Postulates of Linguistics
by Beth Metcalf
In chapter 4 of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze
and Guattari examine four postulates of traditional
Representational linguistics. They challenge these
postulates of Representation and contrast them with their own
linguistic postulates based on univocity.
I.
“Language Is Informational and Communicational”
The first postulate of Representational
linguistics assumes that language is informational and
communicational. That is, language is postulated as a
system of exchange among subjects about external facts in an
intersubjective reference frame. This assumes that language
is structured in a manner that Represents possibilities of an
objectively shared world.
However in contrast, D&G postulate that
language transmits order-words to compel obedience. (76)
“Language is not life; it gives life orders.” Language
does not Represent information about an external world. There
is no non-linguistic reference. Language does not
communicate something seen. It goes from saying to saying.
Therefore, the “origin” of language is not a direct
discourse of metaphor or symbol in direct correspondence to
something seen, but indirect discourse of hearsay. There
are uses of metaphor (signifying similarity) and metonymy
(subjectifying continguity) only if these uses are surface
effects presupposing indirect discourse.
Therefore, language is the transmission of
order-words that does not represent or communicate information of
something seen. Language is hearsay that goes from saying
to saying. Austin showed that language is not reducible to
the extrinsic relations of indicative or imperative modes. There
are performative intrinsic acts of saying. D&G notice
that this means language can’t be a code for conditions of
possibility. Pragmatics must be the presupposition
intrinsic to language. Pragmatics must no longer be the
speech/language alternative --- no longer either the uses
external to language or as determined by conditions of
possibility. Now, the semantic (language) and syntactic
acts (speech) can no longer be defined extrinsically to each
other, or by speech as individual application of language. Rather,
speech-acts are presupposed by language in use. For
D&G, the pragmatic function of speech-acts now becomes the presupposition
of all dimensions of language. Therefore, there are no
prior relations of individuals or objects. There are only
interactions that make themselves seen in speech-acts. These
interactions are not structural relations (or relations derived
from a structure). Rather speech-acts, as pre-individual,
create interactions between individuals or groups. Direct
discourse cannot reach the performative assemblages of
speech-acts as the indirect discourse of order-words. Order-words
are not merely commands referring to something seen. They
are any statement acting as a “social obligation”.
The order-word is language-function
coextensive with language. The order-words are the relation
of every statement to the presuppositions of speech acts
accomplished in the statement. The statement is the
order-word in redundancy. I take this to mean that every
order-word of a statement (form of expression) and its
presupposed statements in a current language (form of content) is
in a relation of redundancy where the form of content and the
form of expression relate (without identity) as a new form of
content presupposed by further acts of expression.
D&G say (180), “Whatever the
differences between significance [information] and
subjectification [communication]….they have it in common to
crush all polyvocality….and operate by signifying
biunivocalization and subjective binarization.” Language
is not information or communication. Rather, language is
the transmission of order-words. Uses of signifiance and
subjectification presuppose the redundancy of the order-word in a
social field.
Information is individuated and
communication is subjectified only because a prior collective
assemblage actualizes a use. The collective-assemblage is
the redundancy of act and statement. These acts are the set
of incorporeal transformations in a society attributed to bodies
in that society. The incorporeal transformations are not
corporeal actions or passions. Rather, they are the
incorporeal speech-acts expressed of statements and attributed to
bodies. Collective-assemblages are in continuous variation
of these transformations. The instantaneous transformation
of the order-word transforms bodies to which the speech-act is
attributed. I take the redundancy of the order-word, then,
to be intensity of incorporeal transformation that changes the
nature of the statement with each act of redundancy.
There is no individual enunciation. There
are only collective-assemblages of speech acts performed in
redundancy with statements of order-words. The repetitions
of the order-words are the internal redundancy that changes the
nature of the assemblage. Expressive acts are the
incorporeal transformations attributed to corporeal
bodies in a given society. This is consistent with
Deleuze’s univocity. These “acts” are the sense
that inheres in the statement (form of expression) used in a
given society and attributed to bodies (corporeal content) that
can possibly be seen by a given society. Order-words are
the intensive incorporeal transformations of the event. Order-words
are the enunciation of incorporeal transformations. This is
the immediacy of intensive redundancy that changes the nature of
the bodies to which the incorporeal transformation is attributed.
Now, this new pragmatics is not merely a
residue of external situations or contexts in opposition to an
internal form of possibility. Indirect discourse is a
reported statement (attributed to corporeal content) within a
reporting statement (incorporeal expression of transformation).
Language is indirect discourse. Uses of direct discourse
are extracted from prior indirect discourse because significance
and subjectification of an assemblage are distributed in
expression and attributed to bodies. The new pragmatics has
variables of usage internal to enunciation as conditions of
temporary use.
Free indirect discourse is the reported
statement within a reporting statement --- order-word within the
word. Direct discourse is extracted from indirect discourse
only insofar as a collective-assemblage distributes variables
that enter into temporary constant relations for an actualized
use. There are pragmatic variables of use internal to
enunciation coextensive with language. Pragmatics is
presupposed by uses of significance (information) and
subjectification (communication).
(Cinema 1, p 72-4) Free indirect discourse
is “an enunciation taken within a utterance, which itself
depends on another enunciation…..there is not a simple
combination of two fully-constituted subjects of enunciation, one
of which would be reporter, the other reported. It is
rather a case of an assemblage of enunciation, carrying out two
inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which
constitutes a character in the first person, but the other of
which is present at his birth and brings him on to the scene.
There is no mixture or average of two subjects, each belonging to
a system, but a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a
system which is itself heterogeneous….It is no longer
metaphor which is the fundamental act of language, inasmuch as it
‘homogenises’ the system; it is free indirect
discourse, inasmuch as it testifies to a system which is always
heterogeneous, far from equilibrium. Free indirect
discourse, however, is not amenable to linguistic categories,
because these are only concerned with homogeneous or homogenized
systems”.
The Cogito is an empirical subject
reflected in a transcendental subject. It is a split
subject of enunciation. One subject is conscious of its
freedom that the other acts mechanically. But free indirect
discourse goes beyond this split of subjective and objective.
It is no longer homogenized opposition of the form-content
duality where content is nothing other than already formed
substances. Free indirect discourse is the heterogeneous
parallelism of content and expression. It opens the forms
of perception. (See my article ‘Hjelmslev’s
Univocity’.)
The statement is individuated and
enunciation subjectified only when collective-assemblages
determine it to be an actualized use. What are the
speech-acts in redundancy with statements that actualize
temporary uses? These acts are not actions/passions of
bodies. They are incorporeal transformations attributed to
bodies. When linguistics is reduced to constants, it links
the statement to a signifier and enunciation to subjectification.
This puts significance and subjectification into a relation of
constant variability. Then, pragmatics is merely a residue
of external circumstances. But the order-word is a new
pragmatics of language-function. There is a use of
order-words as the event or act of intensive incorporeal
transformation.
II.
“There Is an Abstract-Machine of Language That Does Not
Appeal to Any ‘Extrinsic’ Factor”
As we have seen, the first postulate of
Representation assumes that language is direct discourse with
extrinsic reference. That is, Representation assumes an
internal form of language corresponding to the external structure
of reality. Now, we see that the second postulate of
representation assumes that language is an abstract-machine that
does not appeal to any factor extrinsic to language. Together,
these first two postulates of Representation mean that language
refers to something extrinsic without appeal to any extrinsic
factor. But how can this correspondence happen unless there
is miraculous appeal to some transcendent ground?
D&G counter these first two
Representational postulates with their own postulates of univocal
being. Their first postulate says that being is the
language of indirect discourse without extrinsic reference.
Being is saying. Their second postulate says that
language is an abstract-machine that does appeal to
factors (modal acts) extrinsic and heterogeneous to any supposed
constant of language.
Representational linguistics postulated an
abstract-machine of form-content duality. The form of
language Represented the form of things in one homogeneous
structure. Nothing could appeal to any factor extrinsic to
the structure of the already formed content. However,
D&G counter this postulate by making a distinction between
corporeal modifications of content and incorporeal
transformations of expression. There is now parallelism
between content and expression, each having its own heterogeneous
formalization. Therefore, expression never Represents
content. The two formalizations are heterogeneous (like
Spinoza’s attributes). The incorporeal acts are the
expressed events that inhere in statements and are attributed to
the corporeal bodies of content. The body or state of
things is not a referent of the expression. There is only
intervention of a speech act (intervention of sense).
(86-7) “The warp of the instantaneous
transformation is always inserted into the woof of the continuous
modifications….expressions are inserted into
contents….In short, there are degrees of
deterritorialization that quantify the respective forms and
according to which contents and expression are conjugated, feed
into each other, accelerate each other, or on the contrary become
stabilized and perform a reterritorialization….In short, the
way an expression relates to content is not by uncovering or
representing it. Rather, forms of expression and forms of
content communicate through a conjunction of their quanta of
relative deterritorialization, each intervening and operating in
the other.”
The form of content and the form of
expression are heterogeneous parallel series. A
formalization of content may intermingle with a formalization of
expression for a temporary effect or use. Each such
heterogeneous intermingling is inseparable. And that is
because, with the separating movement of deterritorialization,
the degree of intensity separates and necessarily changes the
nature of the formalization. That is, contrary to the
second postulate of Representational linguistics, the
abstract-machine of language does appeal to a factor
extrinsic to any already formalized assemblage.
It is a mistake to think that content causes
expression. Content presupposes a social machinic
assemblage of bodies. Expression presupposes a
collective-assemblage of enunciation. It is also a mistake
to see the form of expression as a linguistic system or as a deep
structure which would only make the abstract-machine of language
into a synchronic set of constants. D&G say (90-1),
“We will not object that the machine thus conceived is too
abstract. On the contrary, it is not abstract
enough….allowing it to consider linguistic factors in
themselves, independently of nonlinguistic factors, and to treat
those linguistic factors as constants. But if the
abstraction is taken further, one necessarily reaches a level
where the pseudoconstants of language are superseded by variables
of expression internal to enunciation itself; these variables of
expression are then no longer separable from the variables of
content with which they are in perpetual interaction.”
If language does not appeal to any heterogeneous extrinsic
factor, then it will be reduced to a homogeneous constant
relation of variability. In opposition to the second
postulate of Representation, linguistic factors of expression
must not be thought independently of extrinsic and heterogeneous
nonlinguistic factors of content.
D&G envision a new abstract-machine that
is the diagram of an assemblage. (91) “Content is not
a signified nor expression a signifier; rather, both are
variables of the assemblage. We get nowhere until the
pragmatic, but also semantic, syntactical, and phonological
determinations are directly linked to the assemblages of
enunciation upon which they depend…..The abstract machine as
it relates to the diagram of the assemblage is never purely a
matter of language, except for lack of sufficient abstraction.
It is language that depends on the abstract machine, not the
reverse….” The diagram of the assemblage appeals
to an extrinsic speech-act that intervenes as the incorporeal
transformation that is the expressed of the statement attributed
to material content.
III.
“There Are Constants or Universals of Language That
Enable Us to Define It as a Homogeneous System”
Structural invariance (whether atomic or
relational) is the basis for claims of a scientific study of
linguistics. Although linguists recognize that language is
heterogeneous, Representational postulates still tie the abstract
machine to universals or constants in order to carve out a
homogeneous system for scientific study. D&G credit
Labov with seeing that every system is in variation and is not
homogeneous, universal, or constant. There is no reason to
assume that variables are necessarily different points of view on
one theme that keeps the principle of the statement constant.
There is no reason to assume constant relations when we reach the
heterogeneity of form of content and form of expression. D&G
envision a new pragmatics of ‘uses’ immanent in
language. They think of language not defined by invariants,
but by lines of continuous variation that are different within
each language.
(94-5) “….there is a constant
tendency to seek a “reduction”: everything is explained
by the situation….But this is to content oneself with
extracting a pseudoconstant of content, which is no better than
extracting a pseudoconstant of expression. Placing-in-variation
allows us to avoid these dangers, because it builds a continuum
or medium without beginning or end. Continuous variation
should not be confused with the continuous or discontinuous
character of the variable itself….A constant or invariant is
defined less by its permanence and duration than by its function
as a center, if only relative”.
Placing linguistic elements in continuous
variation creates new concepts and new elements. But none
are given in advance and none are final. There is no
principle of invariance that would maintain a prior structure in
a constant relation of variability. There is a new
pragmatic function of invariance which is only a relative and
temporary ‘use’. Each invariant use is a singular
and fragile difference incommensurable with any other. All
language is in immanent continuous variation. Placing all
linguistic elements of both content and expression in variation
is to make language itself stammer with disparate styles or
assemblages of enunciation. There is no prior concept of
how content and expression are to be conjoined. There is a
new form of redundancy (and…and…and). Language
becomes continuous variation of intensive assemblages. Continuous
variation is not an actual determination of constant relation.
Language places variables in a new state of continuous variation
without constant relation. There is a (99) “cutting
edge of deterritorialization of language” for the variation
of variables themselves.
The abstract machine of language is not
universal or general. Its rules vary with its variation,
because it is the dice game of univocity. The abstract
machine is a diagram of continuous variation. The concrete
collective assemblage organizes variables as a function of the
diagram --- which variables will take on a constant relation (a
temporary ‘use’) and which will be more fluid. The
abstract machine and collective assemblage function together as
singular variety in continuous collective variation.
IV.
“Language Can Be Scientifically Studied Only under the
Conditions of a Standard or Major Language”
This postulate of Representational
linguistics assumes there is a Major Language that can bring
linguistic variables under the domination of homogeneous
conditions. Although everyone knows that language is
heterogeneous and variable, linguists have carved out a
homogeneous system of universals and constants in order to study
language as an object of science. But D&G see this
scientific model as one with the political power of a dominant
language. The assumption of homogeneous universals and
constants of language brings with it a presumption of a
metalanguage or common default language which must be used in a
scientific study of linguistics.
But D&G reject the Representational
assumptions. Such a Representational Major Language does
not exist. They tell us (103) “You will never find
a homogeneous system that is not still or already affected by a
regulated, continuous, immanent process of variation.”
The major and minor are not two kinds of language, but two uses
of the same language. Constants do not exist apart from
variables. Constants are drawn from variables in two ways.
There are two treatments of variables --- the “major”
treatment and the “minor” treatment. D&G tell
us (106-7) that the major treatment of language consists of
extracting constants from variables. It gives orders to be
obeyed in an extensive system of judgment. The minor
treatment is a placing in continuous variation. It is the
intensive composition of ordinality. The order-word is the
variable of enunciation that defines either a major or a minor
usage. D&G call the order-words the only
“metalanguage” that accounts for this double treatment.
There is no metalanguage of universals or constants, as the
Representational scientific model assumes. The order-word
is the variable that determines which treatment (major or minor)
is being used.
With the major use, the order-word is a
death sentence. With the first treatment of the order-word,
death is the expressed of the statement. Death is the
incorporeal transformation that is attributed to bodies. It
reterritorializes extensive systems of actions and passions.
It separates and distinguishes bodies. If the incorporeal
transformation is the expressed of order-words attributed to
extensive bodies, then there is an act of transformation where
enunciation fuses with the statement to become a
reterritorialized sentence.
D&G write about this major use (107),
“Now if we consider the first aspect of the order-word, in
other words, death as the expressed of the statement, it clearly
meets the preceding requirements [of incorporeal transformation]:
even though death essentially concerns bodies, is attributed to
bodies, its immediacy, its instantaneousness, lends it the
authentic character of an incorporeal transformation. What
precedes and follows it may be an extensive system…..it is
neither action nor passion, but a pure act, a pure transformation
that enunciation fuses with the statement, the sentence.”
With the minor use, the order-word may be a
warning to flee. Then, there is still an incorporeal
transformation attributed to bodies, but the variables are in a
state of continuous variation --- a pragmatic
placing-in-variation. There is an intensive transformation
--- an intensive change in the nature of the assemblage. The
plane of consistency has an assemblage that becomes absolutely
deterritorialized drawing the two forms of content and expression
together in conjunction of a new plane of consistency with new
cutting edges of deterritorialization --- a new abstract machine
--- a diagram of a new assemblage.
D&G say of this minor use (108-9),
“If we consider the other aspect of the order-word, flight
rather than death, it appears that variables are in a new state,
that of continuous variation. An incorporeal transformation
is still attributed to bodies, but it is now a passage to the
limit….In continuous variation the relevant distinction is
no longer between form of expression and a form of content but
between two inseparable planes in reciprocal presupposition.
The relativity of the distinction between them is now fully
realized on the plane of consistency, where the assemblage is
swept up by a now absolute deterritorializaiton. Absolute,
however, does not mean undifferentiated….The relation of
presupposition between variables of content and expression no
long requires two forms: the placing-in-variation of the
variables instead draws the two forms together and effects the
conjunction of cutting edges of deterritorialization on both
sides; this occurs on the plane of a single liberated
matter….”
Therefore, just as D&G postulate (265-6)
“two planes, or two ways of conceptualizing [one]
plane”; there are two languages that are really just two
treatments of one language. These two planes with their
treatments are not on the horizontal axis of content and
expression, but the vertical axis of
territorialization-reterritorialization or deterritorialization
(88). There is (281-2) the plane of organization and
development (the transcendent plane of disparate and
incommensurable uses of major language) and there is the plane of
immanence and univocality (the plane of consistency of minor
language). “It is a jumping from one plane to the
other, or from the relative thresholds [of territorialization or
reterritorialization] to the absolute thresholds [of
deterritorialization] that coexists with them….” We
can see that the Representational postulates of a Dominant Major
Language have no relation to the postulates of univocal
being-saying where the two treatments of language intersect.
The old linguistics of Representational pragmatism has no
relation to the new linguistics of univocal being-saying with
its new pragmatic uses. The intersection of the two
treatments – two types of multiplicities – is a
relation that opens the forms and allows no pseudoconstants to
subsist.
The Representational postulates would lead
us to assume that a Major Language can be used for scientific
study of linguistics. But this is to merely bring minor
dialects under the overcoding domination of the homogeneous
conditions of the Major Language. A dominant use of one
standard Major Language is the death sentence of closed
Representation. But D&G tell us that the question is
not how to flee death, or flee a major language. Rather, it
is how to make both major language of death and minor language of
flight creative. Minor language exists only in relation to
a major language that it makes minor by lines of flight in
intensive continuous variation. It is not a question of
reterritorializing a major language. Rather, becoming minor
is deterritorializing a major language. If we try to use
the Representational postulates of Major Language to reach the
univocal being-saying, we merely block the lines of flight.