Sub-atomic Philosophy
by Beth Metcalf
“If philosophy has a fundamental need
for the science that is contemporary with it, this is because
science constantly intersects with the possibilities of
[philosophical] concepts and because concepts necessarily involve
allusions to science….” (What is Philosophy,
162)
Therefore, we should expect that the
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari must arrive at philosophical
concepts that “intersect” with functions of modern
quantum physics that do not resemble them. The
philosophical concept and the scientific function intersect, each
according to its own line.
(WiP 161) “The [philosophical] concept
does not reflect on the [scientific] function any more than the
function is applied to the concept. Concept and function
must intersect, each according to its line.”
This is the intersection of two types of
multiplicities --- the intensive and the extensive. The
concept is inseparability of variations. The scientific
function is independence of variables. D&G tell us (WiP
155-6) that the scientific line of functions goes from a chaotic
virtual to the state of affairs that actualizes it. The
philosophical line goes in the opposite direction, from the state
of affairs to another kind of virtual that is a consistent event
eluding actualization.
(WiP 126) “Philosophy continually
extracts a consistent event from the state of
affairs….science continually actualizes the event in a state
of affairs….”
(WiP 117-8) Philosophy wants to retain the
infinite (the birth and disappearance of chaotic speeds) while
gaining consistency of concepts on a plane of immanence. Science
approaches chaos by a slowing down of the infinite to gain
reference. By relinquishing the infinite, science gains
reference with functions that actualize a virtual. Therefore,
science is the slowing down that sets limits to the infinite
speeds of chaos. Limits are conditions of this slowing
down.
“Is there just one or several planes of
reference? The answer will not be the same as the one given
for the philosophical plane of immanence with its strata or
superimposed layers [continuous multiplicities]. This is
because reference, implying a renunciation of the infinite, can
only connect up chains of functives that necessarily break at
some point [discrete multiplicities]….” (WiP 124)
Observations of quantum effects have made it
more important than ever for contemporary physicists to ask some
philosophical questions. But the scientist, according to
D&G, can only do this according to the scientific line of the
function. This leads D&G to ask (WiP 162) whether there
are, as well as philosophical concepts of functions, also
scientific functions of concepts. This is to ask whether
science is also in need of philosophy. D&G acknowledge
that only scientists can answer that question. However,
D&G believe science is also in need of philosophy since,
whenever the physicist makes an observation of quantum effects,
the conceptual interpretation must still be discovered.
(WiP 117) “…when an
object….is scientifically constructed by functions, its
philosophical concept….must still be discovered.”
Therefore, we should expect that the
philosophical concepts of D&G involve allusions to
contemporary sub-atomic, quantum physics. And, there is
abundant textual evidence that Delueze (with and without
Guattari) lays out a plane of consistency involving concepts that
are sub-atomic (or as Deleuze sometimes calls them,
‘sub-representative’). And, of course, these
“sub-atomic” concepts can only allude to the
probability functions of sub-atomic effects. These
sub-atomic concepts on a philosophical plane of immanence are not
at all similar to any scientific functions of reference. There
is no analogy or metaphor between them.
The philosophical concepts of D&G must
involve allusions to contemporary science --- allusions that are
not to be taken as examples, applications, or reflections
belonging to the line of the scientific function. Philosophy
can only allude to scientific functions according to its own line
of concepts. Philosophy can only speak about concepts of
functions.
As D&G see it, scientific reference
constantly intersects with the possibilities of philosophical
consistency. Therefore, because contemporary sub-atomic
physics is so different from classical physics, shouldn’t we
expect that the concepts of contemporary philosophy must be
different from all traditional philosophy too? Traditional
philosophy has inadvertently turned the philosophical concept
into a scientific function. Traditional philosophies have
often confused themselves with science. If it is the case
that philosophy needs the science contemporary with it, and that
science constantly intersects with the possibilities of the
philosophical concepts, then contemporary philosophy must find
concepts of a sub-atomic realm that allude to modern quantum
physics.
In the recent history of philosophy,
attempts have been made to escape the essential structure of
traditional philosophies. Can atomism reach beneath
essential forms of generality? Atoms are (A Thousand
Plateaus 254) “finite elements still endowed with
form.” No matter how far we divide extensive elements
into finer and finer granularity, we can finally only reach the
atom which is still endowed with the same extensive form.
(Difference & Repetition 237)
“The divisibility of extensive quantities is defined in the
following manner: by the relative determination of a unit (this
unit itself never being indivisible but only marking that level
at which division ceases); by the equivalence of the parts
determined by the unit; by the consubstantiality of the parts
with the whole which is divided. Division can therefore
take place and be continued without any change in the nature of
what is being divided.”
Nor do diverse relations among already
formed elements help. Changing relations among already
formed substances can’t change the essential nature of the
structure. Whether philosophy is atomic or relational,
forms do not become open. With division or augmentation of
extensive quantities, there is no change in the nature of the
form. Contemporary philosophy must reach a domain that
opens the forms. We must reach the source of singular (not
general) forms. We must reach an inessential domain beneath
the atomic and the relational --- a domain where everything is
possible. We must reach a sub-atomic domain (the domain
that Deleuze sometimes calls the ‘sub-representative’)
that escapes any essential structure of generalizing
Representation.
Therefore, what Deleuze calls the
“sub-representative” domain underneath forms cannot be
an atomism. Nor can it be relations among formed matter
already in an extensive frame of space-time reference. We
must reach a sub-representative field that is the transcendental
condition of any form of space-time reference --- a field
of immanent conditions that does not resemble an already
conditioned frame of empirical reference. Deleuze says
(DR304), “…Opening [of forms] is an essential feature
of univocity.” Therefore, when Deleuze writes about
the sub-representative domain of univocality, he cannot be
referring to atomism or any relations among elements of formed
matter. By “sub-representative” forces, he means
forces of ‘singularity’ or ‘intensity’ (terms
whose philosophical sense must not be confused with their
scientific signification). These sub-representative forces
must be sub-atomic. With division or augmentation, they
change in the nature of their form. Intensive forces are
inseparable variations on conceptual planes of consistency.
Deleuze says (DR 237) “An intensive
quantity may be divided, but not without changing its nature.
In a sense, it is therefore indivisible, but only because no part
exists prior to the division and no part retains the same nature
after division.”
Therefore (DR 238), Deleuze’s
philosophy distinguishes two types of multiplicities. There
are extensive multiplicities which carry the invariable principle
of their metric; and there are intensive multiplicities whose
metric varies with division. The forces of intensity are
always singular difference that, with each augmentation or
division, changes nature while always filling the whole of
ontologically singular Substance. Intensities are
sub-atomic quanta that change quality of the ontologically same
Substance. Deleuze’s forces (on the conceptual plane
of consistency) are sub-atomic quanta that reveal the qualitative
content of quantity. There is qualitative content of
quantity because there is always heterogeneous doubling of
content and expression. Being is expressive. Ontology
is expressionism. Multiplicity is univocal being.
(DR 222) “Intensity is the form of
difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible.
Every intensity is differential, by itself a difference. Every
intensity is E – E’, where E itself refers to an e
– e’, and e to e – e’ etc.: each intensity is
already a coupling (in which each element of the couple refers in
turn to couples of elements of another order), thereby revealing
the properly qualitative content of quantity.”
D&G see something new in Spinoza’s
philosophy that traditional readings could never see. (ATP
253-4) Spinoza critiques substantial or essential forms. He
does this by reaching sub-atomic forces (singular-intensive) that
no longer have form or function. Singular points coexist in
all varieties and distributions. All differentiations of
singular points coexist in really distinct distributions of
composition. The Real is the coexistence of all
differentiations of singular points, in every ramification.
Singular compositions are distinguished by speed and slowness,
movement and rest. Singular points are not atoms that would
be finite elements still endowed with form. They are
infinitely small parts distributed on disparate planes of
consistency. Singularities come in disparate infinities of
real distinction. Yet when their forced movement changes
their nature, they are still ontologically same singular
Substance because they are not extended in form. Therefore,
smaller and larger infinities are not distinguished by their
number, but by their ordinal composition. They are not
numerically distinct substances. Each Individual plane is
singular infinite multiplicity. Any degree of this
intensive difference belongs to a singular Individual which is
part of another Individual, ontologically one. Nature is
individuated multiplicities of singularities said, in whatever
degree of real difference, as ontologically the same Individual.
This plane of univocality is the intersection of all forms and
the machine of all functions. “Being expresses in a
single meaning all that differs. What we are talking about
is not the unity of substance but the infinity of the
modifications that are part of one another on this unique plane
of life.”
(DR38) The sub-representative is
“underneath matters and forms……If individuation
does not take place either by form or by matter, neither
qualitatively nor extensionally, this is not only because it
differs in kind but because it is already presupposed by the
forms, matters, and extensive parts.”
If the philosophical concept and the
scientific function cannot be reduced to one another, how can
they be said to intersect? (WiP 159-162) It seems that
D&G are saying that an event, being inseparable variation on
the plane of consistency, is also inseparable from a state of
affairs in which it is actualized on a plane of reference. And
conversely, a state of affairs is inseparable from the event that
gives consistency to the concept. We must go back up to the
event that gives the concept its virtual consistency, and come
down to the actual state of affairs that gives the function its
reference. The event releases from states of affairs
“a vapor that does not resemble them….” The
event is actualized in states of affairs without resemblance.
It is counter-actualized when abstracted from states of affairs
in order to reach the consistency of a concept. The two
types of multiplicities intersect, each on its own line. They
are inseparable yet independent. The line of science takes
from chaos states of affairs that actualize a virtual in a
coordinate system. Conversely, philosophical concepts have
a virtuality that extracts consistency. Philosophy alludes
to science. Science speaks of philosophy as a cloud. But
they do not constitute each other.
(WiP159) “The event is actualized or effectuated whenever it is inserted, willy-nilly, into a state of affairs; but it is counter-effectuated whenever it is abstracted from states of affairs so as to isolate its concept….Philosophy is always meanwhile.” [underline added]
Werner Heisenberg (1), from the scientific
line of the function says, “The elementary particles are
certainly not eternal and indestructible units of matter, they
can actually be transformed into each other….all particles
are made of the same substance: energy.” And, on the
line of the concept, according to D&G, there is ontologically
one single Substance whose sub-atomic (‘intensive’)
transformations are the source of all real singular difference.
And since every degree of this intensive difference is singular,
all are ontologically the same. The scientific plane is not
the same as the philosophical plane. Yet, according to
D&G, they intersect as an intensive mode on the philosophical
plane of consistency, actualized in an extensive mode on a
scientific plane of reference. But (WiP 124-5) neither of
these modes is any longer to be seen as a linear temporal
succession. The philosophical plane of immanence has
superimposed strata. Before and after are different strata
that become a same superimposed stratum while changing in nature.
Science has serial, ramified time where before indicates ruptures
to come in the future, and after indicates retroactive
reconnections. On the philosophical plane of immanence,
there are inseparable variations that communicate in zones of
indiscernibility. On the scientific plane of reference,
there are independent variables constituting the function. Neither
plane can any longer be thought as unifying. They are two
types of multiplicities. There is no generalizing
consistency. There is no totalizing reference.
Werner Heisenberg (2) says, “In
classical physics science started from the belief --- or should
one say from the illusion? --- that we could describe the world
or at least parts of the world without any reference to
ourselves.” And the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum theory, as Heisenberg tells us, still complies with this
objective criterion of the scientific method as far as possible.
And this is because (as D&G tell us) the scientist can only
ask philosophical questions according to the scientific line of
the function. Quantum theory does not include the mind of
the physicist as part of the atomic event. But it does
arbitrarily divide the “object” from the rest of the
world. Quantum physicists, as a consequence of the
scientific method, use classical concepts to describe the rest of
the world. And that is because (as D&G tell us) science
can only present functions as propositions of a discursive system
(WiP 117). Theoretical interpretations based on functions
(which we know cannot fit nature accurately) can have only a
statistical probability. So, just as philosophical concepts
can only allude to the probability functions of quantum science,
the functions of quantum physics cannot be applied to theoretical
concepts about “what happens” in the sub-atomic domain
– the ‘meanwhile’ of the philosophical event.
Traditional philosophies do not escape the
“belief” or “illusion” that separates the
objective world from our subjectivity. They can’t help
but divide an “object” from the rest of the world that
includes our subjectivity. But contemporary philosophy must
try to overcome that separation of subject and object. It
must try to reach a metaphysical sub-atomic field that is the
source of the actualizations that allude to experimental results
of science. Deleuze offers his
“sub-representative” plane of univocality as that
“sub-atomic” plane. And, as the functions of
science change, due to the intersection of the two types of
multiplicities, the philosophical concepts must change too.
Concepts are multiplicities of singular difference (the
transcendental source of consistency) alluding to the actualized
empirical reference frames of science. Metaphysical
conceptual surfaces are expressed as a doubling of the speed of
‘What happened?’ with the slowness of ‘What is
going to happen?’ But this coupling is not an act of a
subject. It is the necessity of chance. It is a sub-atomic
dice game of univocal being. Just as the laws of classical
physics are not adequate for the interpretation of observed
quantum effects, traditional philosophies are not adequate for
interpretation of the paradoxes we encounter. D&G
write:
(WiP 38) Infinite movement is double, and
there is only a fold from one to the other. It is in this
sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same.
Or rather, movement is not the image of thought without being
also the substance of being.”
This ideal dice game of univocity, on the
philosophical plane, cannot be played without thought. The
content-expression doubling is the necessity of chance in the
sub-atomic dice game that is univocal being.
(LOS 60) “For only thought finds it
possible to affirm all chance and to make chance into an
object of affirmation. If one tries to play this game
[of univocal being] other than in thought, nothing
happens….”
It is only at the surface that something
happens, because thought is the expression that actualizes
something at the surface. But this dice game is the
unconscious of pure thought. This expression of thought is
not an act of a subject. It is an unconscious game that can
only be thought as nonsense. Everything may be affirmed at
the sub-atomic level without exception when we reach univocal
being. All singularly differentiated ramifications of
intensive forces are real. Univocal being reaches that
sub-atomic domain where anything may be possible. Everything
is possible at the same time at the level of the
sub-representational, sub-atomic time of Aion. Singularities
are distinguished by the slowness of waiting for ‘What is
going to happen?’ in the future, and by the speed of
‘What happened?’ in the past. But nothing
“happens” in this present without thickness --- this
time of Aion at the sub-representative, sub-atomic realm. Nothing
“is happening” in this present without thickness.
(WiP 158) The event is not in a time between two instants. It
is the time of Aion --- a “meanwhile” that
“belongs to becoming”. Nothing happens, but
everything becomes or changes. The function is of states of
affairs, or the measurement of ‘What happens?’ in the
present (Chronos) on the scientific plane of quantum effects.
However, on the philosophical plane of immanence of the event,
the present does not exist. The event is a
“meanwhile” that belongs to becoming. The event
is the meanwhile where nothing happens but is an ‘already
past’ and ‘yet to come’. Nothing happens,
but everything changes.
“All the meanwhiles are superimposed on
one another, whereas times succeed each other……It is a concept
that apprehends the event, its becoming, its inseparable
variations; whereas a function grasps a state of affairs, a time
and variables, with their relations depending on
time….” (WiP 158)
Aion is the pure empty form of time --- the
source of all real difference of singular forms. In the
empty form of Aion, the pure instant endlessly subdivides a
present without thickness. The time of Aion eludes the
present by flying in both past and future directions at once.
In this present without thickness, we can only ask “What is
going to happen?” and “What happened?” The
philosophical concept can’t say “What is
happening.” Aion is that doubling of the event that
gives consistency to a concept.
(LoS 164) “In accordance with Aion,
only the past and future inhere or subsist in time. Instead
of a present which absorbs that past and future [Chronos], a
future and past divide the present at every instant and subdivide
it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at
once…..”
What “happens” at the sub-atomic
level of quantum physics? The scientist has no concept.
Schrödinger’s cat is both dead and alive. Only when
the scientist makes an observation is the cat either dead or
alive. A quantum physicist can say “what happens”
only when an observation or measurement is made. And what
“happens” at the sub-atomic realm of philosophical
univocality? All ramifications of past conjoin with all
ramifications of future at the sub-representative (sub-atomic)
level. The philosopher plays an intensive game of
unconscious doubling or coupling that may actualize a conceptual
consistency in expressive thought at the surface. (Might we
say that this coupling of inseparable variations on the
philosophical plane alludes to entanglement of particles on the
scientific plane?)
Heisenberg (3) says, “Therefore, the
transition from the “possible” to the
“actual” takes place during the act of observation.
If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event, we have
to realize that the word “happens” can apply only to
the observation, not to the state of affairs between two
observations”. In other words, he understands that
what happens in the “meanwhile”, between two
observations, is not within the realm of the scientific function.
He continues by saying that the act of observation applies to the
physical interaction of the object with the measuring device, not
the subjective act of observation.
I have compared Deleuze’s
sub-representational domain of univocality with the sub-atomic
realm of quantum physics. Being is saying. Ontology
is expressionism. The physicist can only express
‘what is’ when a measurement or observation has been
made within a mediating frame of reference. The philosopher
can only think the consistency of an event as a
‘meanwhile’ between measurements. But this
ontology of univocal expressionism is never an act of a subject.
(WiP 128-133) On the plane of immanence, philosophy needs conceptual
persona for the creation of concepts. On the plane of
reference, science needs partial observers in relation to
functions. Neither conceptual persona nor partial observer
is a subject of enunciation. Conceptual personae are
non-subjective perceptions and affections of concepts. Partial
observers are non-subjective sensibilia (sense data distinct from
sensation). Subjective interpretations are inadequate.
(WiP 129-30) “As a general rule, the
[partial] observer is neither inadequate nor subjective: even in
quantum physics, Heisenberg’s demon does not express the
impossibility of measuring both the speed and the position of a
particle on the grounds of a subjective interference of the
measure with the measured, but it measures exactly an objective
state of affairs that leaves the respective position of two of
its particles outside of the field of its actualization, the
number of independent variables being reduced and the values of
the coordinates having the same probability. Subjectivist
interpretations of thermodynamics, relativity, and quantum
physics manifest the same inadequacies. Perspectivism, or
scientific relativism, is never relative to a subject: it
constitutes not a relativity of truth but, on the contrary, a
truth of the relative….”
I take this passage by Deleuze &
Guattari to mean that physicists’ measurements necessarily
leave out two particles that, each time, constitute a
“meanwhile”. These are intensive couplings
(before – after) of inseparable variation outside the field
of actualization. If we were to assume a unified universe
observable to a subject, then it would seem that
interpretations cannot avoid relativism (a relativity of truth).
However, under the assumption of multiplicities of worlds, there
is no unified world immanent to a subject. Rather,
under the assumption of multiplicities of a ‘many
worlds’ theory, we might say that intensive couplings allude
to particles left outside a field of actualization. They
would constitute, each time, a ‘meanwhile’ between
singular worlds. A many worlds interpretation could
preserve the notion of objectivity (relative worlds of disparate
actualizations), not a unified world relative to a subject.
With multiplicities of univocality, there is not relativity of
truth, but truth of the relative.
There is no analogy or metaphor between the
concepts of philosophy and the functions of science. There
are only two types of multiplicities that intersect to defy any
totalizing conceptual consistency or any actualized unification
of reference. D&G say that science is not a unity of
reference. Its heterogeneity of systems and discontinuity
of thresholds are the proliferation of axes. Therefore, Deleuze
and Guattari (WiP 119) feel entitled to “doubt the unitary
vocation of science.” Would this mean that D&G
allude to a multi-verse interpretation of quantum physics? Of
course, only scientists can assess the relevance of an
interpretation.
1) Physics and Philosophy: The
Revolution in Modern Science, by Werner Heisenberg, p. 71.
Harper & Row, 1962.
2) Ibid. p. 55-6.
3) Ibid. p. 54-5.