UNIVOCITY IS
MULTIPLICITY
by Beth Metcalf
(Difference & Repetition 35-36) “There has only
ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal…..A
single voice raises the clamour of being…..What is important
is that we can conceive of several formally distinct senses which
none the less refer to being as if to a single designated entity,
ontologically one…..We must add that being, this common
designated, in so far as it expresses itself, is said in turn in
a single and same sense of all the numerically distinct
designators and expressors. In the ontological proposition, not
only is that which is designated ontologically the same for
qualitatively distinct senses, but also the sense is
ontologically the same for individuating modes, for numerically
distinct designators or expressors…..In effect, the
essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and
same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of
all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being
is the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are
not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they
themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense,
but they themselves do not have the same sense….”
This is a much-quoted passage where Deleuze describes Univocity.
However, is it much-understood? If we merely appropriate this
passage by way of the common sense Representational forces of
traditional philosophy, we will not understand Deleuze’s
Spinozist sense. Deleuze’s Univocity is Spinoza’s
Univocity. However, Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza is not that
of the common sense appropriation by traditional Representational
forces. Deleuze sees something new in Spinoza.
We will not begin to understand Deleuze’s Spinozist
Univocity until we understand that Univocity is Multiplicity.
Deleuze tells us that Multiplicity has nothing to do with
‘the Many’ in relation to ‘the One’. (D&R
p.182) “…multiplicity must not designate a combination
of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to
the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order
to form a system. The one and the many are concepts of the
understanding which make up the overly loose mesh of a distorted
dialectic which proceeds by opposition.” Any One/Many
relation never reaches the Multiplicity of Univocity.
For example, if we think that Univocity is ‘the One’
and that Multiplicity is ‘the Many’, then we do not
begin to understand what Deleuze means by Univocity or
Multiplicity. Or, if we think that Univocal Being means that
Being is ‘the One’ or that Being has a common, unitary
ground to which ‘the Many’ beings are identical, then
we are still talking about the One/Many that never reaches the
Multiplicity of Univocity. If we think that Spinoza’s
Substance is ‘the One’ that unifies ‘the
Many’ really distinct differences, then we do not reach the
Multiplicity of Univocity. If we think that there is Unitary
Being that is “immanent” to its diverse manifestations,
then we are still in the Representational transcendence of the
One Essence with its Many Appearances.
Whenever we think about any combination of the One and the Many,
then we are thinking Representationally. Representation is the
two forms of the negative----Opposition and Limitation.
(D&R203) “It is the notion of multiplicity which
denounces simultaneously One and the many, the limitation of the
One by the many and the opposition of the many to the One.”
When we reach the Multiplicity of Univocity, we see that there is
not ‘the One’ in any relation to ‘the Many’.
Therefore, there is not one world, nor are there many worlds.
There is the multiplicity of really distinct worlds that are
designated as ontologically single. But what does it mean to be
‘really distinct’ and ‘ontologically single’?
(Expressionism in Philosophy p. 35) “Two things are really
distinct when they are so conceived - that is, “one without
the aid of the other,” in such a way that we conceive one
while denying everything belonging to the concept of the
other.” There are worlds individuated with rhythms of real
distinction. Each is conceived without the aid of the other. Each
denies everything belonging to the concept of another. However,
there is no numerical distinction of substances at all.
Multiplicity is real distinction without the numerical
distinction of substances. There is not numerically one
substance or many substances. With Univocity (EiP34)
“Numerical distinction is never real….real distinction
is never numerical.” Univocity says being in one sense
(without numerical distinction), and that of which it is said is
difference (real distinction). This is in contrast to the
Representation of being said in ‘Many’ numerically
distinct senses, while that of which it is said is the
‘One’ conceptual identity without real distinction.
This means that when Spinoza talks about One Substance, he is not
talking about One Substance that totalizes the Many modes. Nor is
he talking about Many modes as modifications of One Substance.
Spinoza does not mean that Substance is ‘One’ Unitary
ground of the ‘Many’ modes. Rather, Spinoza is talking
about qualified Substance said in one sense. All qualified
Substance is all real distinction. This is not the Many/One.
Rather, it is “the One – All” (DR37). That is,
Univocity is all really different events in ontologically single
Event.
When it is said that several formally distinct senses refer to
being as if to a single designated entity, ontologically one,
this does not mean that ‘Many’ senses refer to a
Substance that is numerically ‘One’. When it is said
that Substance is qualified as real distinction, this does not
mean that ‘One’ Substance is distributed sedentarily
among the numerical distinctions of ‘Many’. Univocity
does not talk about any numerical distinction of substances at
all. Rather, Univocity sees all Substance, qualified as really
distinct in the attributes, as ontological singularity.
And when it is added that “…this common designated….is said in turn in a single and same sense of all the numerically distinct designators and expressors…..” it means that not only is Being said in a single sense, but it is said in a single sense of all the individuating differences of the numerically distinct modes. Numerical distinction is modal, not substantial. This means that modes are intensive degrees of Substance that SAY the whole of being in ontologically singular sense. Each is an intensive degree of Substance, ontologically singular. All modes in whatever degree of intensity say the whole of ontologically singular Substance in one sense. This means that Substance fills space to modal degrees of intensity. All the numerically distinct modes, in whatever degree, say the whole of Being in one sense. However, even the numerically distinct modes are not numerically one or many. (EiP203) “….number never adequately expresses the nature of modes….number is….only….an abstract way of thinking of modes….Then being is quantitative rather than numerical, strictly speaking.”
We see that this Univocity (which is multiplicity) nomadically distributes beings into an open space. Things/Ideas are distributed into the whole of undistributed Being. Every nomadic distribution is really different from any other, but all say the whole of Being in one sense. Because they are all degrees of ontologically single Substance said in one sense, they distribute the open space of the whole of undistributed Being. All formal and real difference remains in open communication with all others, because they all share the same ontologically single Substance. They ARE the same Substance ontologically. Substance in-itself is singular, intensive degrees of real difference. Therefore, we see that, instead of sedentarily distributing things within a closed space, there is now a nomadic distribution of things into an open space.
Substance has infinite attributes in that the attributes of
thought and extension (not to be confused with categories or
properties of Representational thought) may be coupled in an
infinity of ways (because there is no prior image to tell us how
they must be coupled). These intensive disparate couplings
(see D&R 222) all qualify Substance. Substance is
qualified in an infinity of ways in the attributes. But
each of these qualified Substances are the whole of Being each
time, SAID as same even though they are really distinct. Real
distinction of ontological singularity is multiplicity. It
is not one qualitative form of diversity. Nor is it many
substances. The many/one opposition is a structure
of genus and species that is not the ontological univocity of one-all.
Every disparate coupling --- a mode in the attribute of thought
coupled with a mode in the attribute of extension --- is really
distinct. Any intensity of thought may be coupled with any
intensity of extension --- because there is no prior image to
limit how they can be coupled. But they are ontologically
one modification of substance each time --- said as same
ontologically --- a new modification of substance each time there
is a new intensive coupling. Every coupling of really
distinct modes, in whatever degree of intensity, is ontologically
one modification.
When we reach this Spinozist Univocity which is Multiplicity, we
reach those forces of the virtual-real which are actualized with
real difference. These forces of multiplicity have nothing to do
with the realization of the possible (i.e., the possible forces
of negation---the possibilities of many/one). This is
Deleuze’s Spinozist Expressionism. There are not
‘Many’ numerically distinct substances which could
share ‘One’ common attribute. Rather, attributes are
univocal or common forms in Substance (whose essence they
constitute qualitatively) and modes (whose essences they contain
quantitatively). But it is because attributes are these common
forms that the essence of Substance and the essences of modes now
find real difference that escapes the analogy of Representational
thought. Univocal attributes as common forms are ontologically
the same for qualitatively distinct senses. But we must add that
they are also ontologically the same for numerically distinct
individuating modes. “Being is the same for all these
modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is
‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are not equal. It
is said of all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have
the same sense….” This means that there is the
expression of real difference attributed to ontologically single
Substance. Whereas the Many in relation to the One merely makes
the modes turn around Substance, Multiplicity makes Substance
turn around the modes.