Parallelism and the Syntheses
by Beth Metcalf
Parallelism
Deleuze and Guattari say (Anti-Oedipus p.326-327)
“…The body without organs is the immanent substance, in
the most Spinozist sense of the word; and the partial objects are
like its ultimate attributes, which belong to it precisely
insofar as they are really distinct and cannot on this account
exclude or oppose one another….” Therefore, they
are telling us that it is by way of their Spinozism that they
find real distinction without exclusion or opposition. This is
the Univocity of real distinction that is ontologically one
Substance. If we remain within conceptual possibility that
cannot find its way beyond exclusion and opposition, then we are
still caught within the forces of Representational Thought.
It is through Spinoza’s parallelism of
heterogeneous attributes that all really distinct correspondences
are included without any opposition at all. With what
Deleuze refers to as Spinoza’s “parallelism”, we
find the heterogeneity which allows us to reach the real
distinction of qualified substances that are ontologically one.
With parallelism (Expressionism in Philosophy 107)
“…there is an identity of order or correspondence
between modes of different attributes.” Furthermore,
(EiP109) “…the modes of different attributes have not
only the same order and the same connection, but the same being;
they are the same things…” Attributes are really
distinct, parallel series that have no causal action between
them. There is no causal connection between the modes of
one attribute upon modes of another. There is identity of
order and connection between modes of different attributes.
Because attributes constitute one substance, corresponding modes
differing in attribute form one modification.
Deleuze’s Spinozist parallelism allows
no dualistic opposition of signifier/signified, subject/object,
idea/thing, form/content. Indeed, the real distinction of
parallelism allows no opposition or exclusion at all. With
Spinoza’s parallelism, given a certain qualified substance
(i.e., given a certain unity of modification), modes of different
attributes have the same order and connection. But there is
no causality between the modes of different attributes. Modes
of really distinct attributes have ontological unity or identity
of being. Modes of attributes having the same connection
and order are the same modification. They are the same
being---the same thing. Since there is no dualistic
opposition, there is no need for a transcendent ground of
agreement. There is only Immanence. Because
attributes constitute the essence of one Substance, corresponding
modes differing in attribute form the same unity of modification.
Modification is ontologically one being of corresponding modes
differing in attribute. (However, it should be noted that
modes having another order and connection form a different unity
of modification. They qualify Substance in a really
different multiplicity. But all really distinct
multiplicities are included in ontologically one Substance
without opposition.)
The Powers in Ontological and
Epistemological Parallelism
However, Spinoza’s parallelism as
described by Deleuze, is not merely the parallel series of the
attributes (Thought and Extension as the only two we know).
It is also the parallelism of two powers. The first is the
power of existing and acting. The second is the power of
thinking and knowing. There is equality of these two powers
in parallelism. There is ontological parallelism which is
constituted by the parallelism of the attributes. It is the
first power. Then, there is epistemological parallelism
which is constituted by the parallelism of both powers. Ontological
parallelism is the parallel attributes as constituting the
essence of Substance. Epistemological parallelism is the
parallel powers as the attributes contain the essences of the
individuating modes.
The ontological point of view: one and the
same modification of substance is expressed by the corresponding
modes of different attributes. The epistemological point of
view: Given a mode in some attribute there is an idea in
the attribute of Thought corresponding to it. One and the
same individual is expressed by a given mode (in whatever
attribute) and its corresponding idea (in the attribute of
Thought). Deleuze says, (EiP114) “The epistemological
viewpoint, then, may be stated thus: one and the same individual
is expressed by a given mode and by the corresponding idea.
But the ontological viewpoint thus: one and the same modification
is expressed by all corresponding modes differing in
attribute.”
Therefore, Deleuze sees in Spinoza not merely the parallelism of attributes (ontological parallelism), but also parallelism of two powers (epistemological parallelism). With the parallel series of powers, there is independence of the series of things and the series of ideas. Ideas do not represent things. Incorporeal ideas are attributed to corporeal things. Ideas do not refer to things, but intervene through expressive transformation.
Just as there was no causality between modes
differing in attributes (in ontological parallelism), so also
there is no causal connection between ideas and things (in
epistemological parallelism). There is equality of
attributes and equality of powers. There is no causality
between different attributes or between different powers, but
there is equality of being. Just as there is identity of
being between corresponding modes of different attributes, so
also there is identity of being between the form of things and
objective adequacy of ideas. (Eip117) “…what
follows formally (that is to say, in this or that attribute) from
God’s infinite nature [ontological parallelism], is the same
as what follows objectively from the idea of God [epistemological
parallelism].” The modification of substance is the
same being as the individuating ideas. That is, the
univocity of attributes constitutes the modification of substance
and contains the individuation of the modes. The two
powers, like the attributes, are really distinct and
ontologically one. Attributes are univocal forms in the two
powers of parallelism. Attributes are common forms that
constitute the modifications of substance and contain the
individuations of modes. Attributes are common forms in the
two powers of parallelism. But it is because the
attributes are common forms that now the modifications of
Substance can be really different from the individuation of the
modes.
Epistemological parallelism says that, to
every mode in whatever attribute there will correspond an idea in
the attribute of Thought. (EiP120) “The idea of God
thus represents all formally or really distinct attributes, to
the extent that a distinct soul or idea corresponds to each.
The same attributes that are formally distinguished in God
[ontological parallelism] are objectively distinguished in the
idea of God [epistemological parallelism]. But this idea is
nonetheless absolutely unitary [ontologically one], like the
substance constituted by all the attributes.” Therefore,
the powers are, like the attributes, really distinct and
ontologically one. There is identity of being between
objects and ideas. (EiP117) “One and the same thing is
formal in the attribute on which it depends within the power of
existing and acting, and objective in the idea of God on which it
depends within the power of thinking. A mode of an
attribute and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing
expressed in two ways, under two powers.”
Deleuze says (EiP124-5) that the first privilege of the attribute of Thought is that it contains modes formally that represent the attributes taken objectively. There is an objective distinction between ideas that equals the real formal distinction between attributes. Therefore, the distinction between the ideas of epistemological parallelism will not merely be an objective distinction. Rather, this distinction will be both objective and formal. Since every mode, in whatever attribute, is represented by an idea in the attribute of Thought, the objective ideas will have formal distinction. “Given a substantial modification, it will be expressed only once in each of the other attributes, but an infinity of times in infinite understanding, and, therefore, in the attribute of Thought. And each idea that expresses it in Thought will represent a mode of one particular attribute, rather than of some other. So that there will be as great a distinction between ideas as between attributes themselves or modes of different attributes: they will have “no [causal] connection.” There will thus be an objective distinction between ideas, equivalent to the real formal distinction between attributes, or modes differing in attribute. Furthermore, this distinction between ideas will itself be objective and formal, insofar as it is brought into relation with the formal being of the ideas themselves. Thought will thus contain modes which, while belonging to the same attribute, are nevertheless distinguished not modally, but formally or really.” We can see that the ideas disjoin or divide the connections of the modes. And, this modal division is not merely an objective distinction. When a mode divides, it changes in nature (i.e., formally and really). As Deleuze says, (Difference & Repetition 237) “An intensive quantity [a modal essence] may be divided, but not without changing its nature.” This is the interaction between the two powers. With the disjunction of the modes that were connected, there is change in the nature—a change in connection.
The First Two Syntheses of Actualization
With parallelism we must distinguish between
the powers and their equality and the attributes and their
equality. Ontological parallelism is the equality of
attributes. Epistemological parallelism is the equality of
powers. I understand the two powers in Spinoza’s
ontological and epistemological parallelism to be that upon which
Deleuze bases his first two syntheses. In Difference
& Repetition, Deleuze applies these two syntheses to the
constitution of time. The first synthesis is an ontological
parallelism. It is the contractile passive synthesis of
habits that we are, drawing difference from repetition.
It is ontological form. The second synthesis is an
epistemological parallelism. It is the passive synthesis of
the Idea in Memory. Therefore, this is not a synthesis of
successive instants on a homogeneous line of time. It is
the heterogeneity of parallel syntheses or powers.
Also, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and
Guattari describe the syntheses. The first connective
synthesis is the production and interruption of flows. Connection,
as we have seen, is the first ontological synthesis of
Spinoza’s parallelism. (EiP109) “…the modes
of different attributes have not only the same order and the same
connection, but the same being; they are the same things…”
The second disjunctive synthesis as described in Anti-Oedipus
is the distributive viewpoint. It is the individuating
disjunction of the modes that were connected in the first
synthesis. The modifications of the first synthesis are
disjoined by the ideas of the second synthesis. Isn’t
this Spinoza’s epistemological parallelism? Given a
mode in some attribute, there is an idea in the attribute of
Thought corresponding to it. One and the same individual is
expressed by a given mode (in whatever attribute) and its
corresponding idea (in the attribute of Thought). Ideas
of the second synthesis disjoin corresponding modes in different
attributes, because each of these modes is represented by an idea
in the attribute of Thought.
Therefore, I believe that this description
of the first two syntheses (in Anti-Oedipus) can be
understood by way of Deleuze and Guattari’s Spinozism.
The first connective synthesis is ontological parallelism. This
is the pure, formal expression of the attributes in parallel as
they produce and interrupt flows. There is the same order
and connection between modes of different attributes, but there
is no necessitating causality of the flows between them. The
second synthesis of disjunctive recording can be seen to be
Spinoza’s epistemological parallelism. It is the
disjunction of the modifications of Substance that we found in
the first synthesis. But through the conjunction of
intensities, disjunction reacts on the connections and
reconstitutes them with real difference. We see that there
is no mediation in this process. Connection is immediately
disjunction and conjunction.
Therefore, I understand Deleuze’s
‘first synthesis’ to be Spinoza’s ontological
parallelism. It qualifies Substance in a multiplicity of
ways. This is the first synthesis of real distinction.
I understand that which Deleuze calls the ‘second
synthesis’ to be Spinoza’s epistemological parallelism.
It is the numerical distinction of the individuated modes. It
is the individuation of the modes also affected in a multiplicity
of ways. There are, then, two types of multiplicities.
One is the formal-real distinction of the modifications of
Substance. (However, it should be noted that within a given
unity of modification, there is no real distinction.) The
other distributes the numerical-individuating distinction of the
modes. (However, it should be noted that when a mode
divides, it changes in nature. That is, there is real
distinction.) The two parallelisms (ontological and
epistemological) are the two syntheses or multiplicities that
interpenetrate endlessly in proliferation of sense. Content
is expressed and becomes new content for new expression.
The first two syntheses interact in the process of the
actualization of existing modes.
The Third Synthesis of
Counter-Actualization
If the two powers in parallel show us the
Spinozist basis for Deleuze’s first two syntheses, can we
also find in Spinoza the basis for what Deleuze and Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus,
call the third conjunctive synthesis of Eternal Return?
Deleuze does tell us that he sees the eternal return in
Spinozism. (D&R304) “All that Spinozism needed to
do for the univocal to become an object of pure affirmation was
to make substance turn around the modes – in other words, to
realize univocity in the form of repetition in the eternal
return.”
According to Deleuze’s Spinozism, we
perceive other bodies only as they affect our own. My
subjectivity is only the idea of my own body or mind as
perceiving external effects. However, these effects are
never adequate ideas. The inadequate ideas of these
affections involve their own cause, but do not express it. The
ideas I have of these external perceptions are therefore signs of
my imagination. They are not adequate expressions of the
power of knowing. They are inadequate impressions from
external objects. This is Spinoza’s first kind of
knowledge. I take this first kind of knowledge to be a
reference to the Representational thinking Spinoza found in
Descartes. However, since these inadequate impressions
involve their cause, these affections can help us know what is
common to external bodies and our own. Joyful affections
indicate to us a “common notion” which is adequate,
because it belongs to the idea of the external body and our own.
We can form an idea of what is common to the affecting body and
our own. This adequate idea is the ‘common
notion’ of Spinoza’s second kind of knowledge. It
is a form common to several actualized bodies, or existing modes.
It is found in the actualizations of Univocity.
Therefore, an adequate idea is a common
notion of bodies in the second kind of knowledge. However,
when we reach Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, (EiP300)
“Attributes are still common forms; what has changed is the
sense of the word “common.” Common no longer
means more general, that is, applicable to several existing
modes….Common means univocal: attributes are univocal, or
common to God whose singular essence they constitute, and to the
modes whose particular essences they contain….Ideas of the
third kind are defined by their singular nature; they represent
God’s essence and give us knowledge of particular essences
as these are contained in God himself.” Therefore, the
‘common notions’ of the second kind of knowledge, give
us the adequate idea of relations common to several actualized
existing modes. But the ‘common notions’ of the
third kind of knowledge are the conjunction of singular,
intensive essences. (See my article ‘Ethics and Common
Notions’.) Isn’t this conjunction of intensive
singularities, in Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, the
basis for the third synthesis of eternal return? Isn’t
this the counter-actualization of Univocity?
I believe we can understand the conjunctive
third synthesis through an understanding of Spinoza’s third
kind of knowledge where (EiP300) “An attribute is no longer
understood merely as a common property of all the existing
modes corresponding to it, but as what constitutes the singular
essence of divine substance, as what contains all the particular
essences of its modes.” Are these univocal
singular essences of the third kind of knowledge the conjunctions
of the third synthesis that Deleuze and Guattari describe in Anti-Oedipus?
Aren’t intensive conjunctions the third synthesis of eternal
return of counter-actualization? As we reach these
conjunctive singular intensities, we enter into new affective
becomings. This third (conjunctive) synthesis (AO87)
“…express[es] those nondecomposable distances always
enveloped in the intensities that divide into one another while
changing their form.” (AO88) “The conjunctive
synthesis can therefore be expressed: “So I am the king!
So the kingdom belongs to me!” But this me
is merely the residual subject that sweeps the circle and
concludes a self from its oscillations on the circle.”
This is the third synthesis of consummation of which Deleuze and
Guattari say (AO19) “…attraction and repulsion
produce intense nervous states that fill up the body
without organs to varying degrees—states through which
Schreber-the-subject passes, becoming a woman and many other
things as well, following an endless circle of eternal
return.” The Eternal Return is intensive conjunction
that resonates across all disjunction.
Conclusion
The first synthesis of actualization
qualifies substances. It is the connective synthesis.
Multiplicities of parallel series of really distinct attributes
contain any connection of modes without causal relation.
However, since these heterogeneous attributes are the
same substance ontologically, modes differing in attribute are
the same modification. The second synthesis of
actualization is the individuation of modes. This is the
disjunctive synthesis. The power of thinking disjoins the
intensive connections of the first synthesis to change its nature
by resecting the connections. The third is the conjunctive
synthesis of counter-actualization, or eternal return. Any
intensity of the power of thinking and knowing
(epistemological parallelism of expression) may be conjoined with
any intensity of the power of existing and acting
(ontological parallelism of content). All three syntheses
are immediately related in expressive univocity.
Therefore, Deleuze-Spinoza’s
parallelism overcomes all dualistic opposition. Parallelism,
both ontological and epistemological, has nothing to do with
opposition. There is no opposition between subjective and
objective, theory and practice. There is no negative
oppositional relation at all. All is affirmation of
intensive coupling. (D&R 222) “Every intensity is
E – E’, where E itself refers to an e – e’,
and e to e – e’ etc.: each intensity is already a
coupling (in which each element of the couple refers in turn to
couples of elements of another order), thereby revealing the
properly qualitative content of quantity.” Each
intensity is already a coupling. The coupling of
Spinoza’s attributes (extension and thought) and
Deleuze’s disparate intensities (content and expression),
always form a singular modification of substance with each
repetition that changes in nature. Parallelism is never a
relation of opposition. Every intensive coupling is a
singularity. Each coupling is a folding which makes any
opposition between content and expression (or modes of different
attributes) indiscernible. There can be no oppositional
relation at this sub-representative level of parallelism. Whenever
we misunderstand intensive coupling to be an inverse relation of
constant variability, we confuse it with a scientific function.
Then, according to Deleuze, we confuse the direct relation of
intensive coupling (inseparable variation) with a constant
relation of variability which characterizes the scientific
function. The scientific function and the philosophical
concept are two types of multiplicities that intersect, but they
are not of the same type. The inseparable variation of the
concept comes up through the middle to intersect with the
scientific function to change its nature with each repetition of
difference. Philosophical multiplicities are disparate
intensive constructions of disparate compossible or incompossible
series. Scientific multiplicities are discrete and
non-totalizable. Neither type is generality of the
particular (one-many). Both are singular-universal
(one-all).