Nietzsche’s Univocity
by Beth Metcalf
Deleuze says (Nietzsche & Philosophy p.3) “We will never
find the sense of something….if we do not know the force
which appropriates the thing, which exploits it, which takes
possession of it or is expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an
appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which
finds its meaning in an existing force. The whole of philosophy
is a symptomatology…..”
What does Deleuze-Nietzsche mean by “force which
appropriates the thing”? We are told that there are
“reactive” forces that can be appropriated or dominated
by “active” forces. But forces are not appearances. For
Deleuze-Nietzsche “a phenomenon is not an
appearance…..but a sign…..” Therefore, active
forces do not appear in relations of identity or opposition. They
are forces of multiplicity. They are sub-representative forces of
real distinction ontologically single. These active forces are
not restricted as to which forces they can appropriate. Since
there is no prior appearance, active forces are not separated
from what they can do. They can appropriate any forces. However,
when there is the triumph of reactive forces, then there are
relations of opposition and negation. Then, phenomena are
appearances of identity or opposition. Reactive forces can
appropriate only that which is compatible with prior appearance.
Therefore, Deleuze tells us that we will not begin to understand
the sense of Nietzsche’s Univocity if we do not know
Nietzsche’s active forces which appropriate it. On the other
hand, Deleuze says, (N&P162) “We will misunderstand the
whole of Nietzsche’s work if we do not see “against
whom” its principle concepts are directed. Hegelian themes
are present in this work as the enemy against which it
fights.” Any Hegelian interpretation of Univocity is a
symptom---a sign of the reactive forces that appropriate it.
Deleuze continues (N&P3), “Nietzsche substitutes the
correlation of sense and phenomenon for the metaphysical duality
of appearance and essence and for the scientific relation of
cause and effect. All force is appropriation, domination,
exploitation of a quantity of reality. Even perception, in its
divers aspects, is the expression of forces which appropriate
nature.”
Phenomena are not appearances. Phenomena are signs or symptoms.
Sense is not an essence, but an expression. There is correlation
of the signs with the expressions. But, this is nothing like the
exclusive correspondence of Representational thought which would
be a merely reactive opposition holding everything in the
identity of the essence with its appearances. Nor is this
correlation a linear causal correspondence. Rather, the active
forces which appropriate the thing can correlate any expression
with any sign. The content of any phenomenon can be the sign or
symptom of any expression at the level of active forces. This is
because there is no essence which could dictate its correlation
with a prior appearance. This is the “pluralism”, the
“empiricism”, that is the “properly philosophical
way of thinking” (N&P4). “There is no event, no
phenomenon, word or thought which does not have a multiple sense.
A thing is sometimes this, sometimes that, sometimes something
more complicated – depending on the forces…..which take
possession of it.” Therefore, Nietzsche’s master-slave
relationship is not of Hegel’s dialectical form. It is not
the opposition of master/slave which would merely hold everything
(both Master and Slave) in the identity of a reactive-slave
system. Rather, it is the heterogeneity of differential active
forces in a sign-signal system.
Therefore, Nietzsche’s opposition to dialectics is not a
dialectical opposition. Rather, it is the opposition to
dialectical opposition. Oppositional dialectics separate forces
from what they can do. Dialectics is the triumph of reactive
forces. Atomic and relational-oppositional “forces” are
merely homogeneous, holding everything in an essential identity.
However, Nietzsche’s is the pluralist affirmation of
multiplicity which is also the ontological singularity of
Univocity. It is only the plurality of forces that can relate
force to force. Only plurality, or heterogeneity, of forces
introduces ‘distance’ as the differential element. The
‘will to power’ is the differential element of force.
Pluralism is the philosophy of the will. Thus the ‘will to
power’ has nothing to do with will toward, or power over,
substantial objects of Representation.
(N&P40) “In a body the superior or dominant forces are
known as active and the inferior or dominated forces are known as
reactive. Active and reactive are precisely the original
qualities which express the relation of force with force. Because
forces which enter into relation do not have quantity without
each of them having, at the same time, the quality corresponding
to their difference in quantity as such.” Isn’t this
the way Deleuze describes his forces of intensity? Intensive
forces have quantity. They also have quality corresponding to
their difference in quantity. Quality is inseparable from
difference in quantity. Difference in quantity is the
heterogeneous relation of force to force. It is the differential
element of forces. (Difference & Repetition p. 222)
“Every intensity is differential, by itself a
difference…..each intensity is already a coupling (in which
each element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements
of another order), thereby revealing the properly qualitative
content of quantity.” Therefore, intensity is the difference
that (DR223) “…..tends to ….cancel itself out in
extensity and underneath quality.” That is, intensity is the
active force that tends to be cancelled (i.e., that tends to
become reactive) in extensity.
The oppositional relation of reactive forces is not differential
force at all. It relates elements, not forces. It reduces
quantity to one quality---the reactive quality. It reduces
differences in quantity to equality. It has no
‘distance’. It has no heterogeneity. It is not the
pluralism of forces. Pluralism of forces means that quality is an
aspect of quantity, of intensity. (N&P44) “Quality is
nothing but difference in quantity and corresponds to it each
time forces enter into relation.” And this is why, when
intensive quantity is divided, it necessarily changes in
nature---in quality. (N&P49-50) “We must remember that
every force has an essential relation to other forces, that the
essence of force is its quantitative difference from other forces
and that this difference is expressed as the force’s
quality. Now, difference in quantity, understood in this way,
necessarily reflects a differential element of related forces
– which is also the genetic element of the qualities of
these forces.” Therefore, this is a “superior
empiricism” that is no wider than what it conditions and
that changes its condition as it conditions.
The dialectic misinterprets sense because it does not understand
the nature of the forces which appropriate phenomena. The
dialectic is reactive force of opposition and the will to
nothingness of negation. The dialectic is found in opposition and
contradiction. It reflects the false image of difference---the
inverted image. (N&P196) “The Hegelian dialectic is
indeed a reflection on difference, but it inverts its
image…..Opposition substituted for difference is also the
triumph of the reactive forces that find their corresponding
principle in the will to nothingness.” And again,
(N&P157) “It is not surprising that the dialectic
proceeds by opposition, development of the opposition or
contradiction and solution of the contradiction. It is unaware of
the real element from which forces, their qualities and their
relations derive; it only knows the inverted image of this
element which is reflected in abstractly considered
symptoms…..Dialectic thrives on oppositions because it is
unaware of far more subtle and subterranean differential
mechanisms…” The dialectic misses the differential
relations of forces beneath the apparent relations of opposition.
Nietzsche says that the ‘will to power’ is the
genealogical element of force. Genealogy is differential and
genetic. It introduces real difference into history. However,
(N&P56) when we use a “genealogy” that sees itself
upside down in the mirror of reactive forces, its inverted image
then appears as an evolution. It appears as merely a genealogy of
causal succession. It is this Representational
“genealogy” that is the merely conceptual difference of
historicism. It is that “genealogy” that moves Deleuze
and Guattari to say (A Thousand Plateaus 11&21) “the
rhizome is an antigenealogy.” It is that which moves them to
say (Anti-Oedipus 155) “Alliances never derive from
filiations, nor can they be deduced from them.” This
means that ‘genealogy’ does not go from filiations to
alliances (nor does it deduce alliance from filiation). Rather,
there is a passing from an intensive order to an extensive system
each time. As long as we are still thinking in
terms of an inverted reactive image of genealogy (a descent
through extended structure of filiation) we do not reach
Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy’ or the ‘geology’
of Deleuze and Guattari.
The eternal return is the fact of returning for that which
differs. But what does it mean to ‘differ’?
Oppositional relations of elements do not differ. Only forces can
differ, not elements. Only heterogeneous forces are differential.
The will to power is the differential element of forces. Eternal
return is the becoming of heterogeneous difference of forces.
Nietzsche’s dice-throw is the affirmation of the
multiplicity of chance all at once. It is the unity affirmed of
multiplicity. It is being which is affirmed of becoming. The
eternal return is real difference and the becoming of that
difference. It eliminates that which is return of the same. For
Nietzsche’s genealogy, (N&P85-6) “The will to power
is plastic, inseparable from each case in which it is determined;
just as the eternal return is being, but being which is affirmed
of becoming, the will to power is unitary, but unity which is
affirmed of multiplicity. The monism of the will to power is
inseparable from the pluralist typology.”
For Nietzsche’s perspectivism, there are not relative points
of view or appearances of one universal Truth. Each world is
actualized truth as singular-universal perspective. Each
perspective is really different from any other. However, really
different worlds of perspective are ontologically single.
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is the univocity/multiplicity --
the truth of the relative, not the relativity of truth.
For Nietzsche, there are no moral facts or phenomena. There are
only moral interpretations. Therefore, Nietzsche does not
criticize false claims of truth. He criticizes the Ideal of Truth
itself. That Ideal sees this world as mere appearance. It is
inseparable from a will toward moral obedience and established
value. Thought and knowledge become reactive. Thinking, then,
depends on reactive forces that appropriate thought. However, if
thought is controlled by reactive forces, we are not yet
thinking.