UNIVOCITY IS
MULTIPLICITY
by Beth Metcalf
(Difference & Repetition 35-36)
“There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is
univocal…..A single voice raises the clamour of being…..What is
important is that we can conceive of several formally distinct senses which
none the less refer to being as if to a single designated entity, ontologically
one…..We must add that being, this common designated, in so far as it
expresses itself, is said in turn in a single and same sense of all the
numerically distinct designators and expressors. In the ontological
proposition, not only is that which is designated ontologically the same for
qualitatively distinct senses, but also the sense is ontologically the same for
individuating modes, for numerically distinct designators or
expressors…..In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is
said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same
sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is
the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is
‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are not equal. It is said of
all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense….”
This is a much-quoted passage where Deleuze describes Univocity. However, is it
much-understood? If we merely appropriate this passage by way of the common
sense Representational forces of traditional philosophy, we will not understand
Deleuze’s Spinozist sense. Deleuze’s Univocity is Spinoza’s
Univocity. However, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is not that of the
common sense appropriation by traditional Representational forces. Deleuze sees
something new in Spinoza.
We will not begin to understand Deleuze’s Spinozist Univocity until we
understand that Univocity is Multiplicity. Deleuze tells us that Multiplicity
has nothing to do with ‘the Many’ in relation to ‘the
One’. (D&R p.182) “…multiplicity must not designate a combination
of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as
such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system. The one
and the many are concepts of the understanding which make up the overly loose
mesh of a distorted dialectic which proceeds by opposition.” Any One/Many
relation never reaches the Multiplicity of Univocity.
For example, if we think that Univocity is ‘the One’ and that
Multiplicity is ‘the Many’, then we do not begin to understand what
Deleuze means by Univocity or Multiplicity. Or, if we think that Univocal Being
means that Being is ‘the One’ or that Being has a common, unitary
ground to which ‘the Many’ beings are identical, then we are still
talking about the One/Many that never reaches the Multiplicity of Univocity. If
we think that Spinoza’s Substance is ‘the One’ that unifies
‘the Many’ really distinct differences, then we do not reach the
Multiplicity of Univocity. If we think that there is Unitary Being that is
“immanent” to its diverse manifestations, then we are still in the
Representational transcendence of the One Essence with its Many Appearances.
Whenever we think about any combination of the One and the Many, then we are
thinking Representationally. Representation is the two forms of the
negative----Opposition and Limitation. (D&R203) “It is the notion of
multiplicity which denounces simultaneously One and the many, the limitation of
the One by the many and the opposition of the many to the One.” When we
reach the Multiplicity of Univocity, we see that there is not ‘the One’
in any relation to ‘the Many’.
Therefore, there is not one world, nor are there many worlds. There is the
multiplicity of really distinct worlds that are designated as ontologically
single. But what does it mean to be ‘really distinct’ and
‘ontologically single’? (Expressionism in Philosophy p. 35)
“Two things are really distinct when they are so conceived - that is,
“one without the aid of the other,” in such a way that we conceive
one while denying everything belonging to the concept of the other.” There
are worlds individuated with rhythms of real distinction. Each is conceived
without the aid of the other. Each denies everything belonging to the concept
of another. However, there is no numerical distinction of substances at all.
Multiplicity is real distinction without the numerical distinction of
substances. There is not numerically one
substance or many substances. With
Univocity (EiP34) “Numerical distinction is never real….real
distinction is never numerical.” Univocity says being in one sense (without
numerical distinction), and that of which it is said is difference (real
distinction). This is in contrast to the Representation of being said in
‘Many’ numerically distinct senses, while that of which it is said
is the ‘One’ conceptual identity without real distinction.
This means that when Spinoza talks about One Substance, he is not talking about
One Substance that totalizes the Many modes. Nor is he talking about Many modes
as modifications of One Substance. Spinoza does not mean that Substance is
‘One’ Unitary ground of the ‘Many’ modes. Rather,
Spinoza is talking about qualified Substance said in one sense, and that about
which it is said is all real distinction. This is not the Many/One. Rather, it
is “the One – All” (DR37). That is, Univocity is all really
different events in ontologically single Event.
When it is said that several formally distinct senses refer to being as if to a
single designated entity, ontologically one, this does not mean that
‘Many’ senses refer to a Substance that is numerically
‘One’. When it is said that Substance is qualified as real
distinction, this does not mean that ‘One’ Substance is distributed
sedentarily among the numerical distinctions of ‘Many’. Univocity
does not talk about any numerical distinction of substances at all. Rather,
Univocity sees all Substance, qualified as really distinct in the attributes,
as ontological singularity.
And when it is added that “…this common designated….is said in turn in a single and same sense of all the numerically distinct designators and expressors…..” it means that not only is Being said in a single sense, but it is said in a single sense of all the individuating differences of the numerically distinct modes. Numerical distinction is modal, not substantial. This means that modes are intensive degrees of Substance that SAY the whole of being in ontologically singular sense. Each is an intensive degree of Substance, ontologically singular. All modes in whatever degree of intensity say the whole of ontologically singular Substance in one sense. This means that Substance fills space to modal degrees of intensity. All the numerically distinct modes, in whatever degree, say the whole of Being in one sense. However, even the numerically distinct modes are not numerically one or many. (EiP203) “….number never adequately expresses the nature of modes….number is….only….an abstract way of thinking of modes….Then being is quantitative rather than numerical, strictly speaking.”
We see that this Univocity (which is multiplicity) nomadically distributes
beings into an open space. Things/Ideas are distributed into the whole of
undistributed Being. Every nomadic distribution is really different from any
other, but all say the whole of Being in one sense. Because they are all
degrees of ontologically single Substance said in one sense, they distribute
the open space of the whole of undistributed Being. All formal and real
difference remains in open communication with all others, because they all
share the same ontologically single Substance. They ARE the same Substance
ontologically. Substance in-itself is singular, intensive degrees of real
difference. Therefore, we see that, instead of sedentarily distributing things within
a closed space, there is now a nomadic distribution of things into an open
space.
When we reach this Spinozist Univocity which is Multiplicity, we reach those
forces of the virtual-real which are actualized with real difference. These
forces of multiplicity have nothing to do with the realization of the possible
(i.e., the possible forces of negation---the possibilities of many/one). This
is Deleuze’s Spinozist Expressionism. There are not ‘Many’
numerically distinct substances which could share ‘One’ common
attribute. Rather, attributes are univocal or common forms in Substance (whose
essence they constitute qualitatively) and modes (whose essences they contain
quantitatively). But it is because attributes are these common forms that the
essence of Substance and the essences of modes now find real difference that
escapes the analogy of Representational thought. Univocal attributes as common
forms are ontologically the same for qualitatively distinct senses. But we must
add that they are also ontologically the same for numerically distinct
individuating modes. “Being is the same for all these modalities, but
these modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they
themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but they
themselves do not have the same sense….” This means that there is
the expression of real difference attributed to ontologically single Substance.
Whereas the Many in relation to the One merely makes the modes turn around
Substance, Multiplicity makes Substance turn around the modes.