Widder’s Genealogies of Difference
by Beth Metcalf
In his Genealogies of Difference p.49, Nathan Widder
says, “Deleuze…. presents the structuring operation of
dispersion in terms of a passage from a virtual field of forces
into actual relations of difference. The schema of virtual and
actual is not unlike the Hegelian system….The latter
presents two levels, of actual experience on the one hand and a
movement of forces that gives it meaning on the other. This
second level remains constitutive but hidden….but is
nevertheless fully real: it is not a possibility that may or may
not exist but instead a condition necessary for experience to
“make sense.”” Widder understands that
Deleuze’s virtual-real forces are not forces of the
possible. However, Widder concludes that, because Hegel’s
forces are not empirically contingent possibilities, they must be
“fully real”. Widder does not seem to be aware that
Hegel’s forces ARE the conditions of logical possibility.
Widder still confuses the ‘virtual’ with the
‘possible’. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces is that which conditions, mediates, and determines the
possibility of the meaning and sense of our experience. And, that
is exactly what Deleuze is trying to warn us! Hegel still
mediates logical possibilities. Logical possibilities are
internal to the concept. They still mediate the conceptually
possible. And as long as there is such mediation, Hegel’s
forces are not real. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces is merely mediation of conceptual-logical possibility.
That ‘the real is rational’ means that Hegel takes the
“real” to be rational possibility. These so-called
“real” forces are merely possibilities internal to the
identity of the concept. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces never escapes the identity of the concept. Of course,
Hegel doesn’t remain in the concept as identical in itself,
but his thought is still mediated by the principle of conceptual
identity. Hegel’s forces are forces of
Representation-analogy, not Univocity. Hegel’s forces are
not similar to Deleuze’s forces.
In merely taking the concept to infinity, Hegel does nothing to
introduce any real distinction. Difference & Repetition
p.263, “But what is the point of making representation
infinite? It retains all its requirements. All that is discovered
is a ground which relates the excess and default of difference to
the identical, the similar, the analogous and the opposed.”
Hegel’s relational forces internal to the concept must not
be confused with forces of Univocity internal to the
sub-representative Idea. Forces of Univocity are positive forces
of intensity without negation or opposition. They relate
different to different immediately in one sense. However, the
relational-oppositional forces of Hegel never reach the
subrepresentative, positive forces of intensity. Nor are they
said immediately in one sense. Within Representation, there is
merely an abstract differentiating process of similarities and
differences, genus and species of numerically distinct
substances. Whereas Deleuze’s Univocity says being in one
sense and that of which it is said is difference; Hegel’s
infinite representation says being in several numerically
distinct senses and that of which it is said is internally
related to the infinite variability of conceptual identity. They
are not similar in any way.
The prevalent opinion that Hegel’s forces of infinite
Representation are similar to Deleuze’s forces, at least
initially, ignores Deleuze’s Spinozist Univocity. DR263,
Hegel’s “…intoxications and giddiness are feigned,
the obscure is already clarified from the outset.” From the
outset Hegel’s forces are not at all similar to
Deleuze’s, because Hegel never reaches the
sub-representative forces of Univocity. DR264, “The entire
alternative between finite and infinite applies very badly to
difference, because it constitutes only an antinomy of
representation….because both fail to capture
the…sub-representative source.” Only Deleuze’s
Spinozist Univocity allows him to reach that sub-representative
source of Real difference. Ideas are sub-representative. Ideas
are not concepts. But Hegel never reaches these Ideas, because he
is still trapped in the requirements of Representation-analogy.
In Genealogies of Difference p.40-4, 49-51, 152-3,
Nathan Widder sees Deleuze’s forces as initially similar to
those of Hegel. But Widder says that Deleuze-Nietzsche goes
beyond Hegel’s identity of identity and opposition. Widder
insists that it is possible to go beyond Hegel with a new
synthesis of relational forces. He asserts (GD 43-4) that Deleuze
describes Nietzsche’s forces as still relational, but with a
disjoining that decenters. When relational forces are disjoined,
they are said to overcome their oppositional relations. Widder
sees what he calls Nietzsche’s "relational forces"
as avoiding identity and opposition to find a groundless
difference. (GD40-1) Widder says, “As Deleuze explains,
Nietzsche views differences in force relations that cannot be
gauged on a fixed scale…” He says that Nietzsche’s
forces find an “excess of the in-between”, an
“unlocalizable warping”, or an “unnameable
excess”. Therefore, Widder says that Deleuze-Nietzsche does
not mediate opposites, but rather brings about a disjunction of
relational forces, or a disjoining of heterogeneous differences
through their differences. But what is heterogeneous about the
differences of relational forces? Before such a disjoining there
would still be relational forces of identity and opposition
internal to the homogeneity of the concept. And, even after
mediation by this exclusive disjunctive synthesis, relational
forces are still the mediated possibilities internal to the
identity of the concept. Why does Widder not consider this
disjunctive synthesis to be mediation---that is, a mediation of
the possibilities of the concept? And, although Widder disjoins
conceptual differences, there is still no Univocity. He is still
not reaching the heterogeneity of real distinction. Widder is
talking about Hegel’s relational forces. And, even with
their disjoining, they still never escape the (DR263)
“ground which relates the excess and default of difference
to the identical, the similar, the analogous, and the
opposed.”
Deleuze-Nietzsche’s forces of Univocity are forces of
difference said immediately in one sense. This has nothing to do
with mediation of force relations that can only relate excess to
the identity of the concept. In the disjoining of identity and
difference, Widder does not overcome relations of opposition. He
never reaches the nomadic distribution of singularities in an
opening of space and time. Widder is still within the same
“genealogy” of Hegel’s conceptual difference. Only
Univocity includes the immediacy of the sub-representative.
Difference as intensity relates different to different
immediately. DR117, “…difference must immediately
relate the differing terms to one another. Difference.…must
relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by
the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed.”
And since the disjoining of relational forces is such mediation,
it is not the difference of Univocity. Forces of Univocity are
forces of intensity. They are not negative relations. They are
not relations of identity or opposition. Only Univocity is the
positive difference of intensity said immediately in one sense.
Only forces of Univocity are Real, according to Deleuze. Any
relational forces of identity or opposition are still internal to
the identity of the concept and are therefore merely conceptual,
not real, differences.
So, with this “disjoining”, how does Widder determine
the relational forces that are to be disjoined? These relational
differences can only be thought by the four requirements of
representation----by the identity in the concept, opposition in
the predicate, analogy in judgement, and resemblance in
perception. When there is a disjoining (rather than an identity)
of identity and opposition, there is merely a disjunction (rather
than a conjunction) of conceptual differences. It does not
overcome relational oppositions, but merely relates the excess to
the four requirements of Representation. But this does nothing to
escape the identity of the concept (Logic of Sense
170-6). We still remain within the concept of a world or an
individual in which certain events are excluded. This exclusive
disjunction never breaks the form internal to the identity of the
concept. What is still missing in this “genealogy” of
conceptual difference is the sub-representative difference of
Univocity. We need to reach Univocity without concept if we are
to escape the identity of the concept in general. We must reach a
sub-representative realm where LoS177, “divergence is
affirmed and disjunction becomes a positive
synthesis…[where] all events, even contraries, are
compatible.” Univocity is affirmation of disjunction where
there can be no exclusions of logical, or alogical,
incompatibility. We must reach forces of positive intensity
beneath relational forces. We must reach a sub-representative
inclusive disjunction of real forces, ontologically one.
Widder recounts Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche (Nietzsche
& Philosophy 3), “We will never find the sense of
something…if we do not know the force which appropriates the
thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is
expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an
apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an
existing force.” However, Widder’s understanding of
that analysis misses Nietzsche’s Univocity. That is, forces
of Univocity are not a problem of conceptual relations (i.e.,
force relations of identity and opposition) that may be resolved
by the facts (a resemblance in perception). How can Widder tell
which forces are in relations of identity or opposition unless he
already has a prior concept? How can Widder tell which
forces are in relations of similarity or difference unless he
already knows what constitutes a prior resemblance? Nietzsche’s
Univocal forces are not appearances of perceptual resemblance
whereby one could make judgments about relations of identity and
opposition. There are no prior appearances of resemblance.
There are no prior appearances of relational forces that could be
disjoined. Rather, Univocity finds pre-individual
singularities of expressive sense. Deleuze cannot be understood
through a genealogy of conceptual difference. Deleuze can only be
understood through Spinoza’s Univocity which is omitted in
Widder’s genealogy.
Widder believes that relational forces escape the problems of
atomism. GD25-6, “Primacy is thereby given to the relations
between forces, not the forces in themselves….Force
therefore differs from the object of perception, in which the
atomistic thing is defined by external predicates. Difference and
relationality gain priority.” Widder believes that if
relational forces gain priority, that that would be somehow
sufficient to escape the invariance of atomism. But relational
forces are still internal to the identity of the concept. They do
not escape invariance. (A Thousand Plateaus 92) “The very
idea of structure is inseparable from invariants, whether atomic
or relational.” Deleuze does not have anything similar to
such relational forces. These relational forces are still
relations internal to the concept. They are still relations of
conceptual identity and difference. And, again, how do we make
judgements about relations of identity and opposition? We make
these judgements through analogy. Identity is identity in the
concept. Opposition is in the predicate. And, we can make these
judgements only through resemblance in perception. Widder’s
relational forces never escape the four requirements of
representational identity.
Structural-relational forces of opposition-negation have nothing
to do with Deleuze’s positive forces of Univocity. As
Deleuze says (DR204-5) in regard to structural forces of negation
‘without positive terms’, ‘eternally
negative’, and ‘presupposing the idea of
opposition’, “Everything points to the
contrary….When difference is read as opposition, it is
deprived of the peculiar thickness in which its positivity is
affirmed.” Structural-relational forces introduce arbitrary
denotation. But arbitrary denotation is not arbitrary enough. It
is merely signifying semiology still subject to the despotism of
the Signifier. Anti-Oedipus 214, Deleuze & Guattari
say that arbitrary designation is merely the “reverse
side” of necessity of signification. We must reach an
asignifying semiotics---a transcendental field of pre-individual
forces---that can produce, not merely arbitrary denotation, but
can be an arbitrary source of denotation, manifestation, and
signification. Then, "arbitrary denotation" no longer
refers to merely numerically distinct substantial objects, but to
really distinct fluid assemblages.
Deleuze continually tells us that he disagrees with Hegel.
However, there seems to be a very prevalent opinion that we must
still understand Deleuze by way of Hegel. Some say that Deleuze
“misreads” Hegel. When something in Deleuze’s text
seems inconsistent with the traditional interpretation of Hegel,
they say “Deleuze does not understand Hegel”. But from
what plane can an absolute judgement be made as to whether
Deleuze is right or wrong about Hegel? (Empiricism and
Subjectivity 106) Deleuze says in regard to philosophical
critique, “People say…things are not like that. But in
fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that
or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which
presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or
not.” That is philosophical critique. It has nothing to do
with the question ‘Are things like that?’ or ‘Is
Hegel like that?’ If we want to understand Deleuze, we must
try to suspend judgement. If Deleuze says something that sounds
inconsistent, that means it is only inconsistent from the plane
we are on. It means we have not yet reached Deleuze’s plane
of consistency. To give Deleuze a fair reading, one must try to
make consistency out of what Deleuze is telling us. When we do,
we find ourselves on a plane we could never have imagined before.
When we reach Deleuze’s plane of consistency, we see that it
is not a matter of whether Deleuze is right or wrong about Hegel.
When we see Hegel from Deleuze’s plane of consistency, we
are seeing reality in a whole new way. Then, we can ask the
critical question, ‘Is the plane which puts Hegel in that
light a good question, or not? Is it rigorous, or not? Deleuze is
trying to show us that as long as we remain within conceptual
difference (including that of the Infinite Representation of
Hegel), we will never reach the singular difference of Univocity.
Univocity is a very strange dice game. If we are to play the
game, nothing can remain the same.