Repetition as Universality of the
Singular
by Beth Metcalf
From page 1 of Difference &
Repetition, Deleuze prepares the reader for understanding his
ontology of univocal being. He makes a radical distinction
between the repetitions of univocity, on the one hand; and our
usual Representational Image of Thought, on the other. The
former is repetition as singular-universal. The latter is a
closed generality of the particular. “Generality, as
generality of the particular, thus stands opposed to repetition
as universality of the singular…” But what is
repetition as the universality of the singular? How do we
reach that which opposes the generality of the particular? The
answer to that question is fundamental in reaching an
understanding of Deleuze’s concept of univocal being.
Deleuze says (DR 270) that Representation
distorts repetition no less than difference. First,
Representational Thought provides no criteria for distinguishing
repetition from generality. It merely repeats its own
generality. Its “repetition” is without any
singular difference. Second, Representation uses the
identity of the concept to explain both repetition and
difference. Then, difference is merely a conceptual
difference, and “[r]epetition …is represented outside
the concept, as though it were a difference without concept, but
always with the presupposition of an identical concept”.
There is merely numerical, not real, distinction in space and
time. Third, the negative of opposition and limitation in
the concept causes blockages. An infinite number of things
can be comprehended under the generality of the concept. There
can only be resemblances. Such general difference can never
reach singular difference. Therefore, Deleuze makes the
distinction between the repetition of univocity and the
generality of Representation. The singular difference of
univocity does not presuppose the identity of the concept. Repetition
of singular difference does not presuppose resemblance or analogy
within a general structure.
Deleuze’s difference and repetition
reveal two types of multiplicities. There are
sub-representative multiplicities as planes of consistency, and
there are multiplicities of actualized uses of reference frames.
On a plane of extensive reference, when a particular element
divides, there is no change in its general nature. There
will still be merely the same generality of the particular.
A particular individual will not reach singularity. On a
closed plane of reference, there is only the generality of the
particular. There are no multiplicities. To reach
multiplicities of reference, there needs to be an intersection
with another type of multiplicity --- pre-individual
sub-representative intensive multiplicities that, with division, must
change in nature. All such intensive forces (in any degree,
order, or connection) are the ontological singularity of real
distinction. Singularity changes its nature with each
division on this sub-representative plane of intensities. Then,
the intersecting frames of reference may be multiplicities of
actualized singular uses of general representation. However,
if the plane of general reference does not intersect with the
sub-representative plane --- if the sub-representative plane is
left out --- then there is only one closed plane of
totalizing-generalizing reference. Then there is only a
Dogmatic Image of Thought whose mere variability is often
mistaken for multiplicity. The generality of the particular
is reduced to the Dogmatic Image of Representation if it does not
reach intersection with the sub-representative plane of
univocality. Therefore, only when the two planes intersect
do they open into two types of multiplicities --- intensive and
extensive multiplicities of singular-universal difference. Then,
planes of reference proliferate into discrete multiplicities as
they intersect with the continuous multiplicities of planes of
consistency. There is creation of concepts on planes of
consistency. There are actualized uses of extensive
reference. There are uses of generality that extend
no further than their singular conditions. All such uses
are singular-universal frames of reference, incommensurable with
each other. There is no totalizing generality of
consistency or reference.
Deleuze writes about two types of
distribution (DR 36-7). There is a “type of
distribution which implies a dividing up of that which is
distributed”. I take that to be the Dogmatic Image of
Representational Thought. The other type of distribution is
“nomadic….without property, enclosure or measure.
Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed
but rather a division among those who distribute themselves
in an open space….” I take the former type to be
generality of the particular. The latter is universality of
the singular --- the One-All of univocal being --- the
intersection of two types of multiplicities. Deleuze
writes, “To fill a space, to be distributed within it, is
very different from distributing the space. It is an errant
and even ‘delirious’ distribution, in which things are
deployed across the entire extensity of a univocal and
undistributed Being….” With univocal being, being
is not distributed into a sedentary structure under categories of
Representation.
Deleuze tells us (DR 3) that
“[e]xperimentation is thus a matter of substituting one
order of generality for another: an order of equality for an
order of resemblance. Repetition appears here only in the
passage from one order of generality to another …. as if
repetition momentarily appeared between or underneath two
generalities.” Therefore, an order of generality is
that which, under the same conditions, represents the
“being-equal of the phenomena”. But repetition
must not be confused with a mere difference in a degree of
generality. “In its essence, repetition refers to a
singular power which differs in kind from generality….”
So, it is important to understand what Deleuze means by
‘being-equal’. He says (DR 37), “The words
‘everything is equal’ may therefore resound joyfully,
on condition that they are said of that which is not equal
in this equal, univocal Being: equal being is immediately present
in everything, without mediation or intermediary, even though
things reside unequally in this equal being.” All
things are in absolute proximity (no matter how distant from the
point of view of a prior concept). All participate
equally in being that is ontologically one (not
conceptually identical). There is no sedentary structure of
generality. There is only the ontological being equal of
all singularity that is nomadically distributed. However,
it is only the disparate ‘intensity’ of difference
(DR222) that may be nomadically distributed because only such
disparate difference is singular in all its repetitions. That
is, singular conditions determine each order (or use) of
generality.
(DR25) “The interior of repetition is
always affected by an order of difference: it is only to the
extent that something is linked to a repetition of an order other
than its own that the repetition appears external and bare, and
the thing itself subject to the categories of generality. It
is the inadequation between difference and repetition which gives
rise to the order of generality.”
Therefore, when Deleuze writes about that
singular difference which changes in nature with each division,
he does not mean division within a structure of genera and
species. That could never reach singular difference. Deleuze’s
singular difference involves two types of multiplicities. His
philosophy shows us multiplicities of intensive inseparable
variations of the concept. These are planes that change in
nature as strata are superimposed. The other type of
multiplicities is the independent variables of scientific
reference. The two types of multiplicities intersect, each
on its own line. But if we do not reach the first type of
multiplicities, then the other type merely closes into one
totalizing generality of reference. Then there are no
multiplicities at all. If the inseparable variations of the
philosophical concept are confused with the variables of the
scientific function, then everything is closed into one
totalizing generality of reference --- one totalizing Image of
Representation --- the Dogmatic Image of Conceptual Identity.
The philosophical concept must escape identity. It must
reach ordinal singularity of intensive folding that changes
nature with each fold. Otherwise the philosophical concept
is being confused with the scientific function.
Deleuze writes about philosophers such as
Kant, Hegel, Spinoza, and others. However, commentators
often will say that Deleuze misreads Hegel --- that Deleuze, in
spite of his denial, is really similar to Hegel. Or, some
may say Deleuze is wrong about Spinoza. Or, some may
critique Deleuze according to Kant. But from the
perspective of what plane of consistency can these judgments be
made? In order to criticize or debate with Deleuze in this
way it is necessary to ignore Deleuze’s
‘perspectivism’ as planes of multiplicities. The
philosophers Deleuze writes about are not to be taken as causal
influences. Deleuze’s consistency is not just another one
of many different unified perspectives of generality.
History is no longer conceived as a totalizing generality of
reference. Deleuze’s history of philosophy is not
merely a linear development or chronology of causal continuity.
According to Deleuze, there is no ideal meta-history of universal
generality. Deleuze sees philosophical structure as
problematic. Philosophical perspectives are creation of
concepts on singular planes of consistency. Deleuze’s
univocal being is the dispersion of intensive singularities.
There is proliferation of discontinuous multiplicities of
historical perspective --- disparate conditions of knowledge ---
that create transversals of new continuous variations. Terms
do not maintain a common sense correlated with referents. In
order to read Deleuze, the sense of terms can be deciphered only
in their singular occurrence of dispersion. We can no
longer assume that terms are used in one generalized function or
totalizing signification.
Some commentators, when trying to understand
Deleuze, may read Kant (for example). Then they do not
understand Kant from the perspective of Deleuze’s plane of
univocality. Rather, they interpret Deleuze from the
perspective of Kant’s plane. However, from Kant’s
perspective, it may appear that Kant starts from a transcendental
whole and Deleuze starts with the concrete parts. But,
according to Deleuze’s ‘perspectivism’, what
difference would that make? For Deleuze it does not matter
whether we start from the transcendental or the empirical. In
either case, it is still a Conceptual Image that traces the
transcendental from the empirical. Then there are only
general transcendental conditions of possible experience. The
transcendental is merely traced from the supposed prior
possibilities of empirical experience. Then, there can be
only one generalizing reference frame. It is only when we
finally reach Deleuze’s plane of consistency that we no
longer see many perspectives of one conceptual
image of variability. Deleuze reaches a
sub-representational domain of transcendental-empiricism where
both the transcendental and the empirical are constituted and
actualized together in two intersecting types of disparate multiplicities.
There is no prior Image of a generalized whole with particular
concrete parts. Any collection of intensive singularities
may be a new body without organs. Deleuze’s
intersection of two types of interleaved multiplicities reaches
singular-universal repetition with real singular difference.
In chapter 6 of Empiricism and
Subjectivity, Deleuze writes (regarding critics of
Hume’s empiricism) that most criticisms raised against the
great philosophers are philosophical objections in name only.
And can’t this also be said about criticisms against
Deleuze? Aren’t Deleuze’s critics (and often his
disciples) raising questions that are philosophical in name only?
A good philosophical critique must no longer assume that
philosophical problems are inside a prior generalized structure.
Philosophy must not trace the transcendental from the empirical.
Philosophical critique must not assume an already given structure
of ‘what things are’ or ‘how things are
related’. Philosophy must put such already given
structure in question by reaching ‘intensity’ (i.e.,
the singular difference of that by which the given is given).
A good critique can only ask whether the question which presents
things in a certain light is a good and rigorous question. Only
one kind of criticism is philosophical --- ‘Does the
questioning of the philosopher force the nature of things
enough?’ Yet, Deleuze is often criticized from the
perspective of a totalizing plane that never reaches intensive
multiplicities of singular difference. Such a perspective
of generalizing reference is merely repetition that maintains
conceptual identity. It presupposes what things are
possible, how things can possibly be related, and how constant
relations of variability maintain a prior image of possibility.
But how does that force the nature of things enough?
Of course, Deleuze appears to
“misread” Hegel --- or Deleuze appears Hegelian --- if
he is read from the perspective of Hegel’s plane! Hegel
never reaches Deleuze’s sub-representative plane of
immanence-consistency. He never reaches two types of
singular multiplicities. Hegel does not reach
Deleuze’s plane of univocality. Deleuze changes the
way philosophy is to be done. Each philosopher lays out a
singular plane of consistency --- a new singular creation of
concepts that addresses new problems. But when we use
traditional concepts in order to understand Deleuze, we assume a
totalizing perspective of identity on a generalized plane of
transcendent reference. We never reach Deleuze’s plane
of singular immanence. And yet many disciples of Deleuze
still take some supposed ideal model of Kant or Hegel or
whomever, and critique Deleuze from that perspective. From
that perspective they interpret, or even debate with,
Deleuze’s text. However, that only means they have not
yet reached Deleuze’s plane of consistency. According
to Deleuze, to debate with a plane of consistency is to confuse
philosophy with scientific reference. Philosophy must reach
singular (intensive) multiplicities by which the given
(extensive) multiplicities of scientific reference are given (DR
222). A philosophical plane of consistency may be critiqued
only by asking ‘Is it interesting, remarkable, or
important?’ and ‘Does it force the nature of things
enough?’
Commentators, even as they discuss
Deleuze’s ‘difference’, still unwittingly leave
out his singular difference. They inadvertently presuppose
the generality of the particular. They still presume a
structure that must be maintained in the identity of its
conceptual generality. However, according to Deleuze,
philosophy is no longer to be understood as one totalizing
reference frame that unifies variable perspectives into a
generalized image. Deleuze breaks with common sense and
good sense. He tells us that repetition must not return to
any original idealized model. Deleuze’s repetition of
Kant or Hegel or whomever is to be understood as showing how that
philosopher appears from the perspective of Deleuze’s
plane of consistency. Deleuze’s perspectivism is
multiplicities of singular planes of consistency. All
are real difference, ontologically one --- not
conceptually one. The immanence of disparate
singular-intensive multiplicities may be actualized in disparate
singular-extensive multiplicities of diversity. Each plane
is itself a singular-universal perspective. Philosophy must
reach two types of multiplicities. Otherwise, philosophy
becomes merely a supposed plane of transcendence --- many
perspectives totalized into one conceptual Image of
identity.
Therefore, it is my contention that we must
read only Deleuze when it is Deleuze we are trying to
understand, because only Deleuze lays out his own singular
plane of consistency. If we want to understand Deleuze we
would not read Deleuze according to a prior understanding of
Kant, for example. We would read Deleuze’s Kant in
order to understand how Kant appears from the perspective of
Deleuze’s plane of consistency. Deleuze’s
repetition with real difference is the superimposition of
intensive strata that change nature with each repetition
(division or augmentation). Each such repetition introduces
real difference as it intersects with, and changes, its extensive
reference frame. These intensive and extensive
multiplicities intersect. Therefore, if these are to be
repetitions with real intensive difference, what must they not
be? According to Deleuze (Difference & Repetition
126-8) they must not be copies resembling a supposed ideal model
of Kant or Hegel or whomever. If we are to reach
Deleuze’s simulacra on his plane of univocal being, we must
stop treating repetition as if it were consistent with some
totalizing frame of reference whose “difference”
maintains identity of an original conceptual image of
variability. We must find coherence in Deleuze’s
text --- without importing concepts he does not have --- and
without neglecting concepts he does have. That is, we must
not read Kant or Hegel or whomever in order to understand
Deleuze. We must read Deleuze’s repetition of that
philosopher if we want to see how his concept of univocal being
changes the nature of how that philosopher appears. Deleuze’s
repetition always involves real difference that does not maintain
identity of an ideal model. It does not return to an
origin. It is important to reach Deleuze’s plane of
consistency as he lays it out in his text --- if it is Deleuze
we are trying to understand.
According to Deleuze, transcendental
conditions must no longer entail the assumption of a common
historical origin. Conditions change in the course of
history. There is no maintenance of homogeneous conditions
of determinate causes. So, it can no longer be assumed that
we can read philosophers of the past under unifying
transcendental conditions of possibility. There is no
totalizing perspective from which historical events can be read.
There is no determinate origin to which ‘events’ are
causally related. Events are immediate singularities not
mediated by any general structure. Events are repetition
with real heterogeneous singularity. They are not inside an
already given form of generality. Singular events change
the nature of their own conditions of possibility. Events
change the nature of a structure as they are repeated with
singular difference. They do not maintain a structure of
variable generality. Events may be said as same, but
they are not the same. Events are repetitions with real
difference of changing historical conditions. Deleuze’s
‘transcendental-empiricism’ (like Foucault’s
‘historical a priori’) sees the creation of new
forms throughout history. Deleuze’s time of Aion is
the empty form of the determinable. His
‘perspectivism’ creates historical conditions for new
possibilities of perception and understanding. It prevents
any general, universal, or totalizing knowledge. It never
maintains variable relations of conceptual identity. Discontinuous
dispersions of flows never maintain the same objects, subjective
positions, conceptual forms, or practical function. Concrete
modes of perspective are singular-universal. They have
nothing to do with a process of generality of the particular that
goes from one actual term to another. Rather, the process
of multiplicities goes from virtual singularity to actualized
singular-universal. This has nothing to do with a
homogeneous historicism that maintains constant relations of
variability or generality of function.
Of course, there is not one way to read
Deleuze. We read Deleuze with repetitions of real
difference if we are to follow Deleuze’s way forward. But
how can we do that if we do not first understanding what
Deleuze means by ‘real singular difference’? Without
Deleuze’s new univocal sense of repetition (i.e. repetition
that says all singularity as ontologically one
universality of being), there can be only a return to the
generalizing structure of traditional thought. Of course,
there is nothing wrong with reading Kant or Hegel. But why
should we read philosophers of the past in order to
understand Deleuze? We must first try to understand how Deleuze
lays out his own plane of consistency. But in doing this we
can’t just ignore those concepts that don’t fit our
prior notions of what makes consistency possible. We must
reach a sub-representative source of new possibilities that may
seem inconsistent or impossible from a prior perspective of
traditional thought.
So, how do we stop representing
Deleuze’s words through analogy with traditional
understandings? How do we make consistency of
Deleuze’s plane as he lays it out in his text? How do
we read only Deleuze when attempting to understand
Deleuze? This is not an easy thing to do because it calls
for a paradoxical act of reading. Deleuze asks his reader
to understand that which cannot be represented to our prior modes
of understanding. He asks the reader not to return to
presupposed conditions of possible experience. He talks
about a dice game that is nothing like the games with which we
are acquainted. He tells us to relinquish our assumptions
about common sense and good sense. He writes about a
sub-representative domain that does not resemble the phenomena of
any empirical domain. We are asked to reach pre-individual
singularities rather than the familiar particular individuals
inside a generalized structure. We are told of an Outside
that hollows out a new Inside with every fold. That is,
there is no general external/internal opposition. There are
no negative oppositional relations at all. We are asked to
forget the prior possibilities whereby we suppose that we already
know ‘what things are’ and ‘how things are
related’. We are asked to stop giving to thought only
what is already represented there. We are asked to be open to
violent encounter. It is not easy to break our habits of
Representation.
There may be actualized multiplicities
constituted as disparate singular uses of general
reference with their own functional diversity. There are
multiplicities of singular constituent uses of
oppositions. But these temporary uses cannot be totalized
into one general structure. There is not the one
generality of the many particulars. There is no
universal one/many opposition. Rather, each
actualized use of generality is itself a singular-universal
perspective. These uses are incommensurable with each other
because they are multiplicities of singular-universal difference.
Deleuze’s philosophy reaches multiplicities of immanence.
His philosophy is not an ideal totalizing image of transcendence.
His perspectivism is not different points of view on one
universal generalized image. Rather, there are folds upon
folds of disparately ordered intensities intersecting with
multiplicities of singular-universal planes of perspective ---
‘a thousand plateaus’. Deleuze’s philosophy
of Univocal Being is the effect of singular intensive dispersion.
It is the intersection of two types of singular-universal
multiplicities.
Science is the method in which our
understanding of phenomena must follow the empirical evidence.
If new evidence does not support our current understanding, it is
our understanding that must change. However, Deleuze tells
us that philosophy must not be confused with science. Philosophers
lay out planes of consistency. Each of the great
philosophers creates concepts in answer to new problems. So,
philosophy is not a phenomenology of transcendental conditions in
prior correspondence with our notions of ‘what is’.
Rather, philosophy is singular planes of consistency from which
the transcendental conditions of phenomena are actualized
disparately in frames of reference. Therefore, if a
philosophical text seems inconsistent to a reader, it is not the
text that needs to be criticized. It is the reader that
needs to find the new conditions that make that text consistent.
The reader needs to change the way s/he thinks --- if it is the
philosophical consistency of the text that is to be understood.
Therefore, those philosophers who seem to always think it
necessary to criticize Deleuze’s text are missing the point.
They confuse philosophical consistency with scientific reference.
They do not understand that it is not the text that must fit our
prior concepts about phenomena. It is the reader’s
conceptual plane that must change in order to reach new singular
conditions of consistency.
So, as we read Difference &
Repetition, it is important to keep page 1 in mind.
Deleuze’s univocal repetition must not be confused, as it so
often is, with a merely constant relation of variability --- the
mere variability that maintains the generality of the particular.
We will not understand Deleuze through our usual notions about
oppositional relations among particulars. When we read
Deleuze by way of our usual habits of generalizing
Representation, we have to force his text to correspond to prior
biases of what is necessary to make thought consistent with
experience. In doing this we have to leave out most
everything Deleuze says while using concepts he rejects. At
least, that is how things appear from the perspective of my
reading of Deleuze. Go where Deleuze’s text leads and
a transversal dark precursor will create new uses of consistency
never seen before.