration. Monism rediscovers dualism generated as it is
actualized. Movement is explained by duration inserted into
matter. On the one hand, space (difference in degree) is
homogeneous and discontinuous. On the other hand, duration
(difference in kind) is internal succession that is heterogeneous
and continuous. These are two types of multiplicity. Things have
a rhythm of duration that is a way of being in time. Things
differ in kind from other things and from themselves.
Duration is not merely psychological experience, but our
insertion into the ontology of things. (Bergsonism p.
37) It [duration] is a case of a transition, of
a change, a becoming, but it is a becoming
that endures, a change that is substance itself. So, we see
that virtual duration is single Substance (monism) that is real
difference, because it is dualism as difference in
kind. The real difference, the real distinction of the dualistic
tendencies of difference in kind IS the ontologically single
Substance (duration). Therefore, just as Spinozas Univocity
is ontologically single Substance that is, itself, real
distinction (i.e., real distinction in the parallelism of
attributes and powers); so is Bergsons thought a
monism of contracted Substance (virtual duration)
that is, itself, the dualism of real difference in
kind. Bergsons moment of dualism is the real
difference that allows interpenetrating contractions within the
monism of duration. Monism and dualism are both
together in duration lived in a single sense. There is harmony of
dualism (difference in kind) and monism (degrees of
expansion-contraction). This harmony gives us the
pluralism (including both generalized and limited) of
all real difference lived in the sense of one
Time.
Therefore, just as Spinozas attributes are thought and
extension that together qualify new forms; so also does
Bergsons intelligence (B 88-9) distinguish form
and sense. Form is expanded (or extended) in matter at the
same time that its sense (expression of thought) is contracted in
new uses of matter in a new qualified form of scientific
reference. Neither Spinoza's attributes nor Bergsons
intelligence presuppose an order of matter according to
categories of possible experience. Intelligence is
contracted in matter at the same time matter is expanded in
duration
.
Therefore, for Bergson (as it is for Univocity) all real
distinction IS the ontological singularity of virtuality. The
virtual is not to be confused with the possible. The possible is
in the image of the real. The possible is merely realized in the
homogeneity of resemblance. For Bergson, there is not the
realization of the possible, but the actualization of the
virtual. The actual does not resemble the virtual. The virtual is
distributed in lines that cant be summed up. Divergent
lines that coexist in the virtual cease to coexist in the actual.
Each actualization retains the whole, but from a certain
perspective. But an actualized perspective is not to be confused
with a perspective that is merely a realized possibility of a
totalized concept. Duration is the virtual Whole that becomes
actualized by divergent lines. But these lines do not form a
whole and do not resemble what they actualize. Actualization is
always creation of something new. Actualization is, each time,
the differentiation of the virtual whole, but from a perspective.
Each actualized perspective IS, itself, a really different world
of space-time. Each actualization is a differentiated perspective
of the non-totalizable virtual whole. There can be no totalizable
whole between or among different actualizations, because they are
incommensurable actualized perspectives of a non-totalizable
virtual. Therefore, we see that there is not the relativity of
perspectives within a unified space-time concept. Rather, there
is real difference of duration in each perspective of
spatialized-time. All really different actualizations live time
in one sense. It is because all actualizations are lived
in the singular sense of one time, that they can be really
different rhythms of duration.
Therefore, the composite dualisms of multiple/one opposition are
not to be confused with multiplicity. For Deleuze's Bergson,
monism is not opposed to pluralism. There is not the alternative:
either monism or pluralism. Monism no longer
sees the many as mere illusion. Pluralism is no longer merely the
diversity of a totalizing Unity. Bergsons
dualism of difference in kind is not to be confused
with the negative oppositional dualisms of Representational
thinking. Nor is Bergsons monism to be confused
with a self-identical concept or the unity of a symbolic
spatialized-time. Bergsons monism (consistent
with the Univocity of Time) is the one that is all
real difference in kind. Bergsons pluralism
(multiplicity of duration) is the virtual coexistence of all
real difference in one time. Monism is
pluralism. Univocity is multiplicity. Therefore, Univocity is not
opposed to multiplicity. Univocity is not to be confused with the
one opposed to the multiple. Rather, Univocity IS multiplicity.
(What is Philosophy p.152) There must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from the outset. This is not because dualism is better than unity but because the multiplicity is precisely what happens between the two.
However, Deleuze never refers to Bergsonism as Univocity. I
believe this is because Deleuze sees Univocity as constituted by
three syntheses. Bergson never reaches the third synthesis. (Just
as Hume is Deleuzes influence for the first synthesis,
Bergson is an influence for the first and second. Neither Hume
nor Bergson reaches the Univocity that requires all three
syntheses.) Bergson reaches only the actualization of the
virtual. He never reaches the third synthesis of
counter-actualization---the synthesis of the eternal return.
Bergsonism is movement-image that does not reach the time-image.
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