Reading Maimon
by Beth Metcalf
It has
been asserted that it is not possible to oppose Hegel. To
oppose Hegel’s relational forces of opposition merely puts
us right back into the Hegelian oppositional system. There
is no way out! And this is very true if we begin
with Hegelian presuppositions. There is no way to escape
Hegel if we assume Hegel’s negative relations of opposition.
When we make Hegelian assumptions, there will be no way to avoid
Hegelian conclusions. But Deleuze shows us that it is not
necessary to make Hegel’s assumptions. Hegel’s
assumptions derive from the very “image of thought”
that Deleuze calls “dogmatic”. Deleuze rejects
Hegel’s relational forces that are in the image of
conceptual identity. Such relations are not forces at all.
They are merely elements of already formed matter in constant
relations of infinite variability that maintain conceptual
identity. Deleuze tells us that, in order to escape Hegel,
we must reach forces that are not negative relations of
opposition. We must reach pre-individual forces of
singularity that are not relations of already formed matter.
We must reach the sub-representative ‘Idea’ of
univocality in order to reach multiplicities. I think it is
instructive to read Salomon Maimon’s (1) critique of Kant in
order to understand why relational forces leave out difference.
Maimon criticized Kant’s duality
between sensible intuitions and concepts of the understanding
(2). Such duality maintains a homogeneous structure of
conceptual identity. It assumes correspondence between many
sensible intuitions of things in extension, on the one hand; and
concepts of comprehension that unite the manifold, on the other.
Extension and comprehension, when in relations of identity or
opposition, are merely constant relations of
‘variability’. In contrast to Kant’s many
sensible intuitions united into one manifold, Maimon
reached what Deleuze calls ‘Ideas’ in
‘variety’ or ‘multiplicity’.
Deleuze
says (Difference & Repetition 173) that the Idea
“integrates variation, not as a variable determination of a
supposedly constant relation (‘variability’) but, on
the contrary, as a degree of variation of the relation itself
(‘variety’)….If the Idea eliminates variability,
this is in favour of what must be called variety or multiplicity.
The Idea as concrete universal stands opposed to concepts of the
understanding, and possesses a comprehension all the more vast as
its extension is great.”
Deleuze’s ‘Ideas’ as concrete
universals are singular varieties possessing a comprehension all
the more vast as its extension is great. That is, instead
of inverse relations of opposition that unifies a manifold, Ideas
are direct positive relations in reciprocal presupposition. This
‘reciprocal presupposition’ is not a constant relation
of variability between a conceptual form (comprehension) and
sensible intuitions (extension), which would merely maintain
conceptual identity. Rather, extension and comprehension
are heterogeneous series of singular couplings in positive
relations (relations external to their terms). Deleuze
calls these ‘disparate couplings of intensity’ (see DR
222). They are singular conditions of variety or
multiplicity. How can Deleuze’s forces be confused
with anything similar to Hegelian relations internal to one
Conceptual Image of variability? Hegel’s variable
relations merely maintain invariance.
Deleuze credits Maimon with introducing the
unthought into thought. Maimon recognized that Kant’s
inverse relation between sensible intuitions, on the one hand;
and concepts of the understanding, on the other; merely totalize
the manifold into one homogeneous structure of possible
experience. (Essay on Transcendental Philosophy
49-50) In contrast, Maimon thinks of a proposition as a synthesis
of subject and predicate. But this synthesis must not be
thought as an inverse relation that would merely maintain a
constant relation of variability. The subject
(determinable) of a synthesis can be thought without reference to
the predicate (determination). But the predicate can’t
be thought without reference to a subject. Therefore, the
subject is substance, and the predicate is the accidents of
objective modifications. Subject is the conceptual form.
Predicate is sensible intuition. The subject is
undetermined in itself. In itself, it has no material
content. It needs the determination of a predicate to
become an actual synthesis. Also, by itself, the predicate
is undetermined. Any oppositional relation of duality
between subject (concept of understanding) and its predicate
(sensible intuitions) is merely an oppositional relation internal
to one homogeneous form of conceptual possibility. Maimon
saw this as Kant’s mistake. It leaves out material
difference. In order to correct Kant’s mistake, Maimon
uses a third intervening form (Deleuze would call it ‘form
of the determinable’) for his transcendental condition
(3). One subject comes into synthesis with one predicate.
The singular condition of an objective synthesis lies in the
predicate’s objects of determination. That is, the
ground of a synthesis is objective determinations of a predicate.
If a predicate gains or loses any of its constituent parts, it
changes the nature of the synthesis. The synthesis becomes
a new form of determinability. It changes the nature of the
subject of the synthesis to become a new concept – a new
singular concrete universal.
Therefore, Maimon finds a ‘form of the
determinable’ that intervenes between the oppositional
dualities of subject and predicate which, in themselves, would
both be undetermined. The ‘form of the
determinable’ must be a singular positive coupling. Negative
oppositional determinations must be excluded because they
determine only one form of possibility in general. Only
positive determinations are included in the actual, because they
exclude each other through difference, not opposition. The
subject may be thought disjunctively with different
determinations in a predicate to arrive at disparate objective
syntheses. Maimon’s varieties (something like
Deleuze’s multiplicities) are concrete universals whose
‘comprehension is all the more vast as its extension is
great’.
Maimon asserts that a same subject can find
synthesis with only one predicate, and a same predicate can have
synthesis with only one subject. One predicate is
constituted by certain objective parts. That predicate,
with its parts, can belong to only one subject; and the same
subject can have only the parts of its own predicate.
If a predicate divides (i.e., loses or gains parts) it changes
the nature of its subject. It becomes a new synthesis.
Any assemblage of determinations can belong to only one form of a
determinable substance. Determinations in a predicate
cannot be separated from its subject without changing the nature
of its synthesis. That is, one subject and one predicate
are a positive coupling, formed in reciprocal presupposition.
Each is a singular form of the determinable that intervenes as a
third term. Therefore, just as Deleuze-Spinoza says there
is only one substance per attribute (4); for Maimon, there is
only one predicate of determination per determinable subject.
Any synthesis of subject and predicate is a singular form
(Deleuze’s ‘form of the determinable’).
It is a third term that transforms a subject/object duality.
This form intervenes between an undetermined subject and an
undetermined predicate.
Deleuze says, (Expressionism in
Philsoophy 335), “In short, what is expressed everywhere
intervenes as a third term that transforms dualities. Beyond real
causality, beyond ideal representation, what is expressed is
discovered as a third term that makes distinctions infinitely
more real and identity infinitely better thought. What is
expressed is sense: deeper than the relation of causality, deeper
than the relation of representation.”
Maimon’s determinations of a predicate
function like Deleuze’s ‘disparate intensity’ (Difference
& Repetition 222). Maimon’s intensive
determinations of a predicate can divide or augment, but not
without changing in nature or form of the determinable. Intensive
couplings of extension (determination) and comprehension
(determinable) are positive syntheses in reciprocal
presupposition. They differentiate forms to spatialize time
into singular varieties of concrete universals (multiplicities).
Predicates are singular assemblages of
determination. If an assemblage of determination can be
thought in different syntheses, then it is a substance
(i.e., a determinable). But different syntheses can’t
be thought at the same time. Different determinations of a
predicate are thought at different times, while a subject
persists. Subject persists. Predicate changes. That
is, the subject is said as the same while the synthesis of which
it is said is different. Time determination and space
determination arise together. Things can only be thought
through time. Things change in time. But this change
must not be confused with a constant relation of variable
subjective perspectives that represent only one moment in time.
Rather, like Deleuze’s ‘intensity’, there is
space-time determination that, with division, must change in
nature.
Deleuze says (Difference & Repetition
237) “Division [of homogeneous extensive quantities] can
therefore take place and be continued without any change in the
nature of what is being divided…..[T]he fiction of a
homogeneous quantity vanishes with intensity. An intensive
quantity may be divided, but not without changing its nature.
In a sense, it is therefore indivisible, but only because no part
exists prior to the division and no part retains the same nature
after division.”
That is, homogeneous extensive relations
continue without any change in nature of what is divided. However,
this fiction vanishes with intensity that changes its nature with
division. Maimon’s synthesis is not a dual relation
between subject and object. Before there can be complete
determination, Maimon finds a form of the determinable that
intervenes as a third term that transforms dualities. It is
singular difference, not general variability. The ground of
a synthesis is determinations of a predicate. Without the
determinations of a predicate, there can be no actual synthesis
through time. Negative predicates are excluded because
their oppositional relations determine conceptual sameness, not
objective difference. Only positive reciprocal relations
are included, because they exclude according to difference, not
opposition. Oppositional relations merely conceive of time
as variable subjective perspectives in one homogeneous conceptual
form of space-time. Then, all real difference of
time-determination is cancelled. Then, a synthesis is only
symbolic. But with time-determination that changes the
nature of space-time, ‘perspectivism’ is multiplicities
of singular concrete universals. The synthesis of substance
and accident can apply only to things changing in nature through
space and time.
The determinable subject (concepts of the
understanding) and determinate predicate (sensible intuitions)
are heterogeneous series whose relations are external to their
terms. Therefore, (ETP 17-18) Maimon warns against thinking
of space and time as a priori intuitions. Rather,
they are a priori forms of intuition. That
is, they are on the side of the determinable subject, not the
determinate predicate. Only with time-determination can
space and time become intuition by being brought into a unity
under a concept. Categories are meaningless without
time-determination. Time-determination is meaningless
without the categories of substance (determinable subject) and
accidents (determinate predicate). Categories are
meaningless without determined objects in the predicate. We
can have no insight into the possibility of the form of a
synthetic judgement without intuitions. We can only think
by means of the categories but have no cognition of this without
intuition. There can be cognition only by means of subject
persisting (said as same) and predicate changing (with real
difference) through time.
Maimon’s categories are subject
(substance) and predicate (accidents). Their synthesis
changes form and matter according to time-determination. For
Maimon, time is the determinable form of relating objects to one
another. (ETP 24-5) A ‘relational concept’ is the
synthetic unity of constituent parts thought at the same time.
Continuity of movement through space and time must not be
confused with variable relations of subjective positions which
merely maintain one conceptual form of possibility at one moment
in time. For Maimon, relational concepts are correlates in
a common form of space-time. Correlates of opposition
(e.g., reality and its negation) cannot be thought independently
of each other. We must ask, ‘Are correlates in the
same determinable form of time and space, or not?’ Varieties
or multiplicities are based on singular correlates. A
correlate is a constituent concept-intuition relation in a common
form of spatialized time. A correlate is incommensurable
with those in different spatialized times. Correlates are
singular and cannot be totalized into one conceptual form of
identity.
Therefore,
Maimon’s relations of identity and difference are not the
same as relations of identity and opposition. Maimon’s
categories (ETP 63-4) refer to things determined by conditions. Identity
and difference are relational concepts (correlates). One
cannot be thought without relation to the other. Intuitions
can be judged only by whether or not they are in same form of
space-time. Relations of identity and difference are
conditions of singular multiplicities. They are not general
relations of identity and opposition. Identity and
difference are correlates that share a ‘form of the
determinable’ as their common condition.
Maimon sees that reality and its own
difference cannot be in opposition. Correlates determine
multiplicities of conditions. They are positively related
in singular varieties of multiplicity. Relational concepts
are correlates that form disparate varieties (forms of internal
difference). They give rise to incommensurable
multiplicities that cannot be totalized into one Conceptual
Image. Maimon’s relational concepts (varieties or
multiplicities of correlates) are in contrast to Hegel’s
constant relation of variable opposition.
This is what Deleuze finds in Maimon. Maimon
was not content with Kant’s homogeneous form of possibility
between sensible intuition and conceptual form. Such
homogeneity merely holds everything into one structure of
generality without any creative difference. Maimon
understood that we must reach heterogeneity in the form of the
determinable. It must be an empty form of time that is
not already filled by a priori forms of intuition in
correspondence with a priori categories of understanding.
Such a priori synthesis is merely symbolic, not real.
For Maimon, there can be no synthetic judgement without
intuitions. There can be no possibility of synthetic
propositions a priori.
Deleuze tells us that the criterion for a principium
individuationis (singular difference) cannot be resolved by
the facts. Difference is not a conceptual relation among
facts. Repetition is not an extrinsic difference among
objects subsumed under a same concept.
“So long as we take difference to be
conceptual difference, intrinsically conceptual, and repetition
to be an extrinsic difference between objects represented by the
same concept, it appears that the problem of their relation may
be resolved by the facts.” (Difference &
Repetition 26-7)
This was Maimon’s criticism of Kant.
Kant’s conceptual difference (categories of understanding)
seem to be resolved through the appearance of facts (sensible
intuitions). That is, Maimon did not agree that a singular
individuation can be found in an extrinsic difference between
already formed elements and their relations of generality. Such
negative-oppositional relations of conceptual identity are
represented in a structure of generality. However, such
‘conceptual difference’ is not ‘singular
difference’. Singular difference is not to be found in
the form of possible experience in general. And
Maimon’s criticism of Kant also applies to Hegel. For
Hegel, ‘the real is rational and the rational is real’.
The intelligible is sensible, and sensible is
intelligible. Hegel’s relational elements maintain a
conceptual a priori image of variable relations of facts.
But the form of the determinable must be the form of time –
empty of a priori empirical content of sensible
intuitions. The transcendental condition of singular
determination cannot be resolved by facts that are already in a
conceptual form of generality.
Kant claims that categories are a priori
conditions of possible experience. But Maimon claims (ETP
114) that categories, as syntheses of substance and accident,
must be grounded in objective conditions of the predicate; and
cause and effect are conditions of alteration in objects. However,
if two states of substance and its accidents are completely
different, then there could only be the many accidents that could
never form a unity. And if they were completely the same
there would not be two states, but same state in the identity of
a concept. In either case, there would be no unity of the
many and no perception of alteration. So, the two states of
alteration must be part identical and part different. However,
this must not be taken to mean that the part that is identical is
the concept (identity in the concept). Rather, the concept
persists because it is said as same subject. It does
not mean that the part that is different is merely a relation of
variability. Rather, difference is singular varieties
through time that, with this division, change the nature of their
form. Maimon’s process of singular determination, is
this univocal form of the determinable that is said a same, but
is not the same. Cognition is the synthesis of persistence
and change through time. That is, the synthesis says the
determinable subject as same, but the predicate’s
determination of which it is said, is difference. Categories,
themselves, change in nature. There are no Representational
categories. There is internal difference that determines
singular varieties, not a same unity of a same manifold in
many/one opposition. Apart from synthetic unity of
substance and accidents through time, categories are meaningless;
because there can be no synthetic judgement without sensible
intuitions. There can be no possibility of synthetic a
priori judgements.
Maimon fulfils what Deleuze calls the first
and second syntheses. However, he does not reach the
counter-actualizations of Deleuze’s third synthesis.
(1) Essay on Transcendental Philosophy,
by Salomon Maimon, translated by Midgley, Somers-Hall, Welchman,
and Reglitz, 2010.
(2) (DR 218) Deleuze notices that
Kant’s “harmony of the understanding and
sensibility” depends on a transcendent “appeal to a
miracle”.
(3) Deleuze tells us (DR 85-6), although
Kant understood that in order to avoid direct correspondence
between the undetermined and determination, he had to first reach
a form of the determinable that is a third value
intervening between terms of a duality. However, whereas
Kant’s form of the determinable merely determined one
conceptual form of possible experience, Maimon showed that the
form of the determinable must inject real difference in order to
introduce the unthought into thought. To introduce the
unthought is to create new concepts – to find difference
that is not merely an a priori determination of
possibility. To introduce the unthought into thought, time
must be spatialized and space temporalized with real difference.
(4) Deleuze-Spinoza says there can be only
one substance per attribute (Expressionism in Philosophy
28) “….[T]here cannot be two or more substances
of the same attribute”.