Zourabichvili
by
Beth Metcalf
It has always been
my contention that those who neglect Deleuze’s univocity
inevitably maintain the Dogmatic Representational Image of
Thought – the very conceptual identity Deleuze rejects.
I have always been critical of those Deleuzean commentators who
read Deleuze as if he were Hegelian, or as if he were a
structuralist. There are other commentators who may not
make such claims about Deleuze, yet neglect Deleuze’s plane
of univocality and how it is really different from its
actualizations. In this article I want to explore a book by
Francois Zourabichvili, Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event (DPE)
along with The Vocabulary of Deleuze (VD)*. It
seems to me that Zourabichvili has uncommon insight into Deleuze’s
thought. Zourabichvili understands why Deleuze’s
thought has nothing to do with phenomenology as homogeneous
thought of the same (VD 174). He understands why
Deleuze has nothing to do with the negative dialectical relations
of Hegel (DPE 80-1). He understands why Deleuze
rejects the classical structuralism of absence and lack (VD 215).
Furthermore, he understands why we must not leave out
Deleuze’s plane of univocal immanence. In my view,
Zourabichvili enters into a rare encounter with Deleuze’s
text. His writing is a real singular event of univocal
being.
Zourabichvili
tells us (DPE 37) that Deleuze’s philosophy is “…the
extinction of the term “being” and therefore of
ontology.” However, he means that Deleuze’s
philosophy is the perversion of ‘ontology’ taken in any
classical sense. Zourabichvili tells us that, for Deleuze,
“ontology merges with the univocity of being.” For
Deleuze, being is univocal – ontology is univocal. It
has nothing to do with the equivocal ontology of classical
tradition. Ontology is no longer the metaphysics of
presence. Zourabichvili tells us that Deleuze’s
ontology must be approached with two precautions (VD 173). First,
a new transcendental ontology is a pure given on a plane
of immanence. Here, Zourabichvili means that this ‘pure
given’ is not the empirically ‘given’ on a plane
of transcendence. Rather, this pure given is, as
Deleuze tells us, “that by which the given is given” (Difference
& Repetition 222) on a plane of immanence. Secondly,
there must be heterogenesis. That is, there must not
be a traditional homogeneous engendering that merely traces the
transcendental from the empirical. Rather, it is
heterogeneous coupling of disparate ‘intensity’. It
is the ‘becoming’ of disparate intensity that avoids
any maintenance of conceptual identity. The new concept of
intensive becoming allows us to reach real change in nature.
It is not the classical “becoming” that merely varies
sameness. It is becoming-other. This can occur only
on a plane of immanence where Aion is the time of the event.
Zourabichvili
demonstrates a rare understanding of this plane of immanence.
He understands that every term Deleuze uses takes on a new
ontological sense. Just as ‘ontology’ takes on a
new univocal sense, the term ‘sense’ itself takes on a
new univocal sense and must no longer be confused with equivocal
significations. Zourabichvili’s The Vocabulary
of Deleuze explores the new ontological sense of Deleuze’s
terms. Each term opens into external relations of univocal
sense – ontological sense.
Deleuze writes
(DR 300-1) “….the eternal return is indeed the
Similar, repetition in the eternal return is indeed the Identical
– but precisely the resemblance and the identity do not
pre-exist the return of that which returns….It is not the
same which returns, it is not the similar which returns, rather,
the Same is the returning of that which returns, -- in other
words, of the Different; the similar is the returning of that
which returns, -- in other words, of the Dissimilar….For
the Same, or the Identical, has an ontological sense….The
Similar has an ontological sense….” [underlines
added]
Zourabichvili
asks (DPE 39) how the transcendental and ontological may be
compatible. He has the insight that it is a new sense of
‘immanence’ that brings these two concepts together.
It is not ‘immanence’ in the old classical sense of
immanence to….something (like a subject) that already claims
to know what a body can do. That would merely reintroduce
transcendence, as Deleuze and Guattari tell us (What is
Philosophy 44-5). However, if a being is distinguished
by its degree of power, not separated from what it can do, then affect
opens new possibilities where anything may be brought into
communication with anything else no matter how distant. That
is, beings are not distinguished by classification of generic or
specific differences that merely claim to tell us what a body is
in advance. Rather, new couplings of disparate intensity
may, no matter how distant, communicate by way of common affect.
Therefore, the terms ‘affect’ and ‘intensity’
also take on a new ontological sense.
Zourabichvili
understands that Deleuze’s ‘transcendental empiricism’
takes on a new ontological sense. The ‘transcendental’
is no longer the a priori condition of possible experience.
Rather, there is a sub-representative transcendental field of
affective consistencies never thought possible before. This
transcendental field is that by which the empirically given is
given. The ‘event’ is creation of new
singular possibilities of consistency – never a generalizing
universal truth already formed. This shifting ground
precedes new actualized usages that cannot be totalized. The
event is a ‘becoming’ in a new ontological sense.
‘Becoming’ is no longer the homogeneity of causal
connections. Rather, there is a transcendental field of
forces where ‘external relations’ bring heterogeneous
dimensions into communication.
Zourabichvili
says (DPE 40), “….we would be mistaken in thinking that
the variable has taken another value, while the function remained
intact.” This tells me that Zourabichvili understands
that Deleuze’s transcendental field is not on the plane of
constant variability of functions – which taken alone could
only maintain sameness. Rather, he understands that Deleuze
includes a sub-representative transcendental plane of intensive
doubling – an intensive field of inseparable variation.
Zourabichvili demonstrates the uncommon understanding of how
being, as univocal, reaches real difference because it includes a
plane of immanence – a plane of univocality.
Zourabichvili
understands the plane of immanence is not ground for fixed
relations. Nor is it ground for constant relations of
variability. There is only shifting ground for intensive
singularities of disparate difference. This shifting ground
may be actualized into new singular uses, each time. There
can be no fixed ground for metaphor or literal representation.
‘Event’ is the nomadic distribution of before-after as
new singularity, each time. The event is (DPE 40)
“…a becoming in which the before and the after spring
forth at the same time, on either side of a caesura…”
The event is a becoming through nomadic coupling of before-after.
The event is an in-between, never an origin. ‘Belief’
no longer maintains a value or a constant signification. ‘Becoming’
is no longer that which maintains a constant relation of
variability. Zourabichvili understands that Deleuze’s
becoming is becoming-other. ‘Virtual’ now
means that everything cannot be given. The virtual is not
an already actual form of possibility. The virtual may now
be actualized by transversal syntheses across heterogeneous
dimensions.
The Dogmatic
Image of Thought internalizes the relation between thought and
its outside. It depends on the presupposed good will of the
moral subject. Its absolute transcendence depends on the
necessity of an original grounding. However, the immanence
of ethical intensive difference has nothing to do with moral
negative opposition that depends on the model of recognition in
an a priori form of identity, homogeneity, and permanence. Zourabichvili
understands that Delueze questions the classical assumptions.
What if we question the assumption of a necessary ground or
origin? What if beginning does not return to a prior ground
of thought? What if reality is heterogeneous difference?
Then, ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ take on
a new ontological sense. Transcendence is not in opposition
to immanence. Immanence is not immanent to subjectivity.
There is no longer a negative oppositional relation between
internal and external. There are no oppositional relations
at all. The outside is not opposed to an inside. Reality
is divergence. The external is farther than any outside and
closer than any inside. Reality becomes pure immanence.
Truth is no longer an external objective generality. Modern
thought is affirmation and immanence of the event.
Zourabichvili
understands that Deleuze questions the classical assumption of
transcendence. Only shock of encounter brings thought into
an ‘external relation’ with the outside. But
‘outside’ takes on a new ontological sense. Outside
is not an external world in opposition to internal subjectivity.
There is violent encounter with a shifting ground that thought
does not control. Truth is differentiated by multiplicities
of sense. Truth is not a homogeneous relation between
propositions and things. The ground is problematic and
outside all recognition. Problems are not ready-made.
Sense is the problematic shifting ground of evaluation from which
emerges something new. To pose a problem is to encounter a
pure relation with the outside. The sense of a thing
appears only in relation to the forces that take hold of it.
A sign is a force that seizes an affective evaluation of
heterogeneous sense. A problem emerges with violent shock.
It is encounter with an outside farther than an external
homogeneous world of the empirically given. It is encounter
with an inside closer than any subjective internal world. It
is encounter with a plane of immanence.
Relations are
external to their terms. Signs are heterogeneous ‘external
relations’ that affect, or are affected, in ever-changing
fields of forces. The transcendental field of forces
produces multiplicities of sense not traced from the empirical.
Whereas, false problems are negative-oppositional relations of
transcendence, external relations are immanent intensive
relations. I take these external relations to be
Deleuze-Spinoza’s parallelism between content and
expression. Now immanence is the transcendental conditions
of disparate singularity, not universal generality.
Zourabichvili
understands that Deleuze’s horizons of sense are not
universal. In order for there to be common ground for
conversation, there must be a common problematic. He knows
there must be return to a plane where action and reaction
differentiate themselves (DPE 82) and does not presuppose a
negation. Negation is a fragile and temporary consequence,
not an origin (DPE 83). Only on that plane Deleuze calls
‘sub-representative’ can relations be external to their
terms. Only disparate intensive relations are external to
their terms. With the triumph of reactive forces, both
active and reactive forces become fixed into negative
oppositional structure in the dialectic of false problems. But
Zourabichvili knows how important it is to reach non-dialectical
becoming – to reach that which Deleuze calls ‘vice-diction’
(DPE 85). We must reach thought without image, without
prior concept, without prior recognition. There must be no
transcendent image. There is only immanence of the event
that does not claim knowledge in advance.
Zourabichvili
describes Deleuze’s forces and affects as a field of
exteriority – pure heterogeneity in a field of absolute
difference. THE plane of immanence is this virtual
coexistence of all planes – the ‘body without organs’
in intensive states of difference that divides into itself.
Its internal difference differentiates itself. ‘Difference’
is no longer negative relation, but heterogeneous distances (DPE
104). ‘Intensity’ is no longer degrees of
sameness, but degrees of heterogeneity that do not divide without
changing in nature. Pure ‘intensity’ in its
ontological sense does not resemble its actualizations. Heterogeneous
disparate forces of intensity may be enveloped as singular and
actualized into new uses of diversity.
Zourabichvili
describes Deleuze’s empty form of time, ‘Aion’.
Time is out of joint. That is, with the inclusion of the
plane of ‘Aion’, the sense of ‘time’ itself
has new ontological sense. There is perpetual “ungrounding”
of the present (DPE 97). ‘I’ is an Other. Aion’s
‘event’ has no presence. Zourabichvili
understands that Deleuze’s ‘event’ is the
in-between that unites before-after in singularity. Singularity
is not individual. It is pre-individual. ‘Haecceity’
is pre-individual event. ‘Haecceity’ is singular
intensive event of individuation that is prior to individual
form. The ‘event’ straddles several heterogeneous
dimensions of disjunction. It is the intensive coupling of
past-future, before-after. It brings future (not yet and
already here) into correspond with a past (still present and
already past) of becoming. ‘Event’ does not take
place in the time of Chronos. It takes place in the empty
form of time (Aion) as condition of its own chronology,
differently with each repetition. Aion intersects with
Chronos to effectuate the event. ‘Haecceity’ is
not a state of affairs in pre-existing space-time. It is
incorporeal transformation that presides over the genesis of
states of affairs. Haecceity differs in nature from
corporeal mixtures of bodies that actualize an event.
Zourabichvili
describes the plane of univocality. It is the game of the
“infinitely subdivided unique Throw “numerically one
but formally multiple.…” (DPE 98) That is, they
are not numerically distinct things, but differenciations that
are formally distinct. It is non-chronological time of
heterogeneity. It is not the retentions and anticipations
of Chronos. Rather, the plane of Aion is difference of
intensive coupling that, with division, changes in nature.
‘Desiring
machines’ precede subject-object division and condition it.
‘Desire’ is a machinic assemblage of heterogeneous
intensive dimensions of affect. ‘Partial-objects’
are not parts of a whole. ‘Becoming’ is intensive
heterogeneity that, with division, changes in nature. ‘I’
is becoming-other. ‘Disjunction’ becomes
inclusive, not exclusive negation-lack. Univocal being is
all inclusive disjunction of internal difference said always as
ontological singularity. As heterogeneous disparate
difference, being is plural. As degrees of ontological
singularity, being is one. Pluralism = monism. Difference
is univocal. Zourabichvili’s writing demonstrates
that, if we are to reach an understanding of Deleuze, our use of
terms must take on new ontological sense. Our thought must
encounter a plane of univocal immanence.
*Deleuze: A
Philosophy of the Event (DPE), together with The
Vocabulary of Deleuze (VD), by Francois Zourabichvili,
Translate by Kieran Aarons, Edited by Gregg Lambert and Daniel W.
Smith. Edinburgh University Press 2012.