How Can We Avoid Relativism?
by Beth Metcalf
Since Alan Sokals hoax perpetrated on
a philosophical journal, philosophers lumped under the heading
postmodern have come under attack. Deleuze is
one of those accused of being an intellectual
imposter who abuses scientific terms. The critics
fancy themselves to be champions of scientific objectivism in
opposition to postmodern relativism. But how can the
critics think Deleuze uses terms in a scientific sense? How
can they mistake him for a relativist? Deleuze writes as a
philosopher, not a scientist. He understands that
relativism is a problem for philosophy. It is a problem
that cannot be solved by merely entering into the classical
debate among clashing relative opinions. Deleuze addresses
the philosophical problem of relativism by changing how the
problem is posited.
The classical positing of the problem presumes a negative structure of scientific objectivity or subjective moral value -- objectivism or moral relativism. Stephen Jay Gould addressed the problem by saying that scientific truth and moral value are separate and nonoverlapping magisteria (NOMA). Sam Harris in The Moral Landscape claims that scientific objectivity can determine morality. While Goulds NOMA creates an opposition between the magisteria (1), Harriss claim leads to a scientific reductionism that limits morality to merely that which does not violate the objective (i.e. intersubjective normative) conditions of our human well-being. Both sides still assume the classical negative structure of the problem (opposition or limitation) that Deleuze calls the Representational Image of Thought. This classical model assumes (Difference & Repetition 203) the limitation of the One by the many and the opposition of the many to the One. Neither side allows for any real creative difference, because both are in the unchanging structure of conceptual identity. Whenever forces are negative (opposition or limitation), they are in the image of a prior conceptual possibility. Deleuze says (DR 211), What difference can there be between the existent [actual] and the non-existent [virtual] if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as a possibility?.....Difference can no longer be anything but the negative determined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by possibles upon each other in order to be realized, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real . The negative structure of opposition-limitation assumes a prior conceptual possibility of determination. This structure is the assumption that we already know what is possible and what is not.
Deleuze is not an
enemy of scientific objectivity. (Of course, science must
inform our political and moral choices). Nor does he
advocate anything goes relativism. (Relativism
would be impossible to consistently defend). Rather,
Deleuze rejects the whole structure of the classical debate that
opposes objectivism to moral relativism. Philosophy must
not be opposed to scientific objectivity. However, it
cannot be reduced to science either. When we assume the
Classical Representational worldview, we succumb to a scientific
reductionism that confuses philosophy with science. This
Classical view cannot take us beyond the interchangeability
between one universalizing objective Truth and many
relative perspectives. It is this classical structure that
we must question if we are to overcome relativism.
In America today we see a
religious-political threat to science. Religious
creationism and far right agendas are opposed to scientific
objectivity. And even though creationists believe in
religious absolutes, they try to use a strategy of relativism to
claim that their worldview is just as scientifically valid as
evolutionary theory and should therefore get equal time in public
education. But if scientists blame Deleuzes
postmodernism for this relativistic worldview, they
blame a potential ally in their struggle against relativism.
Classical Representational assumptions cannot be philosophical
foundation for the real difference of scientific evolutionary
theory. Darwin gives us the best supported scientific
theory so far for species change through time. And
science does not need philosophy for empirical support. But
classical philosophy cannot be a good historical-cultural
foundation for a worldview of real change through time. At
best, it can be the metaphysical foundation for an opposition
between fixism and evolutionism, with no real difference between
them (2). When the philosophical foundation is already
extended into one fixed oppositional structure of variability; we
presuppose one Transcendent, Unchanging Conceptual Image of
Identity from which no real difference can evolve.
Richard Dawkins is one of the critics of
postmodernism who disrobes Deleuze and
Guattari as intellectual impostors for using a
pseudo-scientific style of writing. Dawkins still labors
under the classical assumption that philosophical language must
conform to the negative structure (opposition-limitation). However,
according to Deleuze, that classical structure is still a
theological (3) vision. Deleuze writes (Logic of Sense
281), One no longer needs to believe in God. We seek
rather the structure, that is, the form which may be
filled with beliefs, but the structure has no need to be filled
in order to be called theological. Theology is
now the science of nonexisting entities, the manner in which
these entities
.animate language and make for it this
glorious body which is divided into disjunctions. From
Deleuzes philosophical point of view, the atheist Richard
Dawkins is still too theological.
The Classical Representational structure is
the Image of Unchanging Transcendence. It is the Conceptual
Identity of Self-World-God without real difference. It
cannot be a philosophical foundation for modern evolutionary
science, because it cannot allow for real transitional
difference. Likewise, it cannot account for real historical
change or cultural difference. When science assumes an
already given homogeneous and universalizing structure,
Deleuze-Bergson calls this a badly analyzed composite
that philosophy must question --- not in order to oppose science,
but in order to give our scientific worldview the metaphysical
foundation it lacks. Whereas the data of science are
assumed to be empirically given, philosophy must inquire into
that by which the given is given. Philosophy is not opposed
to science. It merely has a different vocation. The
scientific function is an actualization of reference without
consistency. The philosophical concept is virtual
consistency without reference. The philosophical concept
does not resemble the scientific function. Deleuzes
philosophy of univocity can provide a post-classical foundation
for real change in duration. It is the philosophical vision
of pure immanence and creative difference.
In Empiricism and Subjectivity,
Deleuze explains his reading of Hume. Hume is usually
understood from the perspective of the classical tradition.
However, Deleuze sees something new in his reading of Hume.
In chapter 6, Deleuze says that he distrusts the objections often
raised against Humes empiricism. He says that most
criticisms raised against the great philosophers are
philosophical objections in name only. A good philosophical
criticism must take into consideration that a philosophical
theory is not a solution to a problem already structured, but the
necessary implications of a formulated question. If one is
to criticize this question, one must consider the conditions that
make the question possible. We cannot criticize a
philosophical question by assuming as already given What
things are or How things are related. To
do so would be to assume that which philosophy must question.
It is the philosophical question itself that presents things in a
certain light. Critics can only ask whether the question
which presents things in that light is a good and rigorous
question. Only one kind of criticism is philosophical.
Does the questioning of the philosopher force the nature of
things enough? Questions about psychological intentions,
historical causes, or foundations assumed to be already
structured, have nothing to do with philosophy. They are
questions which confuse philosophy with science. Philosophy
must question that by which the sensible given is given as object
for science.
Classical tradition asks, What is
true? --- Objectivism or Relativism? --- Determinism or
Free Will? --- Rationalism or Empiricism? --- etc. But
these questions, when posited in this oppositional manner, are
not good or rigorous questions. They do not force the
nature of things enough. Such oppositional thinking keeps
both our knowledge and our sense experience inside an identity of
a presupposed concept. All oppositional relations of
thought and experience are internally related to a prior way of
thinking them possible. This classical thought is the
Transcendent Representational Image. It assumes we already
know what objects are and what relations there can be. As
long as questions are posited in this classical way, we assume
matter is structured as many numerically distinct entities
(unchanging and continuously existent) internally related in one
form of conceptual identity. No real creative or singular
difference can be derived from it.
In asking Humes question through a
becoming with Deleuzes univocity, there is a change in the
nature of the question. Deleuzes reading of Hume
reveals hidden secrets of empiricism. Hume does not ask,
How does the subject know the object that is opposed to
it? Rather, he asks, How is the subject
constituted inside the given? Humes atomism and
associationism are developments of this question. The
question, when posed in this way, does not assume a given content
already structured, or a subject already constituted. Humes
associationism must not be confused with relations internal to
their terms or with a conceptual structure encompassing its
terms. That would be to presuppose more than what is given
in sense impressions. Rather, relations are external to
their terms without a prior concept.
For Hume, mind is a collection of ideas in
the imagination. Humes question, then, is How
does mind become subject? How does imagination become
faculty? Hume says there is no constancy or
uniformity in how ideas are associated in the imagination. So,
imagination must become a faculty of human nature through other
principles. These principles of association (continguity,
resemblance, and causality) build a constancy of imagination to
form a system. Therefore, association is the nature of
imagination and gives it enough constancy and uniformity to make
the mind an object of a human science. Imagination becomes
human nature because principles of association make it constant
and settled. Humes principles of association are laws
inferred by effects in the imagination. They are not
determinate causes. Therefore, whereas science looks for
theories of cause and effect, the domain of philosophy questions
the virtual-transcendental conditions upon which empirical
science may become actualized. Science is empiricism, but
philosophy is transcendental empiricism.
So, the philosophical questions must take on
a new form. How can a science of humanity be constituted?
If the human mind is to become an object of science, how can we
find in this object enough constancy and uniformity to call it an
object of scientific inquiry? How can the subjective human
mind become its own object? Deleuze says that since a
psychology of mind is not possible, Hume changes the problem.
Only a psychology of the minds affections can constitute a
science of the human mind. But this is not just a question
about the human sciences. Even a philosophy of the natural
sciences must ask how the given is given. Philosophy must
question the constitution of the minds affections prior to
the presentation of objects for science.
Therefore, Deleuzes Hume takes
empiricism beyond the classical tradition of the Representational
Image of Thought. If ideas are not to presuppose anything
more than what is contained in sensory impressions, then we must
no longer assume that the minds associations are already
given along with sense impressions. Relations are external
and heterogeneous to their terms. That means we must no
longer assume relations internal to a homogeneous structure.
We must not assume internal relations of a generalizing,
universalizing, and totalizing concept. We must no longer
assume a homogeneous opposition between the association of ideas,
on the one hand; and sense impressions, on the other. Rather,
associationism is the heterogeneous real difference between
impressions or ideas of terms, on the one hand; and
impressions or ideas of relations, on the other. External
relations are the heterogeneity of parallelism, not the
presupposed opposition of homogeneously formed-matter and its
internal relations. Universal, generalized knowledge is not
derived from sense experience.
If ideas contain only that which we receive in sense impressions, and nothing else, then relations must be heterogeneous and external to their terms. Ideas and impressions are no longer presupposed internal relations of correspondence. It can no longer be assumed that what we say represents what we see in a totalizing structure. In the Classical-Representational model, matter is already formed in one Transcendent Image. From that perspective, Humes associationism could only be seen to internally relate terms of conceptual identity. His atomism could only be a pulvarization of the given extensive form that, in dividing, does not change nature. But Deleuzes Hume opens the forms into movement-image (4). The axes pivot into the parallelism of content (atoms of intensity) and expression (association of external relations). There are now external relations of intensive minima that, in dividing, necessarily change nature.
In the classical reading, Humes
atomism is a pulverization of the given. The atomic minimum
is the indivisible unit beyond which matter can no longer be
divided without losing its form. But that form was still
seen as the homogeneity of internal relations, universalizing one
general form. But Deleuze sees in Hume the open association
of external relations without prior concept. This reaches
that difference Deleuze calls intensity (5). Intensity
is indivisible, not because it has reached the smallest minimum
that is still of homogeneous form; but because in dividing, it
necessarily changes the nature of its form. It is no longer
one form of homogeneous and internally related terms. Rather,
it opens form in the external relations of heterogeneity. Intensity,
without prior extension, opens the forms. That is,
intensity is not yet structured in extensive relations. Whereas
classical atomism was the smallest minimum of extensive form
which, in dividing, does not change; Deleuze sees Humes
atomism as intensive minima that, in dividing, necessarily change
nature. Whereas classical form is already extended in the
numerical distinction of fixed and continuously existent objects;
intensity opens form into the real distinction of real
difference, without prior concept of how form must be extended in
matter. Whereas classical atomism can only be the internal
relations of a prior concept; Deleuze sees Humes atomism as
association of external relations without prior concept. For
Deleuze-Hume, relations are no longer associations of internal
correspondences (6).
Deleuzes post-classical reading of
Hume tells us first of all that, if experience is nothing but a
collection of perceptions, then relations are not given with
experience. Nor can they be derived from experience. Rather,
experience itself must be the effects of external relations ---
effects of principles of association. These principles
constitute, within experience, a subject who, with purposiveness
(divergent interests, pleasures, and pains) can transcend
experience. Humes relations are not causes internal
to the principles. Principles are not derived from
experience. They are laws of association inferred by their
effects. Relations function as effects of practical
conditions that fuse in the imagination to become habit. The
principles do not determine which ideas are conjoined. Rather,
they are principles of how human nature can stabilize the mind in
order to find in it an object of human sciences.
Then, is freedom merely the indeterminate in
opposition to the determinate? Or, is it merely the
limitation or lack of the determinate? Either would assume
that the subject is already constituted in a determinate form and
that free choice is merely internally related to that
determinate form. But Deleuze reads Hume to say that,
although self is determined by certain habits of past
ontological constitution, the divergent processes of this
constitution includes the problematic functioning toward future
purpose. Subject is constituted as the
problematic functioning of ontological individuation and its
external relations of practical interest. There is not a
prior conceptual form to which choices must necessarily conform.
There is no necessary form of how terms must be related in the
imagination to become a faculty. There can be external
relations of creative difference not completely determined by the
form of past constitution.
Therefore, Humes empiricism cannot be
defined as a theory of generalized knowledge derived from
experience. Moral practice is an artifice that functions to
constitute theory and practice together. Empiricism is the
practice of external relations without opposition between theory
and practice. Theory is itself a moral practice that is an
artifice, an invention of real difference. Relations are
not derived from a presupposed nature of things. Heterogeneous
parallelism of content and expression opens the forms. It
is a process of accord between powers of the given and the
principles that constitute the subject inside the given. There
is an accord of purposiveness that constitutes subjectivity
within the given.
An illegitimate functioning of the faculties
can lead to fanciful relations that become reflected in the
imagination. Fanciful relations resonate in the imagination
until these illegitimate fictions can no longer be corrected.
The danger is not error, but delirium of the imagination. But
this delirium does not only result in superstition. The
illegitimate fictions of imagination also become faculties of
human nature. The principles of association discipline this
delirium to make the mind settled and constant. However,
the imagination also uses these same principles to make us
believe that these fictions are Representations of the real.
We believe in the fiction of distinct and continuous bodies
(World), an identity of self (Self), and one universalizing
structure that unites everything (God). Our classical
philosophy is in this fanciful structure of numerically distinct
entities Represented in universalizing relations of opposition.
However, Deleuze-Humes empiricism is a
critique of this fiction that has become our Representational
Image of Thought. Reason is the habit of representations in
the qualified mind, not in things. Relations are not
representations derived from experience. They are means of
a practical activity. Therefore, theoretical knowledge is
not of primary importance for empiricism. Rather, knowledge
is the means to practical activity. There is no longer an
opposition between theory and practice. Theory is only
known through practical, external relations. Moral and
political actions are not determined by theories of science.
Rather, scientific theory is itself moral and political practice.
There is no longer an opposition between value-free science and
moral application. The moral subject is constituted inside,
and along with, the given in its practical constitution. There
are divergent and non-totalizable constructions of individuation.
The external relations of intensity overcome the
opposition-limitation structure between many individuals
and the one collective. The forms are no longer
closed in the oppositional dualisms of classical thought.
Therefore, as long as empiricism was
Classically Representational, it could only see sense impressions
as already constituted experience given to the subjective mind.
Truth could only be in the structure of one totalizable reality
with many relative perspectives. Or, objective truth was seen to
be limited by subjective error. But Deleuzes Hume
sees the subject as constituted inside the given along with
experience. Scientific objectivity now has a more solid
foundation. It must no longer fall prey to the fallacies of
classical universalizing notions of a Transcendent Image of
Representation (i.e. objects already structured and represented
to a constituted subject). Objectivity must be the function
of a new synthesis. Subjectivity is constituted inside the
ontological truth of its own epistemological expression. Post-classical
philosophy is not a theory of what is. There are not the
many relative perspectives on one Transcendent Universalizing
structure of Truth. Rather, theory is a function of
divergent practical constructs of scientific objectivity, each
time extending no farther than its conditions. Relativism is
overcome. Subject and object are both constructed and actualized
in relative objectivities of divergently structured planes.
There is no totalizing or universalizing Truth, but that is not
to say there are no objective truths. There is truth of the
relative, not relativity of Truth.
Therefore, when classical thinkers critique
Deleuzes postmodernism, they do so from their
classical perspective that assumes things already constituted and
structured. They confuse philosophy with science. They
assume that which philosophy must question. But
Deleuzes post-classical philosophy (poststructuralism)
presents things in a new light. He shows us that the
Classical Transcendent Image of Representation is not an adequate
philosophical foundation for our scientific worldview.
(1) However in another context (Deconstructing the Science Wars by Reconstructing an Old Mold), Gould himself rejects such false dichotomies.
(2) Evolutionary biologists no longer use
the classical Linnaean classification system. Rather, they
now use the phylogenetic classification system of cladistics.
However, when some of these evolutionary biologists criticize
philosophers like Deleuze or Foucault, they do so under an
unconscious assumption that philosophy should have to adhere to
that same classical structure science no longer uses. (See
Foucaults The Order of Things).
(3) Theism is a prime example of the
classical negative model of opposition-limitation. Its
internal inconsistency is revealed in the Problem of Evil. The
theistic solution is either oppositional dualism between
ultimate powers of Good and Evil, or Evil is limitation-lack
of Good (Privatio Boni). In order to go beyond
theism, we need to go beyond this negative structure.
(4) Of course, Humes empiricism is
still an example of the actualizations of the movement-image.
For Hume, time is still subordinate to movement. It does
not reach the eternal return of the Time-Image where movement is
subordinate to time. However, Deleuzes Hume does go
beyond the Classical-Representational Image of Thought. So
Hume, like Bergson, takes a first step toward univocity.
(5) Deleuzes terms, such as
intensity, will not be understood if read in a
scientific sense. But he does not use terms metaphorically.
Intensity in the scientific sense becomes
intensity in Deleuzes philosophical sense when
the forms are opened.
(6) The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis posits the
incommensurability of language across cultures. However,
how can this hypothesis be tested by science? As long as it
is assumed that there are numerically distinct objects in an
internal correspondence with terms, there is the assumption of
the commensurability of the diverse. But Deleuze shows us
that real incommensurable difference is not diversity (Difference
& Repetition p. 222). Diversity is the assumption
of conceptual identity. It is the assumption of
commensurability (with its oppositional disjunction: either
deterministic innate universal or culturally acquired
relativism). However, Deleuze allows us to escape any
necessity of commensurability. Disparate intensity is that
by which the given is given as diverse. Deleuzes intensity
comes up through the middle. It re-includes that middle
which had been excluded by the oppositions of classical thought.
[I am indebted to Prof. Daniel Fineman, Occidental College, for
noticing that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis illustrates my thesis.]