Klossowski’s Nietzsche and
the Vicious Circle*
by Beth Metcalf
Deleuze encounters Klossowski’s reading
of Nietzsche. In my summary of Klossowski’s book, I
will sometimes substitute, or parenthetically add, Deleuze’s
terms where I think that encounter is revealed. Nietzsche’s
‘Eternal Return’ is, in Deleuze’s terms,
‘univocal being’.
In his introduction, Klossowski tells us
that his book exhibits an unusual ignorance. He neglects
the exegeses that had recently been written about Nietzsche.
He wants to hear Nietzsche speak directly. His study of
Nietzsche will be false from the point of view of the
traditionally accepted authorities. As he sees it,
Nietzsche’s thought revolves around an axis of delirium.
But Klossowski does not call Nietzsche’s delirium
pathological. He sees Nietzsche’s thought as extremely
lucid. Nietzsche's delirium only seems pathological from
the perspective of the authorities of culture who are chained to
the identity principle and the reality principle. Nietzsche’s
‘Eternal Return’ cannot be understood under the usual
categories of thought because being is not equivocal. Being
is univocal.
Nietzsche’s experimentation challenged
the modern world with a new act of thinking. He experienced
a tension between the lucid and the obscure. But this
tension, far from reaching a synthesis, oscillated around an axis
of delirium. Nietzsche experienced an affective
“tonality of the soul”. This tonality became an
“obstacle” in making itself thought. In trying to
express his experience to others, the obstacle became muteness.
This resistance was in reaction to the language of culture with
its principles of identity and reality. Nietzsche
identified with this mute obstacle of affective intensity in
order to think that which is, according to the authorities of
cultural knowledge, unthinkable. He discovered that the
principles of identity and reality had never been anything other
than the configurations of subjective moods. His experience
of the mute obstacle could only be sustained by resistance to
culture and its authoritative knowledge. The gregarious
generality of culture is the obverse of the singular soul’s
intensity.
Klossowski’s Nietzsche says that, for a
long time, the philosopher of culture was the man with the
greatest experiences according to the received knowledge of
science or the exalted values of religion. This philosopher
condensed knowledge and morality into general conclusions
suitable for the maintenance of social norms. The
philosopher claimed to speak of truth when it was really an
impulse that spoke through him. One impulse, in becoming
dominant, came to be called ‘truth’. And
‘morality’ was only the gregarious criterion for Good
versus Evil. But Nietzsche saw the need to go beyond the
morality of Good and Evil --- beyond any general system of
thought or action. For Nietzsche, the philosopher must
become a singular event through which an unconscious impulse is
able to speak. That is, the philosopher must renounce the
generality of what is communicable in order to speak of the
singularity of lived experience. Thoughts of the
philosopher must not merely reflect the general authoritative
opinions of culture.
For Nietzsche, the knowledge of what is true
or false and the morality of what is just or unjust are questions
that should be posed in terms of sickness (gregarious generality)
or health (singular cases). The problem is that
intensive-active forces, throughout history, have been enslaved
(become reactive). Singular difference is cancelled. And
this triumph of reactive forces happens in individuals and
gregarious society. The reactive slave (Christian morality)
is now the master of culture.
Morality promotes the illusion that culture
should have no inequalities when inequality and struggle is what
makes cultural creativity possible. Morality promotes the
illusion that Good and Evil, or sickness and health, are
opposites inside a generalizing structure. However,
Nietzsche’s singular forces of disparate affective intensity
cannot be mediated by gregarious oppositional relations of
elements. There is no maintenance of conceptual identity.
There is only dispersion that changes nature.
Under a condition of physical suffering and
mental despair, Nietzsche conducted experiments into the source
of thought and morality. He endeavored to listen to the
immediate forces of his body in order to understand the origin of
his thought. He interpreted his suffering as intense
energy. He willed his suffering (the disequilibrium of the
impulses) because it developed into the joy of “voluptuous
lucidity”. He asked whether thought, when not
connected to physical suffering, can be real. Klossowski
says Nietzsche put consciousness and its categories of thought
and language into question. In doing so, he was released
from gregarious categories of guilt.
Nietzsche observed that his bodily impulses
were in conflict with the mental relations of consciousness.
His suffering seemed to be the distress signals of a brain in
pain. A language of unconscious impulses was trying to make
itself heard. He discovered a need to destroy the
resistance that was his ego in order to become aware of a
language of bodily impulses. His pain revealed the need for
a lucid extinguishing of gregarious thought in order to reach the
experience of a delirium of impulses.
Nietzsche experienced intense degrees of
excitation between pain and pleasure. The body uses a
language of intensive signs that are misrepresented by
consciousness as the unity of a code. The code inverts the
active signs and falsely deciphers the body as the product of
thought. The body, as thought by consciousness, is
dissociated from its impulses. The body becomes an
instrument of consciousness. It becomes the ego. Conversely,
without unity of thought, the body no longer belongs to an ego.
Klossowski says (NVC 26), “Nietzsche
did not speak on behalf of a ‘hygiene’ of the body,
established by reason. He spoke on behalf of corporeal states
as the authentic data that consciousness must conjure away in
order to be an individual. This viewpoint far surpasses a
purely ‘physiological’ conception of life. The
body is a product of chance; it is nothing but the locus
where a group of individuated impulses confront each other so as
to produce this interval that constitutes a human life,
impulses whose sole ambition is to de-individuate
themselves.”
Self-identity seems to depend on a history
of linkages (like Deleuze’s strata of intensive coupling).
Unconscious impulses modify the body. Only with the triumph
of reactive forces does the person become fixed into a gregarious
unity. The body produces its own cohesion as personal self.
This cohesion seems irreversible.
Consciousness is a deciphering of impulses.
Meaning is due to habits that form the extensive reference frame
of gregarious norms. Nietzsche observed the oscillation of
bodily impulses that form cohesion between thought and the
impulses that corporealize (actualize) thought. But
Nietzsche’s problem was how to remain lucid while trying to
observe the locus of consciousness in its very unconscious
process of formation. Isn’t this the problem of
Theseus? Ariadne’s thread leads through a labyrinth of
impulses. How can the experience of the multiplicity of
impulses be retrieved without losing that experience in an
interpretative meaning? Nietzsche’s reasoned
concentration of thought was itself the obstacle to his willed
goal. As long as he tried to communicate his experience, he
built an obstacle to the experience. His muteness was
interpreted by the authorities of reason to be madness.
Klossowski says that Nietzsche suspected
that, beneath the supposed unity of self, there are subterranean
bodily impulses in combat. A willed intention is formed on
the surface. Thought is only a cohesive surface effect.
We think continuity on the basis of this fixed code of language
that covers discontinuous states. Philosophers have
imagined a cohesion of impulses that totalizes all consciousness.
But Nietzsche discovered that meanings and goals are fictions.
They are not real. The gregarious categories seem to be
given. But the ‘given’ is not one form of
universal generality. There are intensive subterranean
bodily impulses --- that by which the given is given,
disparately. (See Deleuze’s Difference &
Repetition p222.)
Deleuze’s repetition with difference is
the intersection of two types of singular multiplicities. There
are multiplicities of intensive relations among active and
reactive impulses that create disparate individuation. These
intersect with multiplicities of collective uses of temporary
surface effect. Consciousness is an agreement between
invented signs and what they are supposed to represent. Consciousness
gives impulses an aim. A reactive unity has been invented
that represents a passive system of the conscious self in
formation with a gregarious generality. The intensive
impulses are reduced in an abbreviating (reactive) system that
forms the intentions of a supposed unity of self in society.
The conscious intellect is merely the resistance to anything that
would threaten the unity of the representational code. Thought
is the result of relations of power among impulses that dominate
(active forces) and impulses that are dominated (reactive
forces). When a relation among forces becomes fixed and
rigid, there is a triumph of reactive forces.
The intellect fixes the categories of
consciousness. But these categories are not real. They
are interpretations. Consciousness of meanings and goals
leads only to maintenance of conformity. Therefore, since
we cannot renounce our categories of meanings and goals, we must
evaluate them differently. Nietzsche re-evaluates through
his discovery of the Eternal Return and its new interpretation of
the Vicious Circle. This Vicious Circle is grounded in forgetting.
Ever-new continuities are produced. This is real
difference of the singular. It is not the conceptual
identity of consciousness totalized in gregarious generality.
Nietzsche’s Eternal Return has nothing to do with repetition
of the generality of the particular (as it has often been
misunderstood). It is repetition as universality of the
singular. The Eternal Return reaches the experience of One-All.
It is not to be confused with the many that constitutes one
unity. All really distinct singularity is
ontologically one and said as same. This is
Deleuze’s multiplicity of univocity.
Forgetting is the condition for the
transformations of the Eternal Return. The Eternal Return
is loss of a given identity. It is open to all possible
singularities of real difference. A new will de-actualizes
self-identity to pass through all possibilities. In the
experience of the Eternal Return, I cease to be myself here and
now to become all others. The fortuitous moment of the
experience was revealed as sign of all past, all that is
happening, and all that will ever happen. The Eternal
Return must have already appeared in innumerable forms but was
forgotten in a new state that threw me outside myself to make
‘self’ a different nature. Eternal Return of Same
is event for everything that has ever happened, is happening, and
can ever happen. I take this to be what Deleueze calls the
multiplicities of ‘Aion’ as intersecting with the
multiplicities of ‘Chronos’. It has nothing to do
with equivocal subjectivity or totalizing generality. It is
singularity in all varieties of multiplicity. Nietzsche wanted to
reach a triumph of active forces that Deleuze calls the
intersection of two types of multiplicities. This would
suppress limits between inside and outside. It would
suppress limits between time of here and now (Chronos) and time
of the Eternal Return (Aion).
A system of signs is an everyday code that
corresponds to a unity by which the self is constituted as
thinking. The will seems to be enslaved by irreversible
time that has been spatialized by consciousness (what Deleuze
calls ‘Chronos’ without experience of
‘Aion’). The experience of the Eternal Return is
unintelligible to conscious thought, but this unintelligible
experience is offered to the reflective intellect by the
conscious will. How can re-willing of all past be creative?
Only by self-forgetting can there be real creative difference.
Only a self-returning as ‘other’ can reach real
creative difference. To re-will the non-willed past in all
its really distinct possibilities is the ‘will to
power’. However, Nietzsche wants to go beyond that.
Nietzsche seeks change that is not determined by conscious will,
but the Eternal Return under conditions of the Vicious Circle.
The Vicious Circle of the Eternal Return
reaches a new experience of a brief interval of time. I
take this to be what Deleuze calls ‘the empty form of
time’ or ‘Aion’. The empty form separates
the spatialized time of Chronos from the eternity of the Eternal
Return. This is the re-willing of metamorphosis of
multiplicity.
In the words of Deleuze and Guattari
(Anti-Oedipus p. 21), “The subject spreads itself out along
the entire circumference of the circle, the center of which has
been abandoned by the ego. At the center is the
desiring-machine, the celibate machine of the Eternal
Return….It is not a matter of identifying with various
historical personages, but rather identifying the names of
history with zones of intensity on the body without organs; and
each time Nietzsche-as-subject exclaims: “They’re me!
So it’s me!””
This is not the will of the irreversible
time of Chronos. This is a new reversibility of time that
includes Aion. It is ‘Will to Power’ of creative
Eternal Return. To re-will this Vicious Circle is to
re-will all experience and action as no longer those of my
‘self’. There is no ‘self’ that could
intend a purpose or meaning.
Klossowski says, (NVC 72) “The feeling
of eternity and the eternalization of desire merge in a single
moment: the representation of a prior life and an after-life
no longer concerns a beyond, or an individual self that would
reach this beyond, but rather the same life lived and
experienced through its individual differences…..At the
level of consciousness, meaning and goal are lost. They are
everywhere and nowhere in the Vicious Circle, since
there is no point on the Circle that cannot be both the
beginning and end.”
All will is ‘will to power’
without meaning or goal. It has nothing to do with
equivocal subjective will. Being itself is univocal.
How can the notion of health be restored to
the singular when health has usually been attributed to
gregarious norms of language and exchange? Is the singular
always condemned to disappear? Are active forces always
cancelled in the triumph of reactive forces? Or, does the
singular have its own health? Is it true that
gregarious health is in opposition to singular morbidity? Or,
is that just the way it appears according to the gregarious norms
Deleuze calls the ‘Representational Image of Thought’?
Traditionally the weak have been judged as healthy and the
fullest have been judged as morally lacking. Master and
slave have been reduced to oppositional relations of reactive
Christian morality. Shouldn’t we question whether this
gregarious Moral Image is really healthy?
If we are to discover a new health of the
inessential singular, we must recognize the muteness of the
inessential as unintelligible to gregarious language. Is
there something which, according to the generalizing essences of
gregarious selection, is being excluded? How could we
include the inessential singular case while still including
essential intelligible norms? In Deleuze’s terms, it
would require the paradox of ‘vice-diction’.
Vice-diction (DR 263) “consists in
constructing the essence from the inessential…” And
again, (DR 47) “The inessential includes the essential in
the case, whereas the essential contains the inessential in
essence.”
The singular case requires healthy forgetting.
Whereas a fixed Image of Thought excludes the inessential that
cannot be assimilated into its essential generality, the health
of forgetting includes the inessential singular. In order
to go beyond the oppositions of Good versus Evil, there cannot be
equilibrium in a fixed hierarchy of reactive forces. A
reactive system is arbitrary interpretation. It is not
will-to-power of intensive-active forces of singularity. Will-to-power
is interpreted by gregarious society as violence because
intensive-active forces are a threat to the preservation and
equilibrium of the species and the individual agent.
An individual could never re-actualize all
the disparate singular doublings of random impulses that lead to
consciousness. Only that which is open to all fortuitous
cases (nomadic distribution of Aion) leads to the revelatory
moment of the Vicious Circle. However, this must not be an
instance of religious unity of purpose. Rather, strength
and health are the life affirming value beyond the Good and Evil
of gregarious morality. There must not be an equivocal
distinction between sickness and health. Inessential
meaninglessness is the violence that overthrows the Moral Image
of Good and Evil.
Nietzsche feared that, in having the
experience of the Vicious Circle, he must be mad. He had to
prove a paradox. The loss of lucid self-identity, that is
usually taken to be madness, is the act of greatest
lucidity. To prove he wasn’t mad, Nietzsche tried to
demonstrate his lucidity by appeal to science. But
doesn’t science lack a creative force? Science reduces cause
and effect to an equivalence that is maintained throughout all
its variable changes. It lacks that force Deleuze calls
‘disparate intensity’. How could appeal to
mechanistic science reach the source of real change in nature?
Nietzsche’s ‘will’ is not one general form
that develops into many forms while maintaining
equilibrium. Nietzsche’s will-to-power is a principle
of disequilibrium, an asymmetrical synthesis. There is
discord between the excesses of the will-to-power and the human
well-being that is the goal of scientific knowledge. Whereas
science is a means in the conservation and preservation of the
species, the Vicious Circle reveals life inventing creative
change in nature. Whereas science goes by the reality
principle, the Eternal Return is becoming without a prior
principle of reality or identity. The will-to-power
suspends the reality principle. Oscillations of intensity
change the nature of reality. Intensive forces increase or
decrease and, in so doing, must change in nature. Will-to-power
never maintains equilibrium.
The will-to-power never has a goal toward
the well-being of the species as science does. The lived
intensity of the Eternal Return casts the agent outside its
‘self’ and changes its nature. There is no stable
condition of equilibrium. ‘Thing’,
‘self’, and ‘law’ are fictions. The
subject separated from its own object of action is not real.
However, Nietzsche is not against science. He affirms both
science and the simulacra of will-to-power. For science,
there are stable laws. Material objects and bodies exist.
Logical norms can determine the difference between true and
false. Nietzsche criticized only a science of the general
form of representational correspondence between perception and
language. We think in unities that we borrow from the
concept of self by which we invent the concept of
‘thing’. Scientific functions express a constant
variability, but there are unconscious subterranean
(sub-representative) forces of intensive inseparable variations
of the philosophical concept. Deleuze sees science and
philosophy as two types of multiplicities that are in need of
each other.
Nietzsche’s will-to-power does not have
the goal of self-preservation or human well-being. But how
can we think the experience of the Eternal Return without goal or
meaning? Nietzsche’s answer seems to be that the
intensity of the high tonality is thrown outside its
‘self’ and in the forgetting of the self, changes the
nature of any goal or meaning. All intention is thrown
outside its identity. Variations of intensity are
inseparable because, when forgetting separates them, they
necessarily change in nature. There is no self-identity.
‘Intensity’ is, as Deleuze says, “the properly
qualitative content of quantity” (Difference &
Repetition 222). It is the active force of
will-to-power. Ordinal combinations in hierarchies of
disparate singularity may rise to the surface as fragile and
temporary effects. Yet these intensive differences may be
cancelled in the triumph of reactive forces. Then the
subject is fixed in a gregarious Image of Representational
Thought.
Power, at the level of societies, gives meaning
to history. Sometimes there is the triumph of active
singular forces over reactive subservient gregarious forces.
Sometimes there is triumph of reactive forces over the healthy
active forces. The former are what Deleuze and Guattari
call ‘subject groups’, and the latter are what they
call ‘subjugated groups’ (See Anti-Oedipus 280).
But, in either case, doesn’t this imply one rigid hierarchy
that would reintroduce a fixed goal and meaning? Since
power must will more power, how can it grow without any goal?
But Klossowski’s Nietzsche says that, with intensive forces,
equilibrium can never be maintained. No goal could ever
absorb all energy. Energy itself is the goal. All
real difference is ontologically singular multiplicities.
Intensive forces have no meaning or goal.
They are perceived as violence against the gregarious extensive
elements that would maintain meanings and goals in a fixed state
of power. Subject groups, where active forces are dominant,
cannot present meaning or goals, and (NVC 120) “enslavement
moves in the opposite direction”. The active-singular
forces of the subject groups may become dominated by the
reactive-gregarious forces of the subjugated groups that use
violence in service of a goal or meaning. This is the
triumph of reactive forces.
What we think of as our natural state is
really a state of servitude. It is necessary to dismantle
our usual state, but also to reconstruct a new one. But
isn’t this a new subjective goal? Or, is what we
sometimes interpret as willed by our subjectivity merely nature
realizing itself? Nietzsche saw the Eternal Return as the
way being explicates itself. History leads to nihilism that
calls for revauation of values. There is need for new
criteria of selection. The Eternal Return is the repetition
of the difference that Nietzsche calls ‘will-to-power’.
It is selection without intervention of a subjective will. It
is the dice game of being and it is univocal. Yet uses of
this selective will are actualized in subjects. To
think this Return (repetition with difference) is to think the
alternation between the movement of intensive energy and the
exhaustion of actualized states of rest. How can repetition
remain open to multiplicities of singular difference?
Sometimes philosophers are experimenters,
sometimes imposters. The philosopher-imposter repeats
without forgetting. Then, there is only maintenance of the
same state. But the experimenter-philosopher carries out a
test according to the selective process of the Vicious Circle.
The experimenter is not the agent of selection. Being
itself is the dice game of the creator-experimenter who
actualizes something that does not yet exist. Nietzsche
wanted to go beyond the reactive-slave system of Christian
morality. To create, according to Nietzsche’s Vicious
Circle, would mean to break the gregarious habits of the
pre-existing state of meanings and purposes. To create
would mean to do violence to the states that maintain identity
and security. To create is to will a new real.
The remedy for the sickness of morality is to create new
conditions of life. The true, the good, the reasonable, the
beautiful are invented powers. But Nietzsche wanted to
reach a positive notion of the false.
Two wills collide – gregarious science
and singular philosophy. Isn’t this what Deleuze calls
‘two types of multiplicities’ that intersect? Science
is the means of achieving the gregarious goal of human
well-being. It tends to cancel singular difference. But
the imposter philosopher, as Deleuze says, leaves out the intersection
of two types of multiplicities. Then philosophy is confused
with science. The simulacrum is confused with the
scientific function that preserves a constant relation of
variability within a reference frame. The simulacra merely
reproduce pre-existing phantasms. But Nietzsche pointed
toward a new human species which begins to act without intention
--- a creative becoming beyond the Good and Evil of morality.
Nietzsche foresees a future toward new
conditions for a higher species. Society is already in the
midst of transformation. I take this to be what Deleuze
calls the ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ of the
empty form of time (Aion) --- the present without thickness.
It is the past of waiting (what is going to happen?) and the
future (what happened?). Unless thought rises to the surface
nothing happens in the present (Chronos). This is
the dice game without meanings or goals. But a triumph of
reactive forces tends to cancel this creative difference. Societies
tend to exclude those who live outside the generality of the
exchangeable and the communicable.
From Nietzsche’s perspective, the
strong are the singular cases of real difference that have
usually been eliminated. Nietzsche’s
‘selection’ is different from that of science and
morality. It is unintelligible, subterranean depth of a
dice game. Useless active impulses must dominate the useful
reactive ones. This means we can’t have already formed
criteria of what is true and what is false. The principles
of reality and identity (the gregarious norms of the intelligible
and the exchangeable) disappear. Meaning and goal change
with experimentation. Changing rules of the dice game
depend upon singular cases that never maintain identity. Nietzsche
envisions a future super-human singular case that ushers in a
super-human species. This is not the generality of a
particular. It is the universality of the singular. It
is what Deleuze calls ‘univocal being’.
Klossowski notes the temptation for
Neitzsche’s career to be understood as either leading to an
abyss or preparation for apotheosis. But Klossowski sees
these alternatives to be inseparable. The void
(Deleuze’s ‘empty form of time’) is the
inseparable nature of reason and madness. Disparate forms
or uses of reason are created from the abyss. Nietzsche’s
muteness was interpreted by the authorities of gregarious reason
to be madness. However, what criteria can be used to
distinguish between reason and madness? How can it be
assumed that gregarious norms can be the criteria for judgement
about sickness or health? Gregarious norms merely maintain
their own generality. We must discern between what is
useful to the well-being of the species and an inessential
surplus that changes the nature of the ‘useful’. Nietzsche’s
experience of dispersion destroys the identity principle. His
self-identity disappears. There is only the real difference
of all individuation said as singularity, ‘Nietzsche’.
The Eternal Return is insignificance outside
any principle of identity or non-contradiction. It is
intensity of the singular lived experience that passes through
all really distinct individuations of singularity. In
trying to communicate the experience, it became obscure because
it could not be received by a gregarious understanding. The
experience never resembles its expression. The discrepancy
between designation and designating affect (or in Deleuze’s
terms ‘content’ and ‘expression’) constitutes
meaning. But meaning has continuity of affect only for an
agent. That subject-agent fluctuates as it modifies its
designations in accordance with receptivity of other
subject-agents. Every impulse has a need to dominate other
impulses, as active and reactive forces in disparate perspectives
evolve into some gregarious system of intelligibility. Intelligibility
and morality must find a foundation in the gregarious unity of
forces. But there is no totalizable unity in the forces
that oscillate between conservation and dissolution
(Deleuze’s intersection of two types of multiplicities).
Nietzsche discovers a subterranean domain in
flux. But in order to speak of this substratum he had to
adopt gregarious habits of speech. His intellect had to
adopt habits that constrain the impulses. He experienced
competition between free impulses and the constraint of the
intellect. What discourse could reconcile these two sides?
How can arbitrary freedom be transformed into intellectual
constraint? What discourse can express the discontinuity
between coherence and incoherence? The intellectual concept
is not formed at the level of the intellect. Rather,
discontinuity intervenes to re-interpret the concept. Nietzsche
discovered this paradoxical discourse in the form of the
aphorism. To read without interpretation makes possible a
revaluation of values --- to escape maintenance of identity,
signification, or subjectivity. Nietzsche’s
‘death of God’ comes with the death of a self-identical
ego. The intensive forces are below the surface to rise as
disparate temporary surface effects or fragile ‘uses of
representation’. It is the recombining intensities of
‘sense’ that intervene. Discontinuities of real
difference intervene to be ‘said’ as new continuities.
Nietzsche’s aphorism resists interpretation. The
aphorism reflects the impulses outside the categories of
understanding. The aphorism is discourse without subject,
prior meaning, or purpose.
Klossowski believed that, if Nietzsche had
not experienced “premonitory vertigo”, he may have
risked confusing the Eternal Return with an immutable system.
But Nietzsche overcomes the traditional opposition between true
and false. Only what is useful to human well-being is
intelligible and communicable. However, the incommunicable
singular is without goal or use. Nietzsche’s problem
was how to reach an inverted will --- how to will without goal or
use. How can the will be the only object or goal of itself?
His answer seems to be that without ‘self’, the actor
takes on the necessity of a mask. The actor is the double
of an ‘other’ into what we are becoming. As
Deleuze says (Logic of Sense 150), “The actor belongs
to the Aion…” The singular becomes multiplicities
of univocal being. God and Self are dead. It is not
Theseus, but Dionysus, who rescues Ariadne. Dispersion is
reassembled in disparate uses. There are ever new
correspondences of phantasm and simulacra. Being is saying,
and it is univocal.
*Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, by
Pierre Klossowski, translated by Daniel W. Smith, University of
Chicago Press, 1969.