Politics of the War Machine
by Beth Metcalf
Understanding Deleuze’s thought depends
on understanding his univocity. But what does univocity
have to do with politics? In what sense is Deleuze’s
thought political? Often this question becomes linked with
the question of how, and in what sense, Deleuze’s thought is
compatible with normativity. Paul Patton says (Deleuze
and the Political page 9) that the political ontology of
Deleuze and Guattari is “where the overriding norm is that
of deterritorialisation.” But in what sense is the
‘deteritorialization’ of Deleuze’s univocity
‘normative’? Every term Deleuze uses, I contend,
must take on a new sense. In what way can Deleuze’s
‘deterritorialization’ have a normative sense? What
is the sense of univocity and its terms? And how is the
sense of univocity, and uses of its terms, different from our
usual usage?
Deleuze tells us that philosophy has
traditionally been shackled by the four iron collars of
Representation. These iron collars are the history of a
long error --- identity in the concept, opposition in the
predicate, analogy in judgement, and resemblance in perception.
Deleuze calls this world of Representation the ‘Dogmatic
Image of Thought’. It is the Moral Image to be obeyed.
It can never reach Ethical difference. This
Representational Image implies analogy of being.
(Difference & Repetition 303),
“Representation essentially implies an analogy of
being.”…. And (D&R 38) “….analogy
falls into an unresolvable difficulty: it must essentially relate
being to particular existents, but at the same time it cannot say
what constitutes their [singular] individuality. For it
retains in the particular only that which conforms to the general
(matter and form), and seeks the principle of individuation in
this or that element of the fully constituted
individuals….”
In other words, the structure of
Representation-Analogy can never reach the singularity of real
difference. Real singular difference is not to be found in
any general system of classification. It is not to be found
at the level of the fully constituted individual. With
Representation-Analogy, the individual retains in the particular,
only the generality distributed by the categories. But
categories determine objects that, through mediation of the
Dogmatic Image, are thought to be “possible”. Nor
does merely making Representation Infinite help us to reach
singular difference.
(D&R 303) “The list of categories
may well be ‘opened up’ or representation may be made
infinite; nevertheless, being continues to be said in several
senses according to the categories, and that of which it is said
is determined only by differences ‘in
general’….”
If we are to escape the Dogmatic Image that
merely reproduces identity, we must somehow reach non-categorical
thought. We must reach concepts of singular intensive
difference that have nothing to do with an already extensive
image or structure that maintains or reproduces identity.
But this can only happen by reaching the sub-representative
domain of pre-individual singularity. This requires us to
think ‘difference’ outside our usual habits of thought.
But how can we, when we are still chained by the four iron
collars, get outside the possibilities of that image? How
can we avoid that Dogmatic Image that merely maintains and
reproduces identity? How can we think outside a
generalizing structure of our usual Conceptual Image?
We must somehow reach a domain of forces
that is no longer shackled by the Dogmatic Image and its
repetition of conceptual identity without any real difference.
We must escape that Image whose “difference” is mere
variability of already extended formed-matter. Instead,
Deleuze shows us that philosophy must become an ontology of
immanence. So, Deleuze introduces his univocity as this ontological
sense which reverses the world of Representation. That
world of Representation has never really been an ontology at all.
It has always been merely a Conceptual Image under the principle
of Identity.
(D&R 35) “There has only ever been
one ontological proposition: Being is univocal….What
is important is that we can conceive of several formally distinct
senses which none the less refer to being as if to a single
designated entity, ontologically one….”
We can conceive of formally and
qualitatively distinct sense which refers to being as a single
designated (said as same). But this alone is not enough to
escape Representation-Analogy. Formal distinction is not
necessarily a real distinction. Alone, its
deterritorializations may still be overcoded and
reterritorialized according to the same image of conceptual
identity. Alone, it is not enough to ensure the ontological
sense of univocity. It must be added that being, designated
as ontological singularity, is said in the same sense of all
numerically distinct terms.
(D&R 35-6) “….We must add that
being, this common designated, in so far as it expresses itself,
is said in turn in a single and same sense of all the
numerically distinct designators and expressors.”
This addition ensures the new ontological sense of real disparate difference (intensity). All the numerically distinct modes, in whatever degree, say the whole of Being in one sense. Because they are all degrees of ontologically single Substance, they distribute the open space of the whole of undistributed Being. This ontological sense reaches positive and absolute deterritorialization where any degree of singular content may be coupled with any expression in the dice game of the eternal return. This eternal return is the repetition of really distinct singularity, each time. Univocity repeats the ontologically singular sense of real difference, each time. The ontological sense of univocity opens the forms to that domain of pre-individual singular difference. Univocity is real difference said as same. It can say real difference as same because it reaches ontological forces of intensive disparate singularity. All real difference, being unique rather than general, must be singular. And singularity says, with real difference, the whole of being each time. And, since each repetition of difference (in whatever degree of intensity) refers to the whole of being as if to an ontologically single entity, each repetition changes nature. It is not merely a conceptual difference within the same form of identity. Univocity reaches the singular difference that the generality of Representation-Analogy never can. Univocity is the sub-representative violence threatening a Conceptual Image of Thought that merely maintains and reproduces identity. This 'violence', in its ontological sense, is the war machine of Deleuze and Guattari.
The ontological sense of univocity is
‘difference itself’. And (D&R 222) this real
difference is disparate intensity. It is the differential
coupling of heterogeneous series of real difference said
as same --- each time, a new repetition of disparate difference.
It is the qualitative content of quantity. Disparate
intensity is the real singular difference that is not to be
confused with one form of conceptual diversity. Intensive
difference is that by which “given” disparate forms of
empirical diversity are given, each time. Disparate
intensive difference is the transcendental source of every really
new empirical use of diversity. At this sub-representative
level of intensive difference there is no prior conceptual form
or image. If that sub-representative plane of heterogeneous
difference is left out, then everything closes into one
Representational Image of Conceptual Identity. However,
when the sub-representative plane of univocality is included,
then there are two planes, two types of multiplicities, which
intersect. This intersection opens the forms. Intensive
multiplicities of singular disparate difference may intersect
with multiplicities of formal extension to actualize new
singular-universal uses of diversity, each time.
Therefore, Deleuze’s ontological sense
(where being is univocal) reverses the world of Representation
(where being is thought to be analogical). And, the terms
of univocity have really different legitimate uses that are not
like ordinary uses.
(D&R 300-1) “This [the repetition
in the eternal return] is a complete reversal of the world of
representation and of the sense that ‘identical’ and
‘similar’’ had in that world..….it defines
the conditions of legitimate use of the words
‘identical’ and ‘similar’ by linking them
exclusively to simulacra, while denouncing the ordinary
usage….”
The Dogmatic Image of Thought, and its
illegitimate use of terms, merely repeats the principle of
conceptual identity. But univocity is the eternal return
that is the repetition of real singular difference. Therefore,
with Univocity, ‘same’, ‘identical’, and
‘similar’ have a new ontological sense.
(D&R 300), “…the eternal
return is indeed the Similar, repetition in the eternal return is
indeed the Identical – but precisely the resemblance and the
identity do not pre-exist the return of that which
returns….It is not the same which returns, it is not the
similar which returns; rather, the Same is the returning of
that which returns, -- in other words, of the Different;
the similar is the returning of that which returns, -- in
other words, of the Dissimilar….This is a complete
reversal of the world of representation, and of the sense that
‘identical’ and ‘similar’ had in that
world.”
With each separation of intensive degree,
terms refer to ontologically single being said as same,
but there is a real change in the nature of its sense. Every
numerically distinct designator and expressor is the return of a
new ontologically singular sense of real difference of the whole
of being, each time. That is, every individuating mode says
being as ontologically same, but changes the nature of the whole
of being. A new “legitimate use” denounces the
ordinary usage that reproduces conceptual identity. Every
numerical distinction says ontological sense as same, but
is the return of difference.
(D&R 35-6) “…..In the
ontological proposition, not only is that which is designated
ontologically the same for qualitatively distinct senses, but
also the sense is ontologically the same for individuating modes,
for numerically distinct designators or expressors….”
Deleuze tells us that terms do not have the
same sense that they had in the world of Representation with its
principle of conceptual identity. This new sense of the
terms allows only real singular difference to return. It
allows nothing to return that would maintain or reproduce
conceptual identity. With each repetition of real singular
difference, being is said as same ontological sense. But
the whole of being, designated as same, is not the same.
(D&R 301) “…..The Same, for
ever decentred, effectively turns around difference only once
difference, having assumed the whole of Being, applies only to
simulacra which have assumed the whole of
‘being’.”
In the world of Representation with its
history of a long error, terms repeated as ‘similar’
and ‘identical’ had only the same signification inside
an Image of Conceptual Identity. And Deleuze is often still
read as if he is talking about a return that maintains or
reproduces Conceptual Identity. Many still read Deleuze
only in terms of maintenance and reproduction of
‘identity’ in its ordinary usage. But Deleuze
tells us that univocity uses terms in an ontologically same
sense, not merely for formally distinct senses, but also for
numerically distinct individuating modes. Deleuze’s
univocity gives terms new ontological sense.
(D&R 301) “For the Same, or the
Identical, has an ontological sense….The Similar has an
ontological sense: the eternal return of that which makes
dissimilar….However, the eternal return itself, in turning,
gives rise to a certain illusion….it produces an image of
identity….It produces an image of the negative as the consequence
of what it affirms, ….”
Yet many of Deleuze’s disciples still
fall into the illusion that maintains and reproduces the same
image according to the principle of conceptual identity. They
do not reach Deleuze’s ontological sense of terms that
avoids an image of the negative. They do not reach the
ontological sense of univocity and its legitimate uses of terms.
Many still see only repetition mediated by the Representational
Image. Then, their sense of “eternal return” can
only duplicate the same Image. Rather, with the eternal
return of ontological sense, terms do not have their usual
Representational usage. We must reach the ontological sense
of individuating modes that change the nature of the saying
of the whole of being with each repetition. Only then do we
reach the real difference of ontological sense.
(D&R 301) “The repetition in the
eternal return is the same, but the same in so far as it is said
uniquely of difference and the different....The Similar has an
ontological sense: the eternal return of that which makes
dissimilar…”
Therefore, with univocity, the use of terms
takes on a new ontological sense of real disparate singular
difference that changes the nature of the saying of the
whole of being, each time. The eternal return is the new
ontological sense of difference and repetition. The
ontological sense of univocity reverses the world of Conceptual
Identity and its Representational significations. So we
must reach the conditions of a new ontological sense of the terms
Deleuze uses. Deleuze’s ‘ontological sense’
is the repetition of real singular difference that no longer
maintains variability according to the principle of conceptual
identity. But this reversal can’t happen on a closed
plane of Representation where there could only be a return of the
same structure. We must include the sub-representative
plane of univocality.
(D&R 300) “….the eternal
return is indeed the Similar, repetition in the eternal return is
indeed the Identical – but precisely the resemblance and the
identity do not pre-exist the return of that which
returns….”
Therefore, this has nothing to do with the
Representational Thought where resemblance and identity do
pre-exist in a Conceptual Image. Univocity is the dice
game which is the repetition of the ontological singularity of
real difference without a prior concept.
Therefore, we will not understand the
political importance of the writings of Deleuze and Guattari if
we still think in terms that maintain or reproduce Conceptual
Identity. How can terms of political discourse have ontological
sense to open the forms of the socious? How can
political discourse find new ‘assemblages’ (in
Deleuze’s ontological sense) of state apparatus? This
ontological sense of univocity is not merely of theoretical
interest without any practical application. Deleuze and
Guattari tell us we must reach that sub-representative domain
without oppositional relations (such as theory/practice,
individual/collective, or positive fact/normative value), and
without hierarchy of classes --- that is, without a totalizing
standard of normativity. Rather, we must reach a politics
at a sub-representative level --- a micro-politics of
multiplicities.
Traditional
liberal thought is still internal to an Image of Conceptual
Identity where ‘freedom’ and ‘justice’ are
norms of State sanctioned Ideology. Its ‘liberty’
and ‘equality’ are still measured at the level of the
fully constituted “normal” individual. Its
normativity is still internal to a classifying generality. Its
“singular” individual is still determined inside a
generalizing structure. Its “difference” is still
determined by a prior conceptual image. Its
‘diachrony’ still reproduces the variability of terms
in their usual usage. Its “deterritorialization”
is still relative to subjective positions. Its subjects and
objects are fully formed variables in a constant relation of the
prior State Form. It never reaches sub-representative
conditions of intensity. Its historical framework of causal
connections does not reach the singular events that create new
concepts. It never reaches the ontological sense of a war
machine that challenges the generalizing normativity of the
State.
Therefore when political writers ask
questions about Delueze and ‘normativity’, does the use
of that term escape signification mediated by a conceptual image?
Does the use of terms like ‘normative’ and
‘deterritorialization’ escape a prior principle of
Conceptual Identity? Do we reach the heterogeneity of real
singular difference said as same? I contend that
Deleuze and Guatteri are telling us that ‘normative’
must not have its usual signification. Once we reach
univocity, a ‘normative’ use of generality must not be
totalizing or universalizing. A normative use is modal, not
substantial. It must not maintain or reproduce identity
according to a principle of constant signification or categories
of what is possible according to a prior image. There must not be
a “normativity” that would merely
“deterritorialize” by opening the categories into
Infinite Representation that still maintains a principle of
Conceptual Identity --- that would merely reach a negative
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. We must
reach the sub-representative and ontological sense of
non-categorical thought that opens the forms. We must reach
a ‘minoritarian becoming’ in its ontological sense.
Whenever there is closed State form, there
is a Totalizing Concept that leaves out the sub-representative
plane of the ‘war machine’ in its ontological sense.
Then State appropriates war as object for social control or
military force. But this State appropriation of the war
machine is not to be confused with the pure exteriority of
‘war machine’ in its ontological sense. The
sub-representative ontology of the war machine opens the forms of
power. Then, new legitimate uses of norms extend no further
than their singular conditions. That is, the ontological
sense of ‘deterritorialization’ and
‘reterritorialization’ are not to be confused with the
overcoded norms of a Globalizing State. From the standpoint
of the State, the war machine is to be appropriated as a negative
image of oppositional relations. However, D&G tell us
that the war machine is irreducible to State apparatus. The
war machine is an immeasurable multiplicity. It is
incommensurable with State apparatus. But if we still read
this from within the model of State Thought and habits of
Conceptual Identity --- if we still read this as opposition of
interior of State/exterior of war machine --- we will not
encounter terms in their ontological sense.
(A Thousand Plateaus 354) “It is
not enough to affirm that the war machine is external to the
[Sate] apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of
conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority,
whereas the State apparatus constitutes the form of interiority
we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in
the habit of thinking….In short, whenever the irruption of
war power is confused with the line of State domination,
everything becomes muddled; the war machine can then be
understood only through the categories of the negative, since
nothing is left that remains outside the State. But
returned to its milieu of exteriority, the war machine is seen to
be of another species, of another nature, of another
origin.”
The war machine is against the State, but
without the negative relations of State exchange that would
merely maintain or reproduce norms according to categories of its
prior image. Rather, there must be intensive multiplicities
of heterogeneous alliances that, with each division, change
nature. The war machine is ‘violence’ (used in
its ontological sense) of encounter that changes the nature of
State Image. We must reach the ontological sense of
the ‘war machine’ as a deterritorializing form of pure
exteriority to actualize legitimate uses of state metamorphosis
--- new assemblages without prior normative categories of State
Ideology.
The sub-representative plane of ontological
sense is real heterogeneous difference said as same.
It is the heterogeneous couplings of intensive series that reach
the ontological sense that may actualize really new disparate
uses of diverse norms, without any unifying standard of
normativity. Two heterogeneous series (molecular
desiring-production and molar social-production) reach the
ontological sense of real difference said as same. There
is the heterogeneity of intensive disparate coupling of molecular
and molar series without biunivocal overcoding that homogenizes.
Desiring-production reaches a sub-representative domain of
singular difference that changes the nature of social-production.
This is the war machine included in the process of becoming
minoritarian. Then, the war machine draws mutant lines of
flight to deterritorialize segments that may be reterritorialized
into creative open uses of state apparatus. This is in
contrast to Totalizing State apparatus where many groups
at a molecular level are thought to be homogenized into segments
of one molar unity --- where the many are thought
in terms of one normative standard of unity. (See my
article, The Difference of Univocity, for further
discussion of molecular and molar production.)
With univocity, there are always at least
two heterogeneous series: A series of molecular flows and a
series of molar segments. At one pole, these series may be
overcoded into rigid segments that homogenize both series. At
the other pole, the war machine draws lines of flight that decode
and deterritorialize. Between these poles are molecular
negotiations that may deterritorialize and reterritorialize into
new uses of state apparatus that extend no further than their
changing molecular conditions. Of course, there will always
be risk. But, if political discourse can enter the more
open process of ‘becoming minoritarian’, uses of state
apparatus could more adequately reflect changing conditions at
the level of social practices. Then, the sub-representative
war machine and state apparatus are two types of multiplicities
that intersect to open the forms to real difference.
There is not one Totalizing Concept of
Normativity. Nor is there the mere variability of negative
deterritorializations that reterritorialize on a Same Image of
Conceptual Identity. There are multiplicities of
interpenetrating worlds whose uses of norms cannot be
totalizable. Deleuze’s micro-politics reaches the
ontological sense of real minoritarian difference. There is
not one generalizing Conceptual Image of ‘normativity’
as a liberal framework would still have it. When Deleuze
says (Negotiations 171) he and Guattari think that
“any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of
capitalism and the ways it has developed” he is pointing the
way for us to understand his philosophy of economic and political
‘power’ that must be approached it in terms of its
ontological sense. For example, (Anti-Oedipus 250)
capitalism reaches an immanent deterritorialized field. However,
it is still determined by an oppressive axiomatic that
homogenizes the two series --- exchange money and credit money
--- that should remain heterogeneous. It measures both
labor and finance by the same abstract unit. However, (228)
“….it is not the same money”. So, the
question is, ‘How do we reach the heterogeneity of series said
as ‘same’ in the ontological sense that repeats only
difference?’
Patton is right to think in terms of
‘deterritorialization’ but we must ask if we are
reaching the ontological sense of the term. Do we
reach positive and absolute deterritorialization that is the
ontological sense of the war machine that reterritorializes with
real difference? We must reach the sub-representative plane
--- a pure sub-representative exteriority of the war machine ---
where there are no oppositional relations of exchange that merely
maintain and reproduce identity of the prior State Form. We
must reach heterogeneous alliances of real difference that are
repeated as ontologically singular, each time.
Therefore, a micro-politics must deal with
some new questions. What is the ontological sense of the
economic and political terms we use? How can political
discourse reach the singularity of real difference? How can
political and economic power reflect real singular practices?
What is the ontological sense of problems that are different in
kind from their political solutions? How do we reach new
practices whose conditions are not already extended? How
can political discourse be more open to singular molecular
practices that do not function to maintain or produce Globalizing
State Power? How can ‘revolutionary’ action lead
to real change? How do we reach desiring-production of the
war machine that does not maintain or reproduce the State Form of
desire --- the desire of one’s own repression? How do
we reach an open discourse where minorities have power to speak
from their own singular conditions of pure exteriority? How
can we arrive at new uses of state apparatus where molecular
desiring-production and molar social-production are not
homogenized? Can we enter a process of ‘becoming
minoritarian’ that reaches the ontological sense of
repetition of singular difference each time – to change the
nature, each time – to actualize new uses of state norms
that reflect singular minoritarian conditions? Can it be
possible to envision state apparatus without a prior image of
homogenizing normativity?