Sub-representative Domain (Part 1):
Individuation
by Beth Metcalf
In order to reach
Deleuze’s individuating difference (‘Difference
& Repetition’ 38) it is not enough that univocal
being relates immediately to individuating factors. It is
not enough to reach a univocity like that of Duns Scotus. We
must reach an individuating difference that does not proceed by
way of the individual factors we know from experience. Individuation
is already presupposed by form, matter, and extensive parts.
Individuation must precede matter and form, species and
parts, and every element of the constituted individual. Therefore,
when we proceed by way of generic, specific, or individual
difference, we confine the process to an already formed matter of
representation. We do not reach the sub-representative,
individuating difference of Deleuze’s univocity. If we
are to reach Deleuze’s univocity we must reach the
individuating factors of the sub-representative field---an
individuation of pre-individual singularity. However,
Deleuze’s critics (and even many of his admirers) still do
not reach the sub-representative source of determination. They
are still confined to the already formed matter of experience.
How do we reach
the singular individuating difference of Deleuze’s
sub-representative domain? Deleuze says (‘Difference
& Repetition’ p.275), “The fact is that to
ground is to determine the indeterminate, but this is not a
simple operation. When determination as such occurs, it
does not simply provide a form or impart form to a given matter
on the basis of the categories. Something of the ground
rises to the surface, without assuming any form but, rather,
insinuating itself between the forms…. (A determination
which is not opposed to the indeterminate and does not limit it.)
That is why the matter-form couple is not sufficient to
describe….determination: matter is already
informed….and the whole is under the protection of the
categories. In fact, this couple is completely internal to
representation….” This raises the following
questions I attempt to answer below: 1. What is the
‘something’ of the ground that rises to the surface?
2. What is the ‘something’ that has no form while
insinuating itself between the forms? 3. What is a
determination that does not oppose the indeterminate and will
therefore not limit it? 4. How can this
‘something’ be both without form and determinate at the
same time?
1. ‘What is the
‘something’ of the ground that rises to the surface?
We are told that to ground is to determine
the indeterminate. However (D&R 276), determination
does not immediately bear on the indeterminate. Before we
can determine the indeterminate we must find the form of the
determinable --- the pure empty form of time --- the form of
difference between the indeterminate and the determination.
But this cannot be done at the level of an already formed-matter
under the protection of the categories of possible experience.
That would restrict determination to the plane that represents
difference internal to a concept --- a merely conceptual
difference. Rather, something of the sub-representative
ground rises to the surface. Every determination remains
open to this sub-representative form of the determinable. Something
of this form rises to the surface to ground determination as a
singular use of determination, each time.
Deleuze says (DR 26-7) that as long as
difference is thought to be intrinsically conceptual and
repetition is taken as extrinsic difference between objects
represented by that concept, the relation between difference and
repetition will appear to be a problem that can be resolved by
the facts. That is, difference and repetition will be
restricted to the representational-empirical plane of already
formed matter. Deleuze rejects this formulation of the
problem. Deleuze says that difference is not internal to
the identity of a concept of already formed matter. Nor is
repetition an external difference between objects represented by
that concept. Rather, there is repetition of difference
that is internal but not conceptual. Difference is internal
to a sub-representative Idea, but it is external
to the concept by which an object is represented. Difference
is internal to the Idea on the sub-representative plane, but it
is external to the concept by which objects are represented on
the plane of representation.
‘Repetition’ open to
sub-representative ‘difference’ is that
‘something’ of the sub-representative ground. The
empty form of time gives rise to an internal form of difference. There
is internal difference of the sub-representative Idea that
grounds a concept of an object represented within a whole form of
exteriority. Therefore, on the one hand, we must find a
singular ‘difference’ at the level of
sub-representative Ideas. On the other hand,
‘repetition’ brings something of this
sub-representative difference to the surface. Difference
and repetition must be the result of interferences between two
lines---a representative plane and a sub-representative plane.
There are two types of multiplicity that intersect.
If we see “difference” only in a
form of already extensive objects and qualities, then we cut off
the plane of representation from its sub-representative source.
The principle of individuation appears to be a process at the
level of facts. It traces the transcendental from the
empirical. However, with Deleuze’s concept of
‘difference’, individuation is a process of
pre-individual singularity. Something of the
sub-representative Idea rises to the surface in a modal use of
representation, each time. There is a temporary use
of representation open to a sub-representative process of
individuating difference and repetition.
2. What is the ‘something’ that
has no form while insinuating itself between the forms?
I take the ‘something’ that has no
form to be disparate ‘difference’ that insinuates
itself between the forms through ‘repetition’. ‘Repetition’
is this formless determination that insinuates
‘difference’ between the forms. (DR 57)
“Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the
formless power of the ground which carries every object to that
extreme ‘form’ in which its representation comes
undone. The ultimate element of repetition is the
disparate, which stands opposed to the identity of
representation….”
So, this singular individuating difference
that insinuates itself between the forms is repetition of the
‘intensity’ of disparate difference. But
intensity must not be confused with an impure mixture on the
empirical plane of experience. Intensity is not an impure
mixture of sensible quality and extensity, nor is it physical
quality and extensive quantity. Intensity is not an
individual factor that can be known from experience. Intensity
is sub-representative difference that tends to be cancelled in
extensive quality on the other plane. If intensity is seen
to be greater or lesser degree of experienced sensation, then it
is still mistaken for a degree of sensation on the plane of
extensive representation. (DR 223) “In short, we know
intensity only as already developed within an extensity, and as
covered over by qualities. Whence our tendency to consider
intensive quantity as a badly grounded empirical concept, an
impure mixture of a sensible quality and extensity, or even of a
physical quality and an extensive quantity.” On the
sub-representative plane, intensity is the being of the
sensible as that by which the given (on the plane of extensity)
is given. The being of the sensible cannot be sensed
from the point of view of an empirical exercise (on the plane of
representation), but can only be sensed from the point of view of
a transcendental exercise (on the sub-representative plane).
(DR 222) “Difference [intensity] is not
diversity [extensity]. Diversity is given, but difference
[transcendental condition of real experience] is that by which
the given is given, that by which the given is given as
diverse….each intensity is already a coupling in which each
element of the couple refers in turn to couples of elements of
another order, thereby revealing the properly qualitative content
of quantity. We call this state of infinitely doubled
difference which resonates to infinity disparity.”
So, this coupling that is enveloped by intensive difference at
the sub-representative level must not be confused with the
form-matter coupling at the level of extensive representation.
(DR 23-4) The former is covered repetition. The latter is
bare repetition. The former is the transcendental condition
of the latter. The coupling of the former is heterogeneous
doubling without negative opposition or causal connection (like
Spinoza’s ‘attributes’). There are intensive
degrees of this parallelism. Intensity is the difference of
covered repetition beneath the homogeneous extensive
qualities of bare repetition that tend to cancel it. (DR
230) Intensity is imperceptible on the extensive plane of
representation, because there it can only be covered by qualities
and extensity in which it is explicated. So, I take covered
repetition to be that ‘something’ without form that
insinuates itself between the forms of bare repetition. The
two repetitions intersect in two types of multiplicity. It
is the interference of two forms of repetition on two planes that
intersect in two types of multiplicity.
3. What is a determination that does not
oppose the indeterminate and will therefore not limit it?
What is (DR 275) “determination which
is not opposed to the indeterminate and does not limit
it”? (Italics added.) When determination is opposed to
the indeterminate, it limits the determination to one already
formed matter. When the form-matter coupling opposes
determination to the indeterminate, that
“indeterminate” is already limited to the one
determinate form. The form-matter coupling is already a
form of negative determination internal to representation. It
limits determination to one form of possibility. The (DR
203) ‘oppositions’ and ‘limitations’, on this
plane of already formed matter, are merely negative
determinations internal to a conceptual identity. This
means (DR 85-6) that the determination must not bear directly on
the undetermined. Rather, there must be the form of the
determinable that establishes an internal difference between
being and thought. This form of the determinable is the
pure empty form of time (DR 276). It is the real
distinction that qualifies Substance without negative opposition
or limitation. The sub-representative intensive disparate
is the element of repetition that does not oppose the determinate
to the indeterminate.
(DR 28) “Difference is the state in
which one can speak of determination as such. The
difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and
the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However,
instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine
something which distinguishes itself – and yet that from
which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from
it….as though it were distinguishing itself from that which
does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground
rose to the surface, without ceasing to be
ground….Difference is this state in which determination
takes the form of unilateral distinction.”
Therefore, the ‘something’ of the
ground that rises to the surface is a unilateral distinction
without opposition or limitation. The determination which
does not oppose the indeterminate is the unilateral distinction
of vice-diction. Vice-diction gives us the
sufficient reason, or transcendental condition of real, not
merely possible, experience. It is an intrinsic genesis,
not merely an extrinsic conditioning. (DR 189-191) With
vice-diction something of the sub-representative inessential
ground rises to the surface as a temporary surface effect. Vice-diction
is a process of determination through the inessential. Something
of the inessential ground does not distinguish itself from
determinations at the surface. The concept distinguishes
itself from the Idea, but the Idea does not distinguish itself
from the concept. This keeps repetition open to the
inessential difference of the sub-representative plane.
(DR 152) “Individuation…. operates
beneath all forms, [it] is inseparable from a pure ground that it
brings to the surface and trails with it….For this ground,
along with the individual, rises to the surface yet assumes
neither form nor figure. It is there, staring at us, but
without eyes. The individual distinguishes itself from it,
but it does not distinguish itself, continuing rather to cohabit
with that which divorces itself from it. It is the
indeterminate, but the indeterminate in so far as it continues to
embrace determination….”
4. How can this
‘something’ be both without form and determinate at the
same time?
How can this ‘something’ be both
formless and determinate? I believe that we can understand
this paradox through Deleuze’s Spinozism (‘Expressionism
in Philosophy’ Chapter 12). As we have seen, the
empty form of time is the form of the determinable. It is
empty of empirically formed content. It is without formed
substance. Yet it is not undifferentiated. It is all
real distinction. It is the source of all intensive
differentiation without negation, exclusion, or limitation.
As Deleuze reads Spinoza (Expressionism in Philosophy
195-99), individuation occurs only through a mode’s
existence, not its essence. As long as a mode does not
exist, its essence is only contained in its attributes and cannot
be distinct from them. There is real distinction but no
numerical distinction. A mode’s essence is not
distinct from attributes in which it is contained. Nor is
there extrinsic distinction between modal essences. Extrinsic
distinction happens only when a mode exists. Only existing
modes have extrinsic individuation or numerical distinction.
But there is a prior intrinsic individuation of singular modal
essence even if there is no corresponding modal existence. Modal
essences are intrinsic intensive quantities. There is
singularity of modal essence. A quantitative intensive
variation (a modal essence) is contained in a singular
qualitative variety (attribute). Intensive individuation is
not extrinsic quality. It is intrinsic intensive quantity
contained in singular quality. Attributes contain modal
essences as degrees of intensive quantity. But modal
essences are inseparable as contained in the intrinsic
singularity of the attribute. If a modal essence separates
from the singular unity of its attribute, there is a change in
the singular quality.
Deleuze discusses his understanding of
Spinoza’s notion of the mode’s existence (‘Expressionism
in Philosophy’ Chapter 13). A mode’s
existence possesses a great number of extensive parts external to
the mode’s essence. If a mode exists it possesses
extensive parts corresponding to its essence (its intensive
degree of power). An infinity of extrinsic parts of an
existing mode corresponds to an intensive degree of power of a
modal essence. Extensive parts and degrees of intensity
have no one to one correspondence. Every degree of
intensity corresponds to extensive parts that have some extrinsic
relation of movement and rest. A mode exists when an
infinity of extensive parts enter into a relation that
corresponds to different intensive degrees of power of a modal
essence. A modal essence expresses itself in a certain
disparate intensive coupling on different levels or degrees of
power. A mode comes into existence when extensive parts
actually enter into this relation. If parts enter into a
different relation corresponding to a different modal essence,
they compose a different existing mode. So, there is
singular intensive essence, existing mode composed of extensive
parts, and an individuating formal relation through which an
infinity of extensive parts may have a fragile and temporary
relation to an essence. The extensive parts have only
mechanical laws of determination extrinsic to their essence.
Modal essence and modal existence do not have a real distinction.
They are two types of modal distinction that intersect as two
types of multiplicities. A mode’s essence is intrinsic
to the attributes. A mode’s existence is extrinsic.
The real distinction of the attributes
constitutes the essence of qualified substances and contains the
essences of modes. I take Deleuze-Spinoza’s
‘concept’ to be two types of modal distinction. The
concept (an existing mode) distinguishes itself from the Idea
(the modal essence contained in its attribute), but the Idea does
not distinguish itself from the modal concept that it vice-dicts
(EiP 213-14). The relation of a modal essence is that
‘something’ of the ground that rises to the surface to
be filled by extensive parts in a fragile and temporary modal
existence. On the sub-representative plane, each substance
qualified by the attributes has intensive modal quantity that is
its singular ‘internal difference’. This modal
essence is the determinate singular internal difference of the
Idea. Therefore, modal essences have singular determination
--- an intensive quantity. However, as contained in their
attributes, modal essences have no extrinsically distinct form.
Modes have a virtual half as modal essences. They also have
an actual half as existing modes when filled with extensive
parts. Therefore, modes are unformed (virtual) and formed
(actual). The concept can be both formless and determinate
because it is modal quantity. The concept is no longer
taken to be an essential substance (an already formed matter) on
a closed plane of Representation. Modal essence is the determinate
difference of intensive quantity. Modal essence is also the
changing relations of difference and repetition that is the formless
power where representations become undone. The
sub-representative modal essence and its degrees of relation are
both determinate (difference) and formless (repetition).
Deleuze-Spinoza’s individuation is not
a process at the level of formed matter. It is
sub-representative and pre-individual. When Deleuze tells
us that difference is internal to an Idea, he means that
intensive difference of modal essence is internal to the
sub-representative attribute which contains it. When
Deleuze tells us that difference is external to the concept by
which an object is represented, he means that the existing mode
on the empirical plane has extrinsic and extensive parts in a
corresponding relation to its modal essence. It fills this
relation with extensive parts. But this correspondence is
not a causal connection or resemblance.
Each qualification of Substance constituted by the attributes has intensive modal quantity. This singular modal quantity (modal essence) is the disparate coupling in degrees of intensive difference. It is the properly qualitative content of quantity. It is the determinate ‘internal difference’ of sub-representative individuation. Therefore, Deleuze-Spinoza’s individuation of the concept is not qualitative or extrinsic. It is not a process of substantial forms. Rather, individuation is quantitative and intrinsic (intensive). A mode’s essence must not be confused with a substantial essence. Essence is modal, not substantial. The relation between a mode’s essence and existence is that determination that rises to the surface without any substantial form. Is the corresponding relation that ‘something’ which is both without form and determinate? Is it, then, that point of intersection between two types of multiplicity? Is it not that indiscernibility between the virtual and the actual?
Individuation does not proceed from general
to particular. It proceeds from infinite quality (real
distinction) in the attributes to a corresponding quantity
(modal-numerical distinction) of intensity. But all of this
happens at a sub-representative level. It is only when the
modal essences are cut off from their attributes (thereby
mistaking them for substantial essences) that we fall into the
abstraction of the Representation Image of Thought. However,
the virtual Idea includes the coexistence of all real
distinction. And, since all real distinction is
ontologically singular, each actualized concept retains the
virtual whole from a different perspective.
In conclusion, the sub-representative plane
is the pure spatium of intensity. Ontologically
singular Substance is the matter that fills this spatium
to different degrees of intensity. This must never be
confused with the spatialized time of an extensive order of
generality on the plane of empirical representations. Sub-representative
‘intensity’ is indivisible in the sense that, in
dividing, it necessarily changes nature. It must not be
confused with extensive quantities on the other plane that can
divide without any change in nature. The
sub-representative, virtual-real must never be confused with the
conceptual possibilities that are temporarily actualized on the
other plane. The sub-representative intensive relations of
the Idea must never be confused with extensive structural
relations of the other plane. Unformed Substance qualified
by the attributes on the sub-representative plane must not be
confused with the extensive qualities that cancel difference on
the other plane. The sub-representative disparate coupling
of heterogeneous series must not be confused with the homogeneous
coupling of form and matter on the other plane. Sub-representative
‘sense’ must not be confused with representations of
‘signification’ on the other plane. To fail to
reach the sub-representative plane is to trace the transcendental
from the empirical. The transcendental plane of
pre-individual and sub-representative individuation does not
resemble its actualizations on the empirical plane of extensive
representations. If we fail to reach the sub-representative
virtual source, then we will fail to reach the actualizations of
that virtual source also.