Widder’s Genealogies of Difference
by Beth Metcalf
In his Genealogies of Difference p.49, Nathan Widder says,
“Deleuze…. presents the structuring operation of
dispersion in terms of a passage from a virtual field of forces
into actual relations of difference. The schema of virtual and
actual is not unlike the Hegelian system….The latter
presents two levels, of actual experience on the one hand and a
movement of forces that gives it meaning on the other. This
second level remains constitutive but hidden….but is
nevertheless fully real: it is not a possibility that may or may
not exist but instead a condition necessary for experience to
“make sense.”” Widder understands that
Deleuze’s virtual-real forces are not forces of the
possible. However, Widder concludes that, because Hegel’s
forces are not empirically contingent possibilities, they must be
“fully real”. Widder does not seem to be aware that
Hegel’s forces ARE the conditions of logical possibility.
Widder still confuses the ‘virtual’ with the
‘possible’. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces is that which conditions, mediates, and determines the
possibility of, the meaning and sense of our experience. And,
that is exactly what Deleuze is trying to warn us! Hegel still
mediates logical possibilities. Logical possibilities are
internal to the concept. They still mediate the conceptually
possible. And as long as there is such mediation, Hegel’s
forces are not real. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces is merely mediation of conceptual-logical possibility.
That ‘the real is rational’ means that Hegel takes the
“real” to be rational possibility. These so-called
“real” forces are merely possibilities internal to the
identity of the concept. The movement of Hegel’s relational
forces never escapes the identity of the concept. Of course,
Hegel doesn’t remain in the concept as identical in itself,
but his thought is still mediated by the principle of conceptual
identity. Hegel’s forces are forces of
Representation-analogy, not Univocity. Hegel’s forces are
not similar to Deleuze’s forces.
In merely taking the concept to infinity, Hegel does nothing to
introduce any real distinction. Difference & Repetition
p.263, “But what is the point of making representation
infinite? It retains all its requirements. All that is discovered
is a ground which relates the excess and default of difference to
the identical, the similar, the analogous and the opposed.”
Hegel’s relational forces internal to the concept must not
be confused with forces of Univocity internal to the
sub-representative Idea. Forces of Univocity are positive forces
of intensity without negation or opposition. They relate
different to different immediately in one sense. However, the
relational-oppositional forces of Hegel never reach the
sub-representative, positive forces of intensity. Nor are they
said immediately in one sense. Within Representation, there is
merely an abstract differentiating process of similarities and
differences, genus and species of numerically distinct
substances. Whereas Deleuze’s Univocity says being in one
sense and that of which it is said is difference; Hegel’s
infinite representation says being in several numerically
distinct senses and that of which it is said is internally
related to the infinite variation of conceptual identity. They
are not similar in any way.
The prevalent opinion that Hegel’s forces of infinite
Representation are similar to Deleuze’s forces, at least
initially, ignores Deleuze’s Spinozist Univocity. DR263,
Hegel’s “…intoxications and giddiness are feigned,
the obscure is already clarified from the outset.” From the
outset Hegel’s forces are not at all similar to
Deleuze’s, because Hegel never reaches the
sub-representative forces of Univocity. DR264, “The entire
alternative between finite and infinite applies very badly to
difference, because it constitutes only an antinomy of
representation….because both fail to capture
the…sub-representative source.” Only Deleuze’s
Spinozist Univocity allows him to reach that sub-representative
source of Real difference. Ideas are sub-representative. Ideas
are not concepts. But Hegel never reaches these Ideas, because he
is still trapped in the requirements of Representation-analogy.
In Genealogies of Difference p.40-4, 49-51, 152-3, Nathan Widder
sees Deleuze’s forces as initially similar to those of
Hegel. But Widder says that Deleuze-Nietzsche goes beyond
Hegel’s identity of identity and opposition. Widder insists
that it is possible to go beyond Hegel with a new synthesis of
relational forces. He asserts (GD 43-4) that Deleuze describes
Nietzsche’s forces as still relational, but with a
disjoining that decenters. When relational forces are disjoined,
they are said to overcome their oppositional relations. Widder
sees Nietzsche’s relational forces as avoiding identity and
opposition to find a groundless difference. (GD40-1) Widder says,
“As Deleuze explains, Nietzsche views differences in force
relations that cannot be gauged on a fixed scale…” He
says that Nietzsche’s forces find an “excess of the
in-between”, an “unlocalizable warping”, or an
“unnameable excess”. Therefore, Widder says that
Deleuze-Nietzsche does not mediate opposites, but rather brings
about a disjunction of relational forces, or a disjoining of
heterogeneous differences through their differences. But what is
heterogeneous about the differences of relational forces? Before
such a disjoining there would still be relational forces of
identity and opposition internal to the homogeneity of the
concept. And, even after mediation by the disjunctive synthesis,
relational forces are still the mediated possibilities internal
to the identity of the concept. Why does Widder not consider this
disjunctive synthesis to be mediation---that is, a mediation of
the possibilities of the concept? And, although Widder disjoins
conceptual differences, there is still no Univocity. He is still
not reaching the heterogeneity of real distinction. Widder is
talking about Hegel’s relational forces. And, even with
their disjoining, they still never escape the (DR263)
“ground which relates the excess and default of difference
to the identical, the similar, the analogous, and the
opposed.”
Deleuze-Nietzsche’s forces of Univocity are forces of
difference said immediately in one sense. This has nothing to do
with mediation of force relations that can only relate excess to
the identity of the concept. In the disjoining of identity and
difference, Widder does not overcome relations of opposition. He
never reaches the nomadic distribution of singularities in an
opening of space and time. He goes beyond Hegel but still within
the same “genealogy” of Hegel’s conceptual
difference. Only Univocity includes the immediacy of the
sub-representative. Difference as intensity relates different to
different immediately. There can be no disjoining of relational
differences. DR117, “…difference must immediately
relate the differing terms to one another. Difference.…must
relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by
the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed.”
And since the disjoining of relational forces is such mediation,
it is not the difference of Univocity. Forces of Univocity are
forces of intensity. They are not negative relations. They are
not relations of identity or opposition. Only Univocity is the
positive difference of intensity said immediately in one sense.
Only forces of Univocity are Real, according to Deleuze. Any
relational forces of identity or opposition are still internal to
the identity of the concept and are therefore merely conceptual,
not real, differences.
So, with this “disjoining”, how does Widder determine
the relational forces that are to be disjoined? These relational
differences can only be thought by the four requirements of
representation----by the identity in the concept, opposition in
the predicate, analogy in judgement, and resemblance in
perception. When there is a disjoining (rather than an identity)
of identity and opposition, there is merely a disjunction (rather
than a conjunction) of conceptual differences. It does not
overcome relational oppositions, but merely relates the excess to
the four requirements of Representation. But this does nothing to
escape the identity of the concept (Logic of Sense 170-6). We
still remain within the concept of a world or an individual in
which certain events are excluded. This disjunction never breaks
the form internal to the identity of the concept. What is still
missing in this “genealogy” of conceptual difference is
the sub-representative difference of Univocity. We need to reach
Univocity without concept if we are to escape the identity of the
concept in general. We must reach a sub-representative realm
where LoS177, “divergence is affirmed and disjunction
becomes a positive synthesis…[where] all events, even
contraries, are compatible.” Univocity is affirmation of
disjunction where there can be no exclusions of logical, or
alogical, incompatibility. We must reach forces of positive
intensity beneath relational forces. We must reach a
sub-representative disjunction of real forces, ontologically one.
Widder, recounts Deleuze’s analysis of Nietzsche (Nietzsche
& Philosophy 3), “We will never find the sense of
something…if we do not know the force which appropriates the
thing, which exploits it, which takes possession of it or is
expressed in it. A phenomenon is not an appearance or even an
apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an
existing force.” However, Widder’s understanding of
that analysis misses Nietzsche’s Univocity. That is, forces
of Univocity are not a problem of conceptual relations (i.e.,
force relations of identity and opposition) that may be resolved
by the facts (a resemblance in perception). How could one tell
that forces are in relations of identity or opposition if there
were not a prior concept? How could one tell that forces are in
relations of similarity or oppositional difference if there were
not a prior resemblance? Nietzsche’s Univocal forces are not
appearances of perceptual resemblance whereby one could make
judgements about relations of identity and opposition. There are
no appearances of identities or oppositions. There are no
appearances of relational forces that could be disjoined. Rather,
Univocity finds a prior pre-individual singularity of expressive
sense. Deleuze cannot be understood through a genealogy of
conceptual difference. Deleuze can only be understood through
Spinoza’s Univocity which is omitted in Widder’s
genealogy.
Deleuze-Nietzsche says that Representational thought sees a
correspondence between appearances and essences. Of course,
Widder believes that relational forces escape such atomism.
GD25-6, “Primacy is thereby given to the relations between
forces, not the forces in themselves….Force therefore
differs from the object of perception, in which the atomistic
thing is defined by external predicates. Difference and
relationality gain priority.” Widder believes that if
relational forces gain priority, that that would be somehow
sufficient to escape the invariance of atomism. But relational
forces are still internal to the identity of the concept. They do
not escape invariance. (A Thousand Plateaus 92) “The very
idea of structure is inseparable from invariants, whether atomic
or relational.” Deleuze does not have anything similar to
such relational forces. These relational forces are still
relations internal to the concept. They are still relations of
conceptual identity and difference. And, again, how do we make
judgements about relations of identity and opposition? We make
these judgements through analogy. Identity is identity in the
concept. Opposition is in the predicate. And, we can make these
judgements only through resemblance in perception. Widder’s
relational forces never escape the four requirements of
representational identity.
Structural-relational forces of opposition-negation have nothing
to do with Deleuze’s positive forces of Univocity. As
Deleuze says (DR204-5) in regard to structural forces of negation
‘without positive terms’, ‘eternally
negative’, and ‘presupposing the idea of
opposition’, “Everything points to the
contrary….When difference is read as opposition, it is
deprived of the peculiar thickness in which its positivity is
affirmed.” Structural-relational forces introduce arbitrary
denotation. But arbitrary denotation is not arbitrary enough. It
is merely signifying semiology still subject to the despotism of
the Signifier. Anti-Oedipus 214, Deleuze & Guattari
say that arbitrary designation is merely the “reverse
side” of necessity of signification. We must reach an
asignifying semiotics---a transcendental field of pre-individual
forces---that can produce, not merely arbitrary denotation, but
can be an arbitrary source of denotation, manifestation, and
signification. Then, "arbitrary denotation" no longer
refers to merely numerically distinct substantial objects, but to
really distinct fluid assemblages.
Deleuze continually tells us that he disagrees with Hegel.
However, there seems to be a very prevalent opinion that still
tries to understand Deleuze by way of Hegel. Some say that
Deleuze “misreads” Hegel. When they come upon something
in Deleuze’s text that seems inconsistent with the
traditional interpretation of Hegel, they say “Deleuze does
not understand Hegel”. But from what plane can an absolute
judgement be made as to whether Deleuze is right or wrong about
Hegel? (Empiricism and Subjectivity 106) Deleuze says in regard
to philosophical critique, “People say…things are not
like that. But in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether
things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether
the question which presents things in such a light is good or
not, rigorous or not.” That is philosophical critique. It
has nothing to do with the question ‘Are things like
that?’ or ‘Is Hegel like that?’ If we want to
understand Deleuze, we must try to suspend judgement. If Deleuze
says something that sounds inconsistent, that means it is only
inconsistent from the plane we are on. It means we have not yet
reached Deleuze’s plane of consistency. To give Deleuze a
fair reading, one must try to make consistency out of what
Deleuze is telling us. When we do, we find ourselves on a plane
we could never have imagined before. When we reach Deleuze’s
plane of consistency, we see that it is not a matter of whether
Deleuze is right or wrong about Hegel. When we see Hegel from
Deleuze’s plane of consistency, we are seeing reality in a
whole new way. Then, we can ask the critical question, ‘Is
the plane which puts Hegel in that light a good question, or not?
Is it rigorous, or not? Deleuze is trying to show us that as long
as we remain within conceptual difference (including that of the
Infinite Representation of Hegel), we will never reach the
singular difference of Univocity. Univocity is a very strange
dice game. If we are to play the game, nothing can remain the
same.