Expressive Univocity
by Beth Metcalf
Deleuze describes Spinozas expressive conception of
knowledge (Expressionism in Philosophy p.15),
not as
some operation on an object that remained outside it, but as a
reflection, an expression, of an object in the mind.
Therefore, the object of Expressionism is not to be
confused with the object of Representation. Nor is the mind
to be confused with a conceptual form of psychological
consciousness. That is, the object is not represented in a
concept. Expressionism first asks what expresses itself in a true
idea. Expressionism is not a representation of a perceived object
to a conscious subject. It does not correlate representative
content with conceptual form. Rather, Expressionism composes
internal relations of understanding which precede any relation of
representation. What is this expressive internal relation that
makes an adequate idea a true form?
In EiP 20-22, Deleuze tells us that Hegel criticized Spinozas
geometrical method for being unable to frame an internal
development of the Absolute. Hegel accused Spinoza of using only
geometrical fictions that remain limited by the
externality of viewpoints. But Deleuze is saying that Hegel never
understood what Spinoza was doing. Spinoza is saying that a
geometrical method only involves fictions if causes are inferred
from their sensory effects. However, Spinozas method does
not infer causes from effects. Rather, Spinozas
Expressionism takes Absolute Infinity as a Cause. This Cause is
not inferred from any sensory effects. However, it is not
internal to an Absolute Concept either. That would still merely
be an internal unfolding which would never escape the identity of
the concept in general. Spinozas Univocity has internal
relation. However, Spinozas internal relation is not to be
confused with any relation internal to the concept. Spinozas
Expressionism is without any presupposed concept.
Therefore, Deleuze-Spinozas Expressionism comes out of its
Univocity. Attributes are points of view on Substance. In taking
attributes to their absolute limit, they are no longer external
points of view deducing only single properties of an object. Now,
essences of substance are the infinity of points of view on
Substance. Modes are deduced but, in this absolute limit, they
are properties that take on an infinite collective being.
Attributes express really distinct unlimited forms of Substance.
Attributes qualify really distinct and formally distinct essences
of ontologically single Substance. Attributes are forms common to
the essence of Substance and the essences of modes. When
attributes are taken to their absolute limit, each essence is an
unlimited form of Substance. Yet the really distinct formal
essences are ontologically one. However, these forms must not be
confused with those of Representational thought united in one
universal generality with no real distinction. With Expressive
Univocity, there are no numerically distinct essences or
substances whereby one could be limited by another. In the
absolute limit, each really and formally distinct essence takes
on an infinite collective being. Therefore, Spinozas
response to Hegels criticism would be that the Absolute
cannot be reached through the Concept. The Absolute can be
reached only through Univocity.
Only the internal expressiveness of the Idea is real. Ideas
express the really distinct, infinite qualities of ontologically
single Substance. The Idea represents things only as these things
express their cause. The represented object is never the cause of
the Idea. The sequence of Ideas is not traced from the sequence
of things. It is no longer the mind deducing external objects by
inferring causes. Rather, internal expressive form in correlation
with material cause is the Idea in its own sub-representative
composition. Expressive understanding deduces properties from
what logic perceives as necessary. Ideas do not
represent an object given to perception. The understanding
perceives the logical necessity of really distinct essences in
ontologically single Substance. Therefore, comprehension
is not a conceptual understanding. Perception is not
an empirically given sensory perception of
representational content. It is what understanding perceives
to be necessary in the essence of Substance. Objects express
themselves in a mind that perceives and comprehends
what is expressed. The essence of Substance, when expressed in
the attribute, is a formal essence. When expressed in the Idea,
it is objective essence. There is internal unity of Idea in its
form and its expressive material cause. Understanding of the Idea
is thereby the minds way of perceiving. Ideas
are the eyes through which the mind sees. (EiP22)
This understanding, then, is not a conceptual
understanding, but the comprehension of an Idea. Nor is this
perceiving to be confused with any sensory
perception. EiP 101, But as expressing the essence of
substance, attributes are necessarily referred to an
understanding that understands them objectively, that is,
perceives what they express.
Expression is both ontological and epistemological. Formal and
material causes are differentially united. Expressionism is the
correlative genesis of being and knowing. Ideas follow materially
from the Idea of Substance (ontologically single, unformed
matter), while at the same time following formally from the power
of thinking really distinct forms. There is unity of these two
derivations. An adequate Idea expresses its cause and is
explained by our power of knowing. An adequate Idea unites
expressive content and explicative form. Therefore, the Ideas
cause is not an object it represents. Rather, it represents an
object because it expresses its own internal cause. Logical form
(comprehension) and expressive content (extension) are joined in
the concatenation of Ideas. Ideas do not represent that which is
known through sensory effects. The adequate idea represents a
thing as expressing its cause. Ideas have expressive, not
representative, content.
However, one may ask how these adequate Ideas can necessarily
exist. Just because a logical form is joined with the Idea of a
material cause does not mean that they necessarily exist. But
Expressionism says that they necessarily exist as expressed. They
are not mere possibilities of the concept. They necessarily exist
as expression comprehends and perceives them. They exist as
necessary essences. Only when characteristic relations,
corresponding to the modal essences, are filled by extensive
parts, do modes come into existence (become actualized). But the
modal essences exist, and they exist necessarily, even if they
are not actualized. Modal essences exist as virtual-real Ideas.
With the Representational image of thought, there is
presupposition of a correspondence between the conceptual and the
real. But this correspondence is merely extrinsic designation. It
tells us nothing about the internal form of an adequate idea. It
tells us nothing about the ideas formal content or material
cause. Content is only representational content (extrinsic
designation). Form is mere psychological form of consciousness
(conceptual possibility). However, Expression is a purely logical
understanding of an Idea of unformed matter in the process of
being composed formally and correlated with objective, material
Cause. This is not an understanding through logical properties of
the concept, but through physical affections internal to the
Idea. It is purely the question of What can a body do?
That is, Expressionism is not a moral view of the world in which
mind or soul has eminence over the body.
Expressionism first finds a form of relations internal to the
Idea before representing an object. This gives us the sufficient
reason for what is represented. It makes an idea adequate.
Therefore, Substance expresses itself in an internal
comprehension before becoming actualized in the finite existing
modes. Attributes constitute the essence of Substance while they
contain the essences of modes. Therefore, while the attributes
are the common and univocal form of Substance and modes, they
also complicate the essence of Substance and explicate the
essence of the modes so that essence is not the same in Substance
and modes. Expressionism in Philosophy p.48,
as long
as one refuses community of form [i.e., refuses the same
attributes in Substance and modes], one is condemned to confuse
the essences of creatures [modes] and God [Substance] through
analogy. As soon as one posits community of form, one has the
means of distinguishing them. Cause (Substance) and effect
(modes) are known through their univocal attributes (common
forms) which constitute the essence of their cause and contain
the essence of their effects. Ontologically single Substance is
Cause that remains in itself, and modes are effects that remain
in their cause. Attributes are common forms that constitute the
essence of Substance and contain the essences of modes. But the
essence of Substance is not the same as the essences of the
modes.
This means that as long as we remain in analogical thinking which
refuses any form common to Substance and modes, we will never be
able to find difference between the essence of Substance and the
essences of modes. But Spinozas Univocity posits the
attribute as form common to Substance and modes, thereby giving
difference between the essence of Substance and the essences of
modes. Therefore, Spinozas Univocity gives difference that
analogy never could. Now, attributes are forms that constitute
the differentiation of Substance and contain the differenciation
of modes.
Deleuzes Expressionism is the logic of sense. Essence has
no existence outside the attributes (i.e., essence-sense is the
expressible of every proposition). But essence is expressed as
the essence of Substance, not of the attribute (i.e.,
essence-event is the attributable to all bodies or states of
affairs). Each attribute expresses an essence and attributes it
to ontologically single Substance. Attributes are not properties
that are attributed to numerically distinct substances
represented by a concept. Rather, the attribute is attributive.
It attributes its internal essence (sense) to a Substance
designated as ontologically identical for all attributes and the
modes they contain. Therefore, when it is said that Expressionism
composes an internal relation of understanding, we find that this
internal Idea is the expressed essence or sense. It is not the
universal generality of the concept. As represented in the
concept, attributes can only deduce single properties of an
object in general. But when taken to their absolute limit,
attributes find their internal relation to an Idea. Substance
contains the infinity of points of view (all real-formal
distinctions) on itself (ontologically one).
Therefore, Expressive Ideas are modes of thought. They are
adequate and necessary forms within the internal singularity they
compose. They are necessary within the form of their own singular
composition. However, they must never be mistaken for universal
forms relative to a truth in general. There is variety of the
singular, not the variability of the general. That is, there is
the truth of the relative, not the relativity of truth. Univocity
reconciles the ontological unity of Substance with the
qualitative plurality of attributes. However, this unity and
plurality must not be confused with that of Representational
thought which merely unifies the many into a totalizable unity of
the One. Reality is not a unified Truth that could be represented
from different points of view. Rather, points of view are all
really distinct Individual-worlds, ontologically single.
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