WHAT IS UNIVOCITY?
by Beth Metcalf
Do you believe there are really distinct minds to which may be
attributed different thoughts? Do you believe there are really
distinct bodies to which may be attributed different shapes? If
so, you are thinking according to the common sense dichotomy of
subject and object, consciousness and perception. If you are
still thinking in terms of a process of generality (genus and
species), then you are still thinking Representationally and do
not reach Univocity. You still rely on some external miracle in
the passage between things conceived as really distinct to really
distinct things. You are still stuck in merely representational
mediation of the possible and do not reach the REAL forces of
Univocity, according to Deleuze.
Deleuze defines Univocity by saying (Difference and Repetition
p.36), “Being is said in a single and same sense of
everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said
differs: it is said of difference itself.” What does this
mean? If we want to understand Deleuze’s philosophy, it is
important to come to terms with his Spinozist Univocity. But, let
us first understand what Univocity is NOT. Univocity is not
similar to Representational thought.
A process of abstract generality constitutes Representational
thought (See Expressionism in Philosophy Chapter One). There is
classification by genus and species. Attributes qualify
substances conceived to be really distinct differences in kind.
But attributes also diversify modes. This means that substance is
genus, the attribute is specific difference, and modes are
species. An attribute constitutes the essence of a substance it
qualifies, but it also constitutes the essence of modes it links
to substances sharing a common attribute. Modes distinguish
substances sharing an attribute. This carries the division of
numerically distinct modes into substantial reality, mistaking a
merely numerical distinction of substances for a real
distinction.
Another problem with Representational thinking is that
attributes, as conceived to be really distinct, all share a
common form of conceptual identity. Attributes are conceived in
their opposition to one another. And that means that substances
(whether of the same attribute, or of different attributes) all
share a common conceptual form of negative determination.
Substances share a common conceptual form. But things with the
same concept can only be distinguished by some external cause.
Thus, Representational thinking depends upon an external,
transcendent ground to mediate the correspondence of differing
things with our mind’s way of conceiving them as possible.
Therefore, Representational thought has merely numerically
distinct substances and merely conceptual mediation of
possibility, confusing these with real distinction.
Therefore, Deleuze follows Spinoza in saying that such
Representational definition by genus and species is merely
abstract classification. It is classification by merely extrinsic
sign---by merely perceptible similarities and differences rather
than internal causes. When we, thereby, take attributes as
extrinsic signs, we confuse things conceived as really distinct
with really distinct things. And, in spite of the fact that
Representational thinking believes itself to include real
difference, Deleuze is saying that, with its numerical
distinction of substances, there is no real distinction---no real
difference. Even when Representation opens the categories and is
made infinite, as with Hegelianism, there is still only the
numerical distinction of substances---and numerical distinction
is never real. Nothing REAL-ly changes when Representation
introduces infinite variability into a supposed numerical
distinction of substances. There is still no real distinction
because there is no Univocity. Infinite Representation still has
no real, internal difference. There are still merely perceptual
similarities and differences. The Absolute Concept of
Hegel’s Infinite Representation never escapes the identity
internal to the concept in general. There is merely mediation of
possibility between the rational and what is supposed to be real.
So, what is Deleuze’s Univocity? In contrast to
Representational thought, Univocity has no numerically distinct
substances. In fact, Deleuze-Spinoza says that, not only can
there not be several substances sharing a common attribute, but
there can be only one Substance for all attributes. Now, the
heterogeneous attributes are thought and extension. (But there is
an infinity of attributes which means that they can take on any
form as they qualify Substance.) They are ontologically one
Substance. There is no longer a transcendent ground mediating
between things in extension and possibilities of thought. Now,
the attributes ARE one Substance, ontologically. Substance has
real, not numerical, distinction. This means that Univocity is
not a process of classification by genus and species. With
Univocity, there is an infinity of formally-really distinct
attributes qualifying ontologically single Substance. The really
distinct attributes ARE ontologically one Substance. Substance is
qualitatively, not quantitatively, distinct. Substance and
attributes correspond qualitatively or formally, and not
numerically. There are really-formally distinct senses said in
one ontological Sense. Really-formally distinct events ARE one
ontological Event. Attributes qualify Substance as
formally-really distinct essences of ontologically single
Substance. It is because substances are really distinct forms
that they now can all communicate with each other. They ARE one
Substance ontologically. All formal essences are now open to each
other, because they are not numerically distinct. They are
virtual because they are really distinct and cannot be
numerically separated. (EiP p.66) "All qualified substances
form only one substance from the point of view of quantity. So
that attributes themselves have at once identity of being and
distinction of formaility. Ontologically one, formally diverse,
such is their status."
With Representation, numerically distinct substances can share a
common attribute. This means that there are merely numerical
differences that share a conceptual form of identity. But
Univocity changes everything. There is ontologically single
Substance that itself is constituted of really distinct forms.
With Univocity, attributes are affirmed as positive and infinite
essence of Substance. This means that there cannot be several
substances sharing a common attribute which would give them
something in common by which they could be conceived in relations
of opposition. There is no mediation by way of the conceptually
possible. Therefore, Deleuze’s ‘multiplicity’ must
not be confused with the Representational opposition of
one/multiple. Multiplicity must not be confused with any
numerically multiple substances which could share one common
conceptual form of identity. Nor is Substance a form of unity.
Substance does not unify or totalize multiple or variable forms
in relations of opposition. Substances are qualified as infinite
forms, really distinct even though ontologically single. Only
Univocity includes the qualitative multiplicities of real
distinction.
For Deleuze-Spinoza's Univocity (EiP 32-3), "Two or more
substances cannot share the same attribute, for they would then
have to be distinguished by their modes, which is absurd."
Therefore, whenever we think there can be two or more numerically
distinct substances that share a common property, we are thinking
Representationally in terms of genus and species. But for
Univocity, numerical distinction is never real, and real
distinction is never numerical (EiP 34). The attributes qualify
Substance as all real distinction. But really distinct substances
can share no attribute in common. Therefore, all really distinct
substances must be singular. They cannot be numerically distinct.
Attributes constitute the essence of qualified substance as real
distinction, ontologically one. Attributes also contain the
heterogeneous parallelism of intensive modal coupling (see DR
222). The nature of real distinction changes with each degree of
intensive coupling. But all degrees of intensive coupling are
ontological singularity without numerical distinction. The whole
of Being is said in the same sense for all real distinction of
ontological singularity.
As well as the real distincion of qualified substances, Univocity
also includes quantitative multiplicities. That is, there is a
sort of numerical distinction (although, “numerical” is
just a way of speaking about it). But now, with Univocity, we
realize that numerical distinction is always modal.
Modal-numerical distinction is not to be mistaken for any
numerical distinction of substances. This means that bodies are
not substances. Minds are not subjects. Modes are quantitative
degrees of quality. They are physical degrees of intensity. And,
in dividing, they necessarily change in nature. The essence of
the mode is an intensive degree of power. A mode is the capacity
of a body to be affected at a degree of power. But whatever the
degree, being is said in one sense. Being is the same for all
modes. But the modes are not the same. Each singular degree
expresses itself in a certain relation of speed and slowness,
movement and rest. When a relation is filled by an infinite
collection of extensive parts, the finite mode comes into
existence (is actualized). However, existing modes never resemble
the modal essences they actualize. Univocity is not at all the
abstract generality of Representational thought. No process of
genus and species is ever involved in actualization (i.e.,
bringing a finite mode into existence). Univocity’s process
of numerical distinction of modes is not to be confused with
Representation’s process of numerical distinction of
substances.
With Representational thought, categories divide and repartition
being sedentarily and give it a plurality of ontological senses
(being is said equivocally). However, that of which being is said
is the same (that of which being is said is univocal). There is
no real difference. Being is said only of differences in general.
The essence of Substance constitutes the essence of modes. Now,
let us return to Deleuze’s definition of Univocity.
Univocity is the reverse of Representation-analogy. Being is SAID
in one sense (being is said univocally). Attributes have a common
form in Substance and in modes. That is, the attributes express
being (the essence of Substance and the essences of modes) in one
sense. However, Deleuze’s definition goes on to say that
that of which Being is said is different (that of which being is
said is equivocal). It is difference itself. The essence of
Substance and essences of modes are not at all the same. The
essence of Substance does not constitute the essence of its
modes. The attributes constitute the essence of Substance and
contain the essences of modes. Now, with Univocity, it is not
identity that is said in several senses. It is difference that is
said in one sense.
With the categories of Representational thought, the individual
is classified within a general/particular framework of already
formed matter. The principle of individuation is contained in the
fully constituted individual. Therefore, Representation
generalizes the universal, and it cannot tell us what constitutes
the singularity of the individual. However, with Univocity, there
are really distinct varieties of singularity. Individuating
factors act in a sub-representative domain of pre-individual
singularity beneath form and matter. Singularity is
pre-individual. The individual is no longer determined within a
general framework of already formed matter. Generality does not
determine the individual. There is no universal, abstract
generality. Rather, there is only the multiplicity of
singular-universals. With Univocity, individuation precedes
formed matter, species and parts, and the fully constituted
individual of our experience. (DR247) “Qualities,
extensities, forms and matters, species and parts are not
primary; they are imprisoned in individuals as though in a
crystal. Moreover, the entire world may be read, as though in a
crystal ball, in the moving depth of individuating differences or
differences in intensity.” Now, intensive, modal
singularities relate immediately to univocal being. Universal,
ontologically single Substance is said, in one sense, immediately
of all pre-individual singular modal essences. Only when
individuating factors are intensive (not extended into formed
matter) can they be immediately related to Being without
mediation of extended forms. Modes are repartitioned within
attributes according to mobile singular degrees of individuating
difference. Each singularity can be actualized as an
individual-world of plural modal significations. Being is also
said immediately, in one sense, of these extensive modes. But no
actualized world can be a universal generality. If actualization
is confused with universal generality, then it does not escape
Representation.
Deleuze-Spinoza’s Univocity must never be confused with
Representational categories of possible experience.
Representational thought, with its arborescent structure of genus
and species, has numerically distinct substances sharing a common
conceptual form of negative determination. Representation is
already formed-matter. It never breaks its form-matter coupling.
In contrast to Representational thought, the individuation of
Univocity operates beneath the forms. Univocity breaks the
form-matter coupling to reach a sub-representative domain of
pre-individual singularity where matter is not yet formed.
Rhizomes remain open to the subterranean field of unformed
matter. There is an opening of the forms to allow a qualitative
repartitioning of being without breaking the unity of ontological
Sense.
When we divide modes into numerically distinct substantial,
extensive parts, we fall into abstraction. In Representational
abstraction, we separate modal essences from their internal cause
and from the attributes that contain them. But with Univocity,
representation is temporary surface effect. Univocity always
keeps the representational plane of transcendence open to the
sub-representative plane of immanence. It rhizomatically keeps
the forms open in the eternal return of real difference. That is,
it keeps the forms in contact with the real distinction of
attributes in ontologically single Substance. This means that
actualization is not a process involving numerically distinct
substances. Actualization is not a process involving species
within a common genus. It is singular modes which come into
actualization. Individuation is not a process going from genus to
species, or from general to particular. It goes from infinite
quality to corresponding intensive and singular quantity. It is
singular modal essences which become actualized in the existing
modes, without resemblance. Actualization is always a modal
process. Actualization is not a Representational process of the
generality of the particular. Univocity is the process of
universality of singular difference, each time.
Therefore, forces of Univocity are not at all similar to those of
Representation’s abstract generality. We can define things
Representationally by genus and species. But that doesn’t
tell us the capacity of a body to be affected. We can think by
way of Representational images of consciousness and perception.
But that doesn’t reach Univocity where Being expresses
elements of unformed matter and non-subjectified affect in one
sense. And, even though Representational thought has always
assumed itself to include real forces of difference, Deleuze says
it does not. Deleuze is saying that Representational thought has
only numerical distinction of substances and no real difference.
Only with Univocity do we come to understand what it means to say
that numerical distinction is always modal. Only when numerical
distinction is seen to be modal, not substantial, does
representation remain open to the sub-representative, sub-atomic
field of the real forces of Univocal difference.
Representational Thought is the oppositional negation that opposes ‘what it is’ to ‘what it is not’. Representation excludes everything it is not. But Univocity opposes Representational negation. ‘What Univocity is’ does not exclude or negate ‘what Univocity it not’. That is, Univocity does not exclude or negate representation. Rather, Univocity vice-dicts representation. Univocity includes inessential modal uses of actualized representations. It is not a universalizing generality of Representation that excludes real difference.